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Russian Greatpowerness:  
Foreign policy, the Two Chechen Wars and International Organisations  
  
Abstract 
This dissertation addresses the difficulties encountered in international relations between 
Russia and the West, specifically Europe, in spite of their cultural and geographical proximity 
and the expectation that Russia and Europe would share values and interests following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The problem is addressed through focussing on a particular 
aspect of Russia’s national and state identity – ‘greatpowerness’. Greatpowerness - the self-
perception that Russia always has been and still is a great power - is a significant  part of 
Russia’s self identity.  
The effects of Russian greatpowerness are examined through investigation of Russia’s 
relations with three European international organisations – the Council of Europe, the 
European Union, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe – from the 
early 1990s through to 2004. The particular issue through which these relationships are 
explored are the two Chechen wars of 1994-1996 and 2000-2004. Russian actions in 
Chechnya provoked frequent criticisms from the West, but were seen in Russia in the 1990s 
as an internal matter, and as part of the international war on terrorism in the 2000s. In both 
cases, they reflected in part Russia’s great power aspirations. There were particular sets of 
expectations from the Russian side based on its self-perception in each case. It is argued in 
the dissertation that this plays a part in understanding the difficulties and apparent 
inconsistencies encountered in Russia’s relationship with the West. 
The dissertation contributes to explaining inconsistencies in Russian foreign policy 
behaviour towards the West which are not adequately accounted for by existing empirical and 
theoretical approaches. It begins with a discussion of definitions of being a Great Power and 
understandings of greatpowerness as an issue of self-perception in state identity. It then looks 
at Russian understandings of international relations, different Russian foreign policy schools 
and a series of factors which are persistent in Russian greatpowerness: sovereignty, 
ressentiment, isolationism, expansionism, imperialism, multilaterism and multipolarity.  Next 
it sets the course of the two Chechen wars in the context of Russian political and international 
development.  
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The main empirical section of the dissertation is taken up by the three case studies of the 
Council of Europe, the European Union, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, noting similarities and distinctions in each case as to how Russia experienced 
interaction with the three different organisations. The Council of Europe has adopted a rather 
pragmatic approach in its cooperation with Russia and hence, in spite of some difficulties, the 
relationship has been the best of the three. This cooperation has challenged Russian 
greatpowerness the least and expectations came closest to outcomes. Cooperation with the 
EU has been of a different nature since Russia is not a member state. Here the relationship 
has had good and bad periods, which have very much depended on how Russia has felt about 
its level of expectations met by outcomes. The Russian relationship to the OSCE was also full 
of ups and downs always with strongly power political reasons. Russian expectations were 
highest in regards to the OSCE. However it challenged Russian greatpowerness most and 
caused biggest disappointment.  
In conclusion, it is shown that Russian self-perception of greatpowerness and the 
aspiration to have its status as a Great Power recognised internationally provide one part of 
the explanation of the apparent inconsistencies while showing a form of consistency in 
Russia’s relationship with the West.  
 
  
 
 
v 
Venäjän suurvaltius: Ulkopolitiikka, kaksi Tshetshenian sotaa ja kansainväliset 
organisaatiot  
Abstrakti 
Tutkimus käsittelee kansainvälisen politiikan ongelmia Venäjän ja lännen suhteissa, 
erityisesti läntisen Euroopan ja Venäjän. Ongelmia näissä suhteissa on paljon, vaikka 
kulttuurisesti ja maantieteellisesti Venäjä ja läntinen Eurooppa ovat toisiaan lähellä. 
Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen oletusarvona oli, että Venäjä tulisi jakamaan länsimaiset 
arvot ja intressit, näin ei kuitenkaan ole käynyt. 
Tässä tutkielmassa aihetta lähestytään Venäjän kansallisen ja valtiollisen identiteetin – 
suurvaltaisuuden – kautta. Suurvaltius on Venäjän oma näkemys itsestään ja keskeinen osa 
sen identiteettiä. Venäjä pitää itseään suurvaltana.  
Tarkastelun kohteena on Venäjän suhde kolmeen keskeiseen eurooppalaiseen 
kansainväliseen organisaatioon: Euroopan neuvostoon, Euroopan unioniin ja Euroopan 
turvallisuus - ja yhteistyöjärjestöön. Tutkielmassa valotetaan Venäjän suurvaltiuden 
näyttäytymistä käytännössä 1994-2004 välisenä aikana. Lähemmän tarkastelun kohteeksi on 
valittu Tshetshenian sotien ajankohdat 1994-1996 ja 2000-2004. Venäjän toimia 
Tshetshenian sodissa kritisoitiin paljon lännessä. Ensimmäinen sota koettiin suurimmaksi 
osaksi Venäjän sisäiseksi asiaksi, ja toinen sota osaksi kansainvälistä terrorismin vastaista 
sotaa. Kummankin sodan kohdalla Venäjän suurvaltaidentiteetti korostui vahvasti. Suhteessa 
länteen Venäjällä oli omat arviot ja odotukset, jotka perustuivat sen omakuvaan Venäjästä 
suurvaltana. Tämä osaltaan selittää vaikeuksia ja ailahtelua Venäjän ja lännen suhteissa.   
Tutkimus avaa ja selittää Venäjän ulkopoliittisen käyttäytymisen 
epäjohdonmukaisuuksia suhteessa länsimaihin. Näihin epäjohdonmukaisuuksiin ei ole 
perehdytty tarpeeksi tähänastisessa empiirisessä ja teoreettisessa tutkimuksessa. 
Aluksi tutkimuksessa käydään läpi eri suurvallan määritelmiä ja miten suurvaltius on osa 
valtiollista omakuvaa. Sen jälkeen siirrytään tarkastelemaan Venäjän tapaa lähestyä 
kansainvälisiä suhteita, eri venäläisiä ulkopoliittisia koulukuntia ja käsitteitä, joilla on 
jatkuvuutta Venäjän ulkopolitiikassa ja jotka erityisesti ovat osa Venäjän suurvaltiutta: 
suvereenisuus, ressentiment, eristäytyminen, laajentuminen, imperialismi, multilateraalisuus 
ja multipolaarisuus. Tämän jälkeen käsitellään Tshetshenian sotia osana Venäjän sisäistä ja 
kansainvälistä kehitystä.  
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Tutkimuksen pääpaino on empiirisessä osassa. Luvuissa käsitellään miten Venäjä on 
mieltänyt Euroopan neuvoston, Euroopan unionin ja Euroopan turvallisuus- ja 
yhteistyöjärjestön. Jokaisen organisaation kohdalla löytyy yhtäläisyyksiä ja erilaisuuksia. 
Euroopan neuvostolla on ollut hyvin pragmaattinen lähestymistapa ja vaikeuksista huolimatta 
se on organisaatio, johon Venäjällä on ollut paras suhde. Euroopan neuvoston kohdalla 
Venäjän suurvaltius, Venäjän näkökulmasta katsottuna, on ollut vähiten uhattuna ja tulokset 
ovat olleet lähimpänä odotuksia. Sen sijaan Venäjän suhde Euroopan unioniin on ollut 
ongelmallinen. Luonnollinen syy tähän on, ettei Venäjä ole Euroopan unionin jäsen. 
Suhteessa on ollut hyviä ja huonoja aikoja. Paljon on ollut kiinni siitä, miten yhteistyö on 
vastannut Venäjän omia odotuksia. Vaikka Venäjä on Euroopan turvallisuus- ja 
yhteistyöjärjestön jäsen, mahtuu tähänkin suhteeseen paljon vastakkainasettelua länsimaisten 
jäsenten kanssa. Voimapolitiikka on heijastunut tähän yhteistyöhön enemmän kuin Euroopan 
neuvoston tai Euroopan unionin suhteessa tehtyyn yhteistyöhön. Venäjä panosti Euroopan 
turvallisuus- ja yhteistyöjärjestöön eniten 1990-luvun alussa ja pettyi pahiten. Järjestö haastoi 
eniten Venäjän suurvaltaisuuden.  
Yhteenvetona tutkimus osoitti, että Venäjän omakuvan, suurvaltaisuuden, ja länsimaiden 
Venäjäkuvan välillä on iso kuilu. Sitä ei ole osattu kuroa umpeen. Venäjän suurvaltaisuus luo 
Venäjän osalta raamit kansainväliselle yhteistyölle. Suurvaltaisuuden toteuttamisesta 
kumpuavat epäjohdonmukaisuudet Venäjän ja lännen suhteissa. Näin epäjohdonmukaisuudet 
näyttäytyvätkin johdonmukaisena politiikkana.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Russia’s state identity is based on the self-image of Russia as a Great Power. This has 
become widely accepted as an important factor in Russian international politics, but very few 
studies of Russian foreign policy have explored this aspect of identity in any depth. The aim 
of this study is to open up and investigate the Russian foreign policy discourse of 
greatpowerness and explore what kind of impacts it has on Russia-West relations. The 
hypothesis is that Russian assumptions about cooperation owe something to the Russian self-
perception as a Great Power and the identity of greatpowerness.  
Russian Great Power identity has developed over centuries of interaction with other great 
European powers, and more recently with the United States, and has played an important role 
in Russia’s international relations. Russian greatpowerness has evolved through different 
state formats and times. The assumption after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 was that 
the Russian Federation would now, finally when the ideological barrier was lifted, move 
closer to the Western countries. Russia’s democratic choice in 1992 was seen as a good basis 
for the functioning of a new era of cooperation. Such expectations were particularly strong 
with regard to Europe, with which Russia shared a cultural heritage and where common 
values had already been emphasised in Mikhail Gorbachev’s concept of the ‘Common 
European Home’. However, this assumption that an age of harmony and of Russia’s 
integration with Europe would emerge naturally proved to be too hasty. Why is it that Russia 
and the West, especially Europe, despite their cultural proximity and numerous shared 
interests, continue to have a very complicated relationship, and why is cooperation still 
difficult?  
This study will explore how Russian great power identity has expressed itself in Russian 
interactions in several European based international organisations. The framework of 
international organisations provides a valuable testing ground since there have been clear 
signs of Russian willingness to cooperate and interact in multilateral settings. Both sides had 
high expectations as cooperation favoured the idea of success. Through the case-studies, 
analysing how the two Chechen wars effected multilateral cooperation, the dissertation hopes 
to find some of the answers to the roots of the problems existing in Russia-West relations.  
From this examination we will see what factors guide Russian greatpowerness and what kind 
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of impact this self-perception had on foreign policy concepts, playing an influential role when 
a domestic political matter is dealt with within an international organizations framework.  
 
1.1 Approaches 
The dissertation ties Russian foreign policy making since 1991 into mainstream 
international relations theory. The traditional ‘area studies’ approach to Russia has, in the 
past, tended to stay apart from the international relations theory approaches. However three 
of the international relations schools of thought – liberalism, realism, and constructivism (or 
social constructivism) – which are discussed in more detail in chapter two, can be identified 
within the area studies domain. Notably, Christer Pursiainen’s groundbreaking work, which 
sought to bridge the gap between Soviet/Russian studies and international relations theory, 
identified these as the schools which had most to offer to the study of contemporary Russian 
foreign policy.1 
Liberalism has played less of a role in understandings of Russian foreign policy, due to 
the Russian Federation’s international economic ties falling short of high levels of integration 
in the past. This trend started to change with Russian economic recovery in early 2000. One 
popular subject from which to approach Russian foreign policy has been energy geo-
economics. However it does not fit comfortably within a liberal framework.  The liberal 
framework provides a relatively straightforward explanation in cases where economic 
interests, interdependence and institutions play a decisive role. The assumption that these 
three economic factors guide Russian foreign policy still waits to be fulfilled and does not yet 
help to explain Russian foreign policy making.2  
Approaches which are related to the two other schools of thought focussed on here – 
realism and constructivism - on the other hand, can be found even in the study of the Soviet 
Union. During the Cold War there were two competing approaches in western studies of 
Soviet foreign policy - one supposed that Marxist-Leninist ideology was what guided policy 
and therefore Soviet foreign policy was something different and peculiar, while the other 
approached the Soviet Union as a ‘normal state’ promoting national interests and security.3  
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
1 Christer Pursiainen,  Russian foreign policy and international relations theory, London: Ashgate, 2000 
2 See for example Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman ,Why Moscow Says No - A Question of Russian 
Interests, Not Psychology, Foreign Affairs, vol.90 pp.122-138 ,2011 
3 For comprehensive accounts on international relations theory on Russian studies, in addition to Pursiainen see  
Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International relations, London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988. 
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The ‘normal state’ approach clearly has a close correspondence to today’s realist school 
in international relations. Realism has been and perhaps still is dominant in broader public 
understandings of Russia, but still falls short of providing complete explanations. It is often 
attractive to depict the power clashes between Russia and the West purely as zero-sum 
games. The world becomes simple, but such a characterisation does not seem to provide 
explanations of why sometimes Russia is very willing to cooperate with the West, and why 
sometimes material gains come second to gains in prestige. 
The approach focusing on the state of mind and subjective aims of the makers of Soviet 
foreign policy has more in common with constructivism. Constructivism places human 
awareness or consciousness above the materialist interests which constitute the main analytic 
driver in the competing realist school of thought. And yet social constructivists in general, 
and in today’s studies of Russian foreign policy in particular, assign little role to ideology. 
Historical, cultural, and personal factors are instead emphasized.  For Russia ideology has 
always been an important concept whether it has been discussed in the framework of Russian 
ideas, identity or communism. So in this sense we are building on Constructivism, which 
comes closest to the core of this study. Explanations anchored in persistent factors and 
identity can help to explain fluctuations in Russian foreign policy directions and in fact turn 
inconsistencies into consistencies. Greatpowerness as an identity, an important element of 
Russian self-perception, however, has not been emphasised in constructivism, not at least 
from the Russian point of view.    
 
1.2 Russia and Greatpowerness  
In this work, by arguing that Russia’s state identity, informed by the self-perception of 
greatpowerness, is in effect an ideology, the conceptual framework of constructivism is 
extended.  The key to this argument lies in examining the role Russian greatpowerness plays 
in the way Russians imagine themselves. The self-image of Russia as a Great Power then 
exerts a decisive influence on how Russians interpret a particular situation they find 
themselves in and how interests are defined. This follows Alexander Wendt’s constructivist 
line of how the ideas of intersubjectively constructed identities form the basis of interests.4  
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
4Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 
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So, while it is argued in chapter two that elements of realism and liberalism are essential 
to a full understanding of Russian foreign policy in general, the focus on greatpowerness and 
its role in self-perceptions locates this study more closely to the constructivist school of 
international relations. In Western foreign policy studies devoted to Russia, the social 
constructivist (constructivism) school has been gaining ground on realism as the main 
theoretical approach among academics. In contrast, the realist approach is still applied more 
often in international relations generally, while in Russia itself realism remains the dominant 
school of thought.5  
There is plenty to suggest that Russian political elites themselves embrace the notion of 
Russian greatpowerness, but more significantly it is an attitude widely shared among the 
population. As a result, the domestic political need of Russia’s leaders to stay in tune with 
popular opinion infringes into foreign policy decision making.6 While Alexander Wendt 
stressed the importance of external factors, many Russian foreign policy scholars from the 
constructivist school have explored the effect of the domestic arena. Iver Neumann has 
analysed Russian national identity through ‘otherness’ and why the Russian quest for 
greatpowerness is so hard to accept in the West.7 Andrei Tsygankov has examined domestic 
identity coalitions and the concept of honour effecting Russian foreign relations.8 In Ted 
Hopf’s study state identity was stressed. Hopf was looking for an answer to the question of 
how domestic identity formation contributes to defining national interests.9 Anne Clunan’s 
study on Russian foreign and security policy drew inspiration from aspirational 
constructivism that incorporates social psychology and historical legacies’ role in shaping 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
5 Tatiana Romanova, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Today’s Russia’, Russia in Global Affairs, October 2012 and 
Tatiana Romanova and Elena Pavlova, ‘Towards neoclassical realist thinking in Russia?’ in Asle Toje and 
Barbara Kunz (eds), Neo-Classical realism in Europe: Bringing Power Back In, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2012. 
6 William Zimmerman, The Russian People and Foreign Policy – Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993-
2000, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002. 
7 Iver Neumann, Russia and the idea of Europe: A study in identity and international relations, London: 
Routledge, 1996 and ‘Russia as a Great Power 1815-2007’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 
Nr.11, 2008. 
8 Andrei Tsygankov,  Russian Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, second edition, 
London: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2010; Andrei Tsygankov,  Russia and the West from Alexander to 
Putin: Honor in international relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012; Andrei Tsygankov, ‘If 
not by tanks, then by banks? The Role of Soft Power in Putin’s Foreign Policy’, Europe-Asia Studies, 58, 7, 
November 2006. 
9 Ted Hopf,  Social Construction of International Politics; Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1955 and 
1999, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002 
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national identities and interests.10 And Valentina Feklyunina has studied extensively the 
Russian battle for perceptions and constructing an international image and how both 
perceptions and image effect Russian foreign relations.11  
The English School of international relations is not explored in greater depth here, but 
the notion of greatpowerness uncovered in this dissertation has something to offer to its 
proponents. The notion that Russia adheres to a ‘pluralist’ variant of international society at a 
time when western countries incline to a more ‘solidarist’ variant has been explained in part 
by Russia’s insistence on the distinction between Great and non-Great Powers.12 The finding 
that greatpowerness has played a role in Russia’s dealings with international organisations 
would seem to support this contention, but such further consequences of greatpowerness are 
beyond the scope of the thesis. Other schools of international relations which focus on 
institutional and social divisions within society have much to offer for the analysis of Russian 
foreign policy but are not discussed here, firstly because they have not yet been widely 
applied in the Russian context, and secondly because an important aspect of this dissertation 
is its finding of the universalism of greatpowerness in Russia. 
This study deploys the constructivist approach to examine one particular feature of 
Russian self-identity – Greatpowerness – which is now widely held to be an important part of 
identity which has implications for foreign policy. As David McDonald has put it: 
‘…..whatever the ambiguities or contradictions in the rhetoric of Russian absolutism and 
statehood, Russians from virtually all sections of society and on either side of the state-
society divide agree that Russia is “fated to be a Great Power”’.13 
In greatpowerness the external, in the spirit of Wendt’s ideas, is very much activated by 
internal factors, as the case studies show. Great Power identity can differ from or be the same 
from one Great Power to another, usually sharing many features but also varying according to 
national specificities. In this thesis, greatpowerness is analysed as a state ideology, and a part 
of the self-perception of all Russian political elites and most Russian citizens, that can cause 
contradiction and conflict with interest-based partners, such as the West is for Russia. 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
10 Anne Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence; Aspirations, Identity and Security Interests, 
New York: John Hopkins University Press, 2009 
11 Valentina Feklyunina, ‘Battle for Perceptions: Projecting Russia in the West’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol.60, 
issue 4, 2008, 605-629; Valentina Feklyunina, ‘Russian foreign Policy towards Poland: Seeking reconciliation? 
A Social constructivist analysis’, International Politics, Vol.49, issue 4, 2012, 434-448 
12 Christopher Browning, ‘Reassessing Putin’s Project: Reflections on IR Theory and the West’, Problems of 
Post-Communism, vol.55, no.5, September/October 2008, 3-13, p.7. 
13 David McDonald, ‘Domestic Conjunctures, The Russian State, and the World Outside, 1700-2006’, in Robert 
Legvold (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007, 145-203, p.163 
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Greatpowerness in itself is a complex term and has not been opened up properly. What is 
meant by Great Power identity and how it seems to combine elements of the three seleceted 
IR schools of thought are questions dealt with in chapter two. 
In Russian contexts the term greatpowerness comes from the words ‘velikoderzhavnost’ 
or just ‘derzhavnost’. Mark Urnov has defined it in Russia’s case as ‘The vision of Russia not 
as one among a community of equals but more as an independent player on the global stage 
that incites fear and therefore respect and is in a position to impose its will on others.’14 The 
concept is old and plays a significant role in Russia’s past and present as well as future 
foreign policy. Bobo Lo has observed: ‘If we interpret ideology more generously – as a 
“predispositional influence” on policy thinking and decision-making – then there is no reason 
to exclude the re-emergence of Russia’s sense of “greatpowerness” (derzhavnost) as one of 
the key strands of the post-Soviet foreign policy debate.’15 In Lo’s view Russian 
greatpowerness is based on a belief in Russia’s global status and gives Russia ipso facto a 
‘right of involvement’ in any matter Russia sees as important for its own interests.16 Lo’s 
suggestion that greatpowerness is an ideological belief of sorts is rarely uttered by 
constructivists, but is pursued further in this dissertation. Chapter three continues by 
exploring Russian understandings of greatpowerness. 
 
1.3 The Shadow of Chechnya 
While Greatpowerness can be seen in operation in many spheres of Russian foreign and 
domestic policy, its role has been accentuated in the context of perhaps the most important 
challenges that the young Russian state has faced and which provide the focus for this study – 
the two Chechen wars. “Chechnya was the most dangerous manifestation of this domestic 
Other, the empowerment of periphery in general was the central threat to the maintenance of 
both the Russian Self and Russia itself.”17 
 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
14 Mark Urnov, ‘Defeating the authoritarian majority: an uneasy agenda’, in Vladislav Inozemtsev and Piotr 
Dutkiewicz,  Democracy versus Modernization: A Dilemma for Russia and for the World, London: Routledge, 
2013, 65-76, p.70 
15 Bobo Lo, Russian Foreign policy Making in the Post-Soviet Era – Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking,  
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave 2002, p.53 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics; Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1955 and 
1999, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, p.277 
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A war situation can reveal both the weaknesses and strengths of a state in domestic and 
international politics. Russia faced a challenge from an internal entity; in the first war it was 
more of a challenge to the survival of the state in concrete terms and in the second war it was 
more a matter of prestige, image and power relations. In the right circumstances, a domestic 
challenge to a Great Power’s statehood is the most sensitive of all and will reveal a true state 
identity to the international community.  
The wars in Chechnya challenged Russian self-perceptions of greatpowerness in the 
international framework as well as domestically. The West, by criticising and wanting to 
exercise its own influence inside Russia, challenged the Russian state identity as one of a 
Great Power. Chechnya revealed the borders that Russia was not ready to cross in Russia-
West cooperation. As Thomas de Waal wrote in 2004: ‘The Chechen conflict is a classic case 
of the law of unintended consequences.’18  
Chechnya became Russia’s Achilles’ heel not only in president Yeltsin’s Russia but also 
in Russia under presidents Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. The ‘law of unintended 
consequences’ still haunts the Russian state’s leadership in its efforts to lift Russia’s status on 
the international scene and also in its aim to create domestic order. The Guardian 
correspondent Andrew Osborn illustrated the role of Chechnya in the Russian leadership’s 
thought well: ‘If there is one thing guaranteed to make Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 
elf-like face drop it is any mention of Chechnya.’19 
 
1.4 The Council of Europe, the European Union, and the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 
Great Power identity can be examined concretely in Russia’s interactions with the 
international organisations - the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe – over a domestic matter like Chechnya. 
The focus of this study does not allow for an exploration of every aspect of greatpowerness in 
International Relations – most significantly, by excluding the USA, which in some respects 
provides the most obvious point of reference. During the Cold War, the greatpowerness of the 
Soviet Union was defined by its rivalry with the USA. Even since the Cold War, negative 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
18 Thomas De Waal, ‘A War of Unintended Consequences’, Index on Censorship, October, Vol.33., No.4, 2004, 
54-63, p.56 
19 Andrew Osborn, ‘The EU’s Chechnya Challenge’, The Guardian, 7 November 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/nov/07/worlddispatch.russia/print, accessed 06.11.2012 
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Russian discourses about the West tend to forefront the USA, which according to some 
authors has taken the place of the ‘Other’ in Russian national identity.20 However, this is 
precisely what makes Russia’s relationship with Europe more intriguing and, it is argued 
here, more significant in terms of its Great Power status. The USA has stood either as 
something which Russia can aspire to or imitate, for example in its level of economic 
development, as was largely the case at the beginning of the 1990s; or it is something hostile 
which is, in the tradition of the Cold War, seeking to undermine Russia’s place in the world 
through opposing it in forums like the UN, through NATO action in Serbia, or through 
supporting anti-Russian forces in Russia’s near abroad. Europe, by contrast, is a place where 
Russia can not only aspire to be on equal terms with the leading members, but where it can 
also offer cooperation in a number of spheres which can be of mutual benefit to both.  
Historically, West Europeans have subscribed to an unflattering image of Russia as a 
non-European barbarian country. It has been described as more exotic and remote than 
Africa.21 The image owed a great deal to the writings of European travellers in Russia. 
During the late 18th and early 19th centuries many aristocrats in Europe saw Russia as ‘the 
promised land’ for the nobility after the French Revolution (rather as, in the aftermath of the 
Socialist revolution in Russia, many socialists from the West looked to the Soviet Union as 
the promised land of equality). Both of these examples highlights also what happens when 
expectations are high and reality does not match expectations. Many who went to Russia 
returned disappointed and holding the view that the differences between European history, 
the European way of life and European aspirations on the one hand and the barbarian Russian 
country on the other, were so huge that no positive developments could be expected from the 
latter.22 This feature of western views 200 years ago, no doubt very much coloured by the 
persons writing and their personal experiences, has been influential in shaping the image of 
Russia in Europe even in later times.  
The volume of writing on the Russia-Europe relationship tells its own story of how close 
Russia and Europe are to each other, at the same time as revealing the complications of this 
relationship. After the fall of the Soviet Union, when one ideological barrier disappeared, 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
20 Peterson, Bo, ‘Mirror, mirror…Myth-making, self-images and views of the US ‘Other’ in contemporary 
Russia’ in Taras, Ray (ed.) Russia’s Identity in International Relations: Images, perceptions, misperceptions 
London: Routledge, 2013, 11-23. 
 
21 Helene Carrere d’Encausse: ‘Russia and Europe in a historical Context’, in Tom Casier and Katlijn Malfliet 
(eds), Is Russia a European Power? The position of Russia in a new Europe, Leuven: Leuven University Press 
1998, p.11. 
22 Ibid. p.12. 
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Russia’s first reaction was that naturally it would ‘return’ to its rightful place in European 
Great Power politics (referring to the status lost in 1917). Expectations were high. 
Russia immediately  began to pursue its place in European politics through engagement 
with the major international organisations. Russia applied for membership in the Council of 
Europe in May 1992, only 5 months after the fall of the Soviet Union. President Yeltsin even 
went so far as several times hinting to the USA that Russia could someday join NATO.23 
Towards the European Union there was little interest in membership from Yeltsin’s side 
initially. In 1994 the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the EU was 
signed in Corfu, stressing cooperation but not integration. However in early 1997 Yeltsin 
went so far as to say that Russians were prepared to join the European Union.24 The one 
European organisation Russia did not need to seek membership in was the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, where it inherited the Soviet Union’s place. Russia 
hoped to turn the OSCE into a pan-European security organisation.  
The early optimism with regard to all three organisations soon gave way to bleaker 
assessments, as Russia found that none of them were quite as accommodating to Russian 
aspirations as anticipated. The difficulties were interpreted by Russians as disrespect for 
Russian greatpowerness by the states in the organisations. The case studies will show that 
when Russian greatpowerness was not threatened by cooperation, it was easier to find a 
common approach. 
  
1.5 Research Setting 
The Chechen wars are used as a case study through which Russia’s Great Power identity 
is examined in relation to - to use the common constructivist notion – ‘the other’ – in this 
case, the West, especially Europe.  The West is the most common other in Russian foreign 
and security policy studies. Its relevance has not gone away. Western-centrism has retained 
its dominant position in Moscow’s world-view, either as a friend or a foe.  
Before the Second World War, the West consisted mostly of Europe and since the end of 
the Second World War the United States has occupied the dominant principal point of 
reference. What should be kept in mind is that Western-centrism does not mean at all a pro-
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
23 Timothy J Colton, Yeltsin: A Political Life, New York: Basic Books, 2008, p.269 
24 Associated Press, 1997, Yeltsin says Russia interested in the EU, 23 March, The spokesman-review, 
http//:www. spokesman.com/stories/1997/mar/23/yeltsin-says-russia-interested-in-eu/, accessed 07.11.2012 
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Western policy.25 It is still the single most important ‘other’ through which to mirror Russian 
Great Power identity. During the Cold War Russians defined the West largely in terms of the 
capitalist opponent of the communist East. Since the end of the Cold War the West has been 
seen more in institutional terms, as embodied in a variety of international organisations. The 
West is identified especially as those organisations which are either exclusive to the West in 
terms of membership (NATO, the EU) or are dominated by either the USA or EU members. 
Either way, there appears an element of competition between Russia and organisations 
focussed on the West. 
The fact that Russia should devote so much effort to its relationship with the more 
Europe-centred organisations reflects the European aspirations of Russianness, but is also an 
expression of Russian greatpowerness. While Russian international relations operate at a 
number of levels, the argument of this work is that it is in the multilateral context that 
Greatpowerness has the clearest influence. Multilateralism is not the framework within which 
Russia is often seen as a keen player or as the one that would best serve the interests of 
Russia in its claim to greatpowerness. But as Robert Legvold has said ‘Multilateralism, as the 
Russians fancy it, complements their notion of how the international setting, if rightly 
organised, can aid Russia’s return as a great power, and in the meantime minimize the risk 
and pain of standing in the shadows of others’.26 
Within the theoretical framework of constructivism and the context of the two Chechen 
wars, a case study approach is adopted. In case study methods there are several ways to 
proceed: idiographic case studies, hypothesis generating case studies, hypothesis testing cases 
and plausibility probes.27 Here the idiographic case study method and plausibility probes are 
applied. The idiographic case studies aim to describe, explain, interpret and/or understand a 
single case as an end itself – here how the Russians argued and cooperated on the matter of 
the wars in Chechnya with the international organisation mentioned above. The plausibility 
probe approach allows the researcher to sharpen a hypothesis or theory, to refine the 
operationalization or measurement of key variables, or to explore the suitability of a 
particular case as a vehicle for testing a theory.28 In this study the plausibility probe is 
Russian greatpowerness. 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
25 Lo, 2002, p.8 
26 Robert Legvold, The role of multilateralism on Russian foreign Policy, in Elana Wilson-Rowe and Stina 
Torjesen (eds), The Multilateral Dimension in Russian foreign policy, London: Routledge, 2009, 21-45, p.21 
27 Jack S Levy, , ‘Case Studies: Types, Design and Logics of Inference’, Conflict Management and Peace 
Science, Vol.25, No.1, 2008, 1-18, p.3 
28 Levy, 2008, p.6 
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What constitutes a Great Power is constructed through three articles - Jack S Levy, 
‘Alliance Formation and War behaviour – An analysis of the Great Powers 1495-1975’, 
Joseph S Nye Jr., ‘Changing Nature of World Power’ and Iver Neumann, ‘Russia as a Great 
Power 1815-2007’. The articles are chosen to represent the different theoretical approaches 
based on great power definitions. The task to find a definition of what is a great power proved 
to be impossible to fulfil without reference to all three schools of thought. The IR frameworks 
of realism, liberalism and constructivism are chosen to highlight how one theory on its own 
has difficulties in explaining complex issues like foreign policy preferences, guiding lines 
and behaviour.  
Greatpowerness is the identity of a Great Power. It is about self-perception. While Great 
Powers can be very similar, each and every one has its own particularities. Russian 
greatpowerness is unique since no other Great Power has experienced such a flux around its 
self-perception. The rise and fall of the Russian empire, revolutions and radical changes of 
state systems makes Russia a special case, incomparable to others. This has effects on the 
Russia-West relationship and makes it also a fruitful domain for the study of how self-
perceptions effect external relations. 
The different Russian foreign policy determinants and variables forming greatpowerness 
defined in the early chapters are tested in the case studies. One of the best methods for testing 
the impact of a country’s state identity on foreign policy and international relations is to 
reflect on an internal matter debated in both domestic and international arenas. It is one thing 
to express views on international events but when it comes to the point of defending, 
explaining and arguing in the international arena what can also be seen as an internal affair, 
sometimes hidden foreign policy orientations, preferences and interpretations are uncovered. 
In internal Russian foreign policy debates a triangular divide is visible. There are several 
ways of labelling the three different schools, which very much follow the line of international 
relations schools of thought. In this study the approach of Andrei Tsygankov in characterising 
the main streams has been adopted; he divides Russian foreign policy actors into westernisers 
(liberal), statists (realist) and civilizationists (constructivist). Naturally the division is not 
fully comparable but there exist enough elements, to make it parallel the western schools of 
thought. Without knowledge of Russian internal foreign policy debates, it is also impossible 
to create a coherent picture of Russian greatpowerness and foreign policy behaviour. 
 
 
 
12 
Thus the function of the argument that Russian state ideology as a Great Power identity 
is a guiding line in Russia foreign and security policy is tested through the effect the two wars 
in Chechnya had on Russian interaction with three Europe-dominated international 
organisations – the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Union (EU) and the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Russia has a meaningful identity connection 
with each of these organisations as well as practical advantages from cooperating with or 
joining each of them. The Council of Europe has adopted a rather pragmatic approach in its 
cooperation with Russia and hence, while there have been disagreements and heavy 
criticisms, the relationship has been the best of the three. This cooperation has provided the 
least challenge to Russian greatpowerness. Cooperation with the EU has been of a different 
nature since Russia is not a member state. Here the relationship has been through good and 
bad periods. The key variable in the relationship has been Russian perceptions of the extent to 
which the EU has been ready to treat Russia as an equal partner.  Russia’s relations with the  
OSCE have also gone through periods of cooperation and periods of conflict, but in this case 
there have been real political conflicts involved. The OSCE put up a direct challenge to 
Russian greatpowerness. This was particularly hard to swallow, since the organisation had a 
special place in Russian foreign policy, which in turn led to more severe Russian reactions. 
 
1.6 Sources  
A wide range of different materials has been used as the sources for this study. The 
breadth of sources provides both a weakness and a strength to the study. Weakness in the 
sense that it is difficult to detect a single model or line of argumentation, like when some 
newspapers are selected with the emphasis on economics, some emphasising party politics or 
others representing the state’s official line. It is a strength in the sense that Russian foreign 
policy debates inside of Russia have many aspects, different newspapers can carry articles 
representing the views of all three different foreign policy schools in Russia, while inside of 
the political elite trends also change and a clear line is not always found if the view is 
restricted to just one or two foreign policy representatives (president, foreign minister etc.) 
Moreover, the lines between journalism and politics are often blurred, not only because of 
political influence on the media. One good example is Aleksey Pushkov who started as a 
journalist expressing his foreign policy views in various newspapers as well as on his own 
TV show, while today he is the head of the foreign affairs committee in the Russian state 
duma. 
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In order to ensure a broad range of opinions were covered, newspaper material has been 
used based on subject matter, rather than being selected according to the type of publication. 
Russian newspapers from 1994-1996 have been researched through the Integrum and 
Eastview databases. The valuable collections of the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 
proved extremely useful for finding articles on Chechnya and international organisations, 
especially from 1994-1996 and 1999-2002. The Current Digest had already selected articles 
for publication. However the selection was carried out in such way that views representative 
of all three different Russian internal foreign policy schools can be found there. Some articles 
were found through information given in interviews or encountered in field trips. 
The western and other newspaper (English language newspapers in Russia) articles have 
simply been selected based on subject matter: Chechnya, The CoE, the EU, the OSCE, 
international organisations and Great Power have been the most used search words. Based on 
this approach, this research does not represent a single line or view but has tried to explore 
the subject of study as broadly as possible. The same method has been applied to speeches 
and documents. Documents included Council of Europe, OSCE and European Union official 
documents and press releases, and Russian foreign ministry documents. 
Interviews conducted in Russia and in Strasbourg on field trips provide expert 
communities’ views and some inside information for the study. The interviews conducted in 
Strasbourg 20-23.06.2006 are here used anonymously since some of the officials asked not to 
be named, and so the principle was applied to all interview subjects. Most of the interviewing 
trips to Moscow were made during 2002-2005 on several separate trips. The interviews were 
conducted with officials, journalists and the expert community. In addition to the interviews 
carried out in Moscow and Strasbourg, some interviews have been conducted with OSCE 
officials, Finnish foreign office officials and a German foreign office official. Not all of the 
interviews have been quoted in the study but all of them have contributed tremendously.  
Secondary sources have been academic journals and books published both in Russia and 
in the West. Russian foreign policy research is perhaps thin overall but widely spread across 
different types of IR studies, therefore this study has not limited itself to one category of 
journal but has kept the door open to all that have taken up Russian foreign policy. This has 
also proven the best way to take the perspectives of all three schools of international relations 
into account. 
 
 
14 
One category of sources that should be mentioned separately is memoirs. Memoirs as a 
source material are counted among the primary sources. Naturally memoirs are not an 
objective observation of events but are always coloured by the personality of their authors. 
Memoirs are usually used by historians but could be used more in IR. They might not give an 
objective account but they do reflect the author’s feelings and interpretations of a particular 
event that can provide the ‘missing link’ in a political discourse which allows for 
interpretation of underlying beliefs and identities. 
Thus the dissertation combines a range of sources with three case studies, three schools 
of thought in international relations, and a number of key characteristic features of Russian 
foreign policy in general, and applies them to the specific context of the two Chechen wars. 
What emerges is a picture of inconsistent policies and behaviour but underpinned by a 
consistent belief in Russia’s status as a Great Power, greatpowerness as a state ideology. 
While this is only a contributory part of the complex story of Russian foreign policy 
behaviour, it is hoped that this study will contribute to a clearer picture of Russian behaviour 
in international forums and show that indeed there is an ideology in Russian foreign and 
security policy.  
 
1.7 In Summary 
This dissertation takes a specific aspect of Russian attitudes towards international 
relations – Greatpowerness – in developing a constructivist approach to the study of Russian 
foreign policy. It goes beyond previous constructivist studies in three ways: firstly, through 
its focus on one specific facet of Russian identity rather than a holistic approach; secondly, by 
conducting a rigorous case study approach to the role of Greatpowerness in specific settings; 
and thirdly, by developing the notion that Greatpowerness represents something more than a 
personal or societal disposition – a state ideology. These tasks are achieved through the 
linked case studies of Russian participation in three Europe-centred international 
organisations, where Russia came under intense scrutiny as a result of its engagement in the 
two Chechen wars. 
The study proceeds with an overview, in chapter two, of the place of Russia in 
international relations theory. The context of the post-Cold War unipolar world as set out as 
the background to Russian foreign policy behaviour which has yet to be satisfactorily 
explained by the realist school. After exploring in more depth the historical and contemporary 
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relationship between Russia and the West, definitions of a Great Power and what an identity 
of greatpowerness constitutes are both looked at thought the lenses of the three international 
relations schools of thought: realism, liberalism and constructivism. From the constructivist 
school, the recently developing but still young study of greatpowerness as a factor is foreign 
policy is summarised and discussed. In chapter three Russian greatpowerness as a self-
perception is analysed more closely through different concepts that belong to Russian foreign 
policy: the importance of history, imperialism and expansionism, ressentiment and 
isolationism, and finally the multilateral aspect. These are the key elements of Great Power 
identity, whether Russian or other.  
Next, chapter four links these elements into the experiences and impact of the two 
Chechen wars. After summarising the key political discourses of the war, closer attention is 
paid to the attitudes of different Russian actors and the wars’ place in Russia’s historic and 
contemporary development. Having set up the theoretical, conceptual and empirical 
background, chapters five, six and seven then explore the case studies of Russia’s 
engagement with the Council of Europe, European Union, and Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe respectively.  
The conclusion revisits the constituent elements of Russian Greatpowerness within the 
framework of constructivism. Overall, it provides a detailed, theoretically framed, and 
empirically tested investigation of a significant ingredient of today’s international order. 
More research needs to be done to pin down the general role of Great Power identity in world 
politics. This study provides only a small slice of a much bigger cake - Russian 
greatpowerness. 
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Chapter 2: International Relations Theory – Russia, the West and 
Greatpowerness 
 
Russia after the Cold War is a unique case of a superpower which has lost its status from 
the former bipolar world. Its foreign policy behaviour has been analysed from different 
perspectives which often fall into three of the schools of international relations theory: 
realism, liberalism and constructivism. The argument of this thesis is that, given the complex 
nature of Russian politics and society, none of these theories on its own provides a full 
understanding of Russian foreign policy behaviour. Each of the three approaches offers some 
insights into that behaviour. 
These three schools of international relations theory, and what they bring to the 
understanding of Russian foreign policy, was discussed at the end of the Yeltsin era by 
Christer Pursiainen. He describes in detail the constructivist, liberal and realist approaches 
(the ‘three broad approaches’ as he terms them29) to Russian foreign policy, and also 
investigates the varying attitudes to the ‘incommensurability’ of these three theories, 
alongside the theoretical attempts to allow for more than one theory to contribute to a unified 
understanding. While critical of many of these efforts, Pursiainen’s own conclusion is that 
‘attention must be paid not only to the connection between facts and theory, but also to that 
between different theories’.30 It should further be noted that a majority of Russian area 
studies experts who do not pay much explicit attention to theory do implicitly accept a 
mixture of motivations in political actors, which could be related to different schools. While 
this dissertation does not address directly the issue of commensurability and accepts the 
constructivist paradigm as of greatest relevance to the topic of greatpowerness, it follows 
Pursiainen in accepting that there are links between theories, and indeed that greatpowerness 
is one of those links. 
One area in which all three schools has something to offer is in understandings of what 
constitutes a great power. While such definitions, and the differences between them, are 
important in understanding different Western approaches to Russia as a great power, they do 
not in themselves explain the effects of Russia’s great power identity on Russia’s behaviour. 
The much less developed field of understandings of greatpowerness focusses on more remote 
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29 Pursiainen, Russian Foreign Policy, p.160. 
30 Idem, p.216. 
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historical examples (Germany before WWI and the Soviet Union in the Cold War) but 
nevertheless contains important pointers as to the ways in which a great power identity can 
influence the behaviour of a country whose status as a great power might be considered as 
ambiguous – in this case, post-Soviet Russia.  
This chapter proceeds with a brief summary of the three chosen schools of international 
relations theory and some of their sub-branches, as well as examples of the definitions each 
of them has provided of a great power. This is followed by an outline of approaches to 
greatpowerness that have already been developed.  
 
2.1 The International Context: Russia in a Unipolar World 
As is demonstrated in chapter 3, Russia since 1991, and especially under Putin’s 
leadership, has argued that the world is or should be multipolar. By contrast, with the collapse 
of the USSR in 1991, academics almost universally agreed that a unipolar system of 
international relations came into being. Although there has been substantial disagreement as 
to whether such a unipolar system was lasting or represented a temporary ‘moment’, and 
equal disagreement as to whether unipolarity promoted stability or was inherently unstable, it 
is against the reality of a unipolar world that Russian foreign policy behaviour since 1991 
needs to be examined, even if Russian leaders would wish it were otherwise.  According to a 
realist account states ought to behave in the way which brings them biggest advantage in the 
world as it is, not in the world they would like to see.  Realist descriptions of a unipolar world 
predict certain patterns of behaviour by lesser powers, and hence the failure of Russia to 
conform to such patterns in practise would suggest that either the theory of unipolarity itself 
is flawed, or else that Russia is in some way exceptional. 
The most comprehensive realist statement of a stable, benevolent and enduring  unipolar 
world was presented by William C. Wohlforth in a 1999 article ‘The Stability of a Unipolar 
World’.?? Twelve years later, this article was described as ‘as one of the most influential 
perspectives in debates about current international politics’.?? Although the War on Terror 
and the growth of Chinese economic power mean the international order has changed 
substantially since then, the quantitative data Wohlforth deployed to demonstrate the USA’s 
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31  William C. Wohlforth, 1999, ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’, International Security, vol.24, no.1, pp.5-
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32 Nuno P. Monteiro, ‘Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful?’ International Security, vol. 36, no.3, 
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unique place as the unipolar power continues to hold good. While the article is devoted in the 
main to comparisons of the current status of the USA with earlier multipolar or bipolar 
orders, it also addresses the likely behaviour, from a realist viewpoint, of lesser powers in a 
unipolar world: ‘The only options available to second-tier states are to bandwagon with the 
polar power (either explicitly or implicitly) or, at least, to take no action that could incur its 
focussed enmity’. Deferring to the unipolar power extends, according to Wohlforth, to areas 
of prestige as well as real power competition: ‘unipolarity generates comparatively few 
incentives for security or prestige competition among the great powers.’????
 
According to Wohlforth, in a unipolar system there is no serious possibility of a second-
tier power challenging the unipolar superpower: ‘Both hegemonic rivalry and security 
competition among great powers are unlikely under unipolarity. Because the current leading 
state is by far the world's most formidable military power, the chances of leadership conflict 
are more remote than at any time over the last two centuries.’?? Even at the regional level, 
any attempts by lesser powers to establish themselves as a hegemonic pole are doomed to 
fail.?? In the specific case of Russia, Wohlforth contends that the shortlived attempt to re-
establish multipolarity in the 1990s ended in failure.?? 
 
In a later (2011) critique of Wohlforth’s article, Nuno Monteiro has tackled Wohlforth’s 
key argument that unipolar systems tend to be peaceful, showing that in some cases conflicts 
between the unipole and minor powers can and do occur, and that in the event of the strategic 
disengagement of the unipole, conflict between major powers might occur. Adopting a realist 
starting point, however, Monteiro shares many of Wohlforth’s assumptions about the 
behaviour of ‘major powers’, and agrees that it is not generally in their interest to oppose 
themselves to the unipole. Major powers will tend, rather, to accommodate to the unipole, in 
this case the USA: ‘Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can 
guarantee their own survival, and they stand to benefit greatly from being part of the unipolar 
system. Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo’.?? While 
Monteiro goes on to argue that there may with some regularity be circumstances where minor 
powers do enter into conflict with the unipole, giving Iraq (1990) and Serbia as examples, he 
does not entertain this possibility for major powers. Indeed, in his analysis it was Russia’s 
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propensity to keep in line with the USA which disappointed Serbian expectations and led to 
the conflict over Kosovo.?? His argument that strategic disengagement by the unipole might 
lead to major power conflict applies only to regional settings and remains hypothetical, given 
Monteiro’s admission that the USA has not pursued such a strategy since the end of the Cold 
War.?? 
 
The model of major powers as docile accommodators to the unipolar power has been 
challenged from some quarters, most notably by Samuel Huntington. His argument not only 
allows for major powers acting as great powers on a regional level, but also makes room for 
resentment against America’s sole superpower status as an important influence on foreign 
policy behaviour, citing Russia’s Primakov doctrine of the 1990s as a prime example.??  In 
contrast to the realist treatments of Wahlforth and Monteiro, Huntington sees resistance to the 
acceptance of the USA’s exclusive position: ‘political and intellectual leaders in most 
countries strongly resist the prospect of a unipolar world and favor the emergence of true 
multipolarity.’?? Notions of prestige or status are implicit in this argument, but are not 
elaborated. 
 
The literature on unipolarity naturally focuses on the place of the USA, with other 
countries grouped together as ‘major’ or ‘minor’ powers. What such approaches miss is the 
unique position of the Russian Federation in this order. The unipolar world emerged at the 
end of nearly five decades of bipolarity, in which the other superpower was Russia’s 
precursor, the Soviet Union. Depending on how a Great Power is defined, Russia is today 
viewed at best as only one of a group of great powers from Europe and East Asia, which is 
rapidly being eclipsed by China and even India and Brazil. Only Russia’s control of 
substantial nuclear arms and energy resources prevents it slipping further down the global 
pecking order. Among this group of second tier great powers, apart from Russia only Great 
Britain has any recent record of being a superpower, and in Britain’s case this was in a more 
distant past and finds echoes only in its ambivalent positioning between Europe and a 
Transatlantic world, with the British Commonwealth as the only institutional vestige of its 
former status.  
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Analysts and academics have yet to get out of the habit of labelling Russia and other east 
European states as ‘post-communist’, even though the institutions of communism have long 
past into history. Attitudes from the past do linger, however, and when it comes to Russian 
foreign policy rhetoric and behaviour, it is another aspect of Russia’s past which comes the 
fore. In international relations, Russia is not so much ‘post-communist’ as ‘post-superpower’, 
and it is this aspect which lies at the centre of this dissertation. Among the many complex 
factors influencing Russian foreign policy, it is argued that this aspect of Russia’s past has 
been neglected by realists and liberals alike, and only partially explored by adherents of 
constructivism. The soreness Russia feels at its lost superpower status is only sharpened by 
the fact that its former competing pole is now the unipole. This factor contributes in particular 
to fraught and inconsistent episodes in Russia-US relations. As BBC analyst Jonathan Marcus 
put it ‘These [Russia and the USA] are no longer equivalent powers and they have so far not 
found a way to co-operate on terms that benefit both’.42 
When it comes to the more specific question of Russia’s interaction with international 
organisations, Maria Raquel Freire has noted the unpredictability of Russia: ‘The Russian 
position within and towards the OSCE has been ambiguous. Russia has at times been 
cooperative and sought the strengthening of the OSCE, to the extent of expecting to raise the 
organisation’s status to that of primacy among other international organisations (particularly 
to the detriment of NATO). At other times, Moscow has revealed distrust for a powerful 
OSCE and has limited the organisation’s reach and decision-making power.’ For Freire, this 
ambiguity can be explained by competing interests on Russia’s part: ‘Politico-military, 
strategic and economic considerations sustain the Russian position.’?? On this reading, 
Russia’s stance in relation to the OSCE is dictated by its own interests and nothing else: 
‘[Russia] has been playing the OSCE card at its will, making the bets according to its own 
interests’.?? But these interests are conflicting for Russia, on the one hand wanting enhance 
the OSCE’s role and provide credibility to Russia’s aspiration to be part of a community of 
European states, on the other hand opposing outside interference which hampers Russia’s 
ability to deal with its own problems of succession and terrorism: ‘Russian acquiescence to 
the deployment of the OSCE group in Chechnya was a demonstration of the Russian desire to 
appease the international community while enhancing the OSCE’s role in the European 
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security framework’. However ‘for the Russian government, the Chechen issue is an internal 
matter: international mediation between a state and one of its “subjects” does not make 
sense’.?? As Freire correctly points out, these alternating stances mean Russia ends up 
undermining its own interests, since by blocking OSCE involvement in its own affairs it 
undermines the organisations credibility as a European security organisation, which Russia is 
keen to promote.?? The OSCE – Russia relationship is examined more closely in chapter 
seven. 
 
This self-contradiction poses a fundamental problem to the realist approach. States do 
have competing interests, but if this leads to ambivalent attitudes which end up undermining 
those interests, then something is missing from the realist account. One avenue of explanation 
is to explore the different institutions and individuals that are involved in foreign policy 
making and which may have different priorities, leading to changing positions according to 
which faction has the upper hand at any given moment. In exploring the different Russian 
policy actors in chapter three of this thesis we see that the several groups in Russian foreign 
policy making do indeed have some differing priorities, and more importantly different 
means to reach their goals.  But what emerges as even more striking is the similarity in 
rhetoric between these different groups the key strategic aims of Russian policy. In spite of 
different interests, there exists in certain respects a unity of purpose, and the argument of this 
thesis is that it is the shared self-understanding of greatpowerness that underpins this shared 
purpose. 
 
Moreover, Sinikkuka Saari has shown that Russian participation in multilateral contexts 
has not had the socialising effects that are predicted by liberal theories of multilateralism: 
‘The CoE hoped that membership would encourage norm socialization by Russia to the 
European norms by strengthening the moral authority of the organisation and evoking 
processes of persuasion and institutionalization’.47 These hopes were not fulfilled. On the one 
hand Russia behaved in the CoE context as any member, and on the other hand it chose its 
own way of acting in the organisation, hand-picking which norms were ratified and which 
were not. ‘The non-compliance to the European norm of abolition [of the death penalty] was 
not due to a lack of political or material resources. After all, Russia already practised 
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abolitionism and only refused to comply with the European legislative requirements on the 
issue. The discourse in the Russian press implies that non-compliance with the European 
norm became a symbolic, principled issue to Russia’.48 The case of the CoE is looked at more 
closely in chapter 5. 
As argued below, both realist and liberal approaches have a great deal to offer in 
explaining Russian foreign policy behaviour. But taken on their own, each approach would 
suggest a certain level of predictability and consistency in that behaviour. This is clearly 
lacking in Russian behaviour in general, and especially in relation to the international 
relations which form the case studies of this dissertation. Not only does Russia behave 
differently in each of the three organisations, but as Freire has pointed out in the case of the 
OSCE, it behaves inconsistently within the context of each separate organisation. While the 
state interests highlighted by realists and economic interests highlighted by liberals do play a 
major part in Russian foreign policy, it is where Russia fails to consistently pursue either, or 
even undermines both, that constructivism comes in. Russia’s identity and the domestic 
political messages of its leaders cause it to behave in certain ways, and while there is a lack 
of consistency over the pursuit of interests, the argument of this thesis is that there is a clear 
consistency in rhetoric which, moreover, provides a partial explanation of Russian behaviour 
as seen in the case of international organisations concerning the Chechen conflicts. This 
consistent theme is the self-perception of Greatpowerness. 
 
2.2 Three Schools of International Relations Theory 
I assume that most potential readers of this study are familiar with the central ideas of 
three of the most widely known strands of today's IR, realism, liberalism, and constructivism. 
However the next part will go through in a rather text book style the most important features 
of these three international theory schools. The aim is to recap the different strands of each 
school and how, in their simplicity, the three schools form a rather complex world of 
international relations. Although my emphasis here is on the importance of identity located in 
the constructivist school, the selection of these schools is based on the assumption that self-
understanding itself in a study of Great Powers, in the case of this study Russian 
Greatpowerness, is based on various aspects which are drawn from realism and liberalism 
and embedded in an identity formation.  
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2.2.1 Viewpoint I : Realism 
Realism is the oldest and arguably most lasting current in international relations thinking. 
Its basic ideas have remained unchanged and have not been affected by time, international 
systems or development. Therefore it can be said that realism itself is more a school of 
thought than a theory. From the realist school of thought several theories branch out that base 
their ideas upon it. The basic core assumption in the realist school of thought is that human 
nature is egoistic and power-seeking but that individuals also seek ‘groups’ that have similar 
interests and similar views as to how to enhance them. This assumption strongly influences 
the first definition of a Great Power that will be examined, that outlined by Jack S Levy in 
‘Alliance Formation and War behaviour – An analysis of the Great Powers 1495-1975’. 
Even if we live today in a globalised world, the international system retains some ‘old 
features’ – states are independent entities with diverse interests and have no guarantees that 
other states will act benignly toward them or even stick to their commitments. As Kenneth 
Waltz has stated, world politics is a ‘self-help system’, in which states seek to maintain and 
insofar as it is possible expand their power and in which they are concerned about their power 
relative to others as well as about their own welfare.49  
The classic realist solution to this problem of anarchy is to concentrate power in the 
hands of a single authority and to hope that this despot will prove a partial exception to the 
rule that men are bad and should be regarded with distrust.50 Such a solution remains largely 
hypothetical at the national scale, and impossible to realise on a global scale. Hence the 
realist school of thought is very pessimistic about the prospects of eliminating war and 
conflicts in the world.51  
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Table 2.1 Realist school of thought in international relations 
 
 Classical realism 
 
Sub-schools - Neorealism Specific theories – 
Balance of power, 
security dilemma, 
offensive realism and 
defence realism 
View 
point 
Human affairs are seen to be 
based on groupism, egoism 
and power-centrism. ‘politics 
is likely to be conflictual 
unless there is some central 
authority to enforce order’.52 
Based  on assumptions about 
human nature. Multipolarity 
seen as ‘safest’ option. 
States as main actors 
(human nature as such 
not important) in 
international politics, 
internal politics did not 
matter; also geography 
and technology were 
subordinated. 
‘international politics is 
not foreign policy’ 
(Waltz 1996). Bipolarity 
seen as stable and safest 
option. 
Analysing the role and 
nature of hegemony, 
expansionism, military 
build-ups and alliances, 
rivalry between great 
powers, geopolitical 
considerations 
Authors Machiavelli, Morgenthau Waltz, Grieco Waltz, Mearsheimer, 
Jervis,  
 
 
There are a number of more specific theories springing from the realist school of thought 
which give a more nuanced picture of realist thinking. There are some small but significant 
differences within this school of thought. The main differences between Classical realism, 
neorealism and certain more specific theories are summarised in table 2.1.  
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One important difference is the conceptual split between defensive and offensive realist 
stands. These two lines of thought inside the realist school fundamentally disagree over 
whether the anarchic nature of the international system causes states to want to preserve the 
status quo, as defensive realists argue, or to want to maximise relative power, as offensive 
realists believe.53    
The defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz and Jack Snyder ‘assumed that states have 
little intrinsic interest in military conquest and argued that the cost of expansion generally 
outweighed the benefits. Accordingly, they maintained that great power wars occurred 
largely because domestic groups fostered exaggerated perceptions of threat and an excessive 
faith in the efficacy of military power.’54 Waltz has argued that system-level theories, such as 
the one he developed in his Theory of International Politics, cannot explain specific unit-level 
behaviour, but only general system-level outcomes and aggregate state behaviour. Structural 
realism can explain why balances of power repeatedly occur, or why no state has ever 
achieved world-wide hegemony, but it cannot explain why one state balances or fails to 
balance a specific threat.55 
This is a claim that the offensive realists argue against. ‘If a structural realist theory of 
foreign policy can explain anything, it should be able to explain the behaviour of states 
during war. Therefore, if offensive realism can explain why states expand their political 
objectives during war better than defensive realism, it has passed an important test for the 
utility of the theory.’56 The offensive realist theorists like Mearsheimer, Labs and Zakaria 
argue that anarchy encourages all states to try to maximise their relative strength simply 
because no state can ever be sure when a truly revisionist power might emerge.57  
This split is indeed a significant one from the point of view of the nature and aims of 
Great Powers. On the one hand defensive realism argues for preferring the status quo and on 
the other hand offensive realism argues in favour of the war-proneness of great powers. The 
split itself is perhaps not so new or fresh as it looks at first glance. Some trace the first realist 
writings back to Thucydides’ analysis of the origins of the Peloponnesian War where the rise 
of Athens threatened Sparta. This analysis backs the idea that states should be aggressive to 
safeguard and maintain their interests and positions already gained. However, another author 
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also often named as one of the fathers of the realist school, Niccolo Machiavelli in sixteenth 
century Italy, argued for the importance of military power (equivalent to the modern day 
balance of power)  to maintain the status quo. By looking at history, it is clear that at some 
times some great power states act in an aggressive manner in order to expand their power, 
while at others great powers cooperate in order to avoid conflict and unrest.  
This debate also shows clearly some of the weaknesses of the basic realist thinking, with 
its emphasis on the power aspirations and war proneness of states in unfettered competition 
with each other. The absence of alternatives to defensive and offensive positions does not 
allow space for the analysis of progress and change. The world has changed considerably 
since the early analysis of realism. States have changed fundamentally from total 
authoritarianism to functioning democracy, from full sovereignty to interdependence and 
integration and naturally there are also states somewhere in between. That is not to say that 
realist thinking would have disappeared or would be irrelevant in the study of today’s foreign 
relations, but the methods of realism, war and state centrism, are not as evident today as they 
have been in the past. Even if self interest still plays a big role in international relations, it is 
not any more only the self interest of states. Many other actors are involved like individuals, 
NGOs, transnational companies etc.  
The arrival of neorealism on the scene of international relations at the end of the 1970s 
can be seen and understood very much in the framework of US-Soviet relations.58 The 
dominance of neorealism can therefore be put down to the dominance of the Cold War 
bipolar world where the adversaries were the Soviet Union and the United States. This central 
feature of international relations during the Cold War has also left very deep marks on 
today’s analysis of Russian foreign policy and understanding of the world. As Ted Hopf has 
observed: ‘Instead of figuring out how to deter nuclear war or how to encourage a more 
amicable relation with Moscow or thinking of an alternative way of understanding how the 
world works, the central issue became managing an unavoidable enmity.’59  
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2.2.2 Viewpoint II: Liberalism 
Liberalism has existed as a school of thought at least since the late eighteenth century. 
Liberalism as a guide to foreign policy came about through established liberal regimes and 
therefore it could be said that liberalism, in the first place, is a domestic theory which has had 
spill over effects into foreign relations. Perhaps the most notable thinker in this respect was 
Immanuel Kant with his notion of ‘Perpetual Peace.’ His idea that liberal regimes do not go 
to war with each other still has a strong resonance in the modern world and especially in the 
foreign policies of the Western world. The fall of the Soviet Union represented one of the 
triumphs of liberalism against the realist school of thought.  This was so even if some 
defenders of realism keep claiming that Soviet diplomacy in the period of 1985-1991 was 
consistent with realist theory.60 
Liberalism incorporates a belief in the possibility of progressive change facilitated by 
multilateral arrangements and it has an ethical dimension.61 All liberal theories imply that 
cooperation is more pervasive than even the defensive version of realism allows but each 
view offers a different recipe for promoting it.62 
Liberalism shares with realism the stress on explaining the behaviour of separate and 
typically self-interested units of action. But from the standpoint of international relations 
there are three key differences. 1) Liberalism focuses not only on states but on privately 
organized social groups and firms. 2) Liberalism does not emphasize the significance of 
military force. 3) Liberalism believes in the possibility of cumulative progress (while realism 
assumes that history is not always progressive).63  
From the liberal tradition emerged Robert Keohane, whose writings on the liberal 
tradition in international relations can be compared to Kenneth Waltz’ in the realist school of 
thought. The specific school that Keohane is most often connected to is neoliberalism or 
neoliberal institutionalism. The argument put forward by Keohane is that liberalism provides 
thoughtful arguments designed to show how open exchanges of goods and services on the 
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one hand, and international institutions and rules on the other can promote international 
cooperation as well as economic prosperity.64 
According to Keohane, there are at least two different sets of conditions where the 
progressive impacts of liberalism may fail and even go into reverse: 1) If only few 
governments seek to promote social equity and welfare in an open economy, they may find 
their policies constrained by the more benighted policies of others.2) Liberalism may have 
perverse effects if the global extension of interests that it fosters cannot be defended. 
Decaying liberal systems may be the most dangerous of all.65 
Another key liberal text for the purpose of this thesis, Joseph Nye’s Changing Nature of 
World Power includes a definition of a Great Power which is used in the following section. 
Nye’s article takes a clear stand for neoliberal institutionalism’s growing importance in 
global affairs and downplays traditional realism: ‘the real problem of a post-cold-war world 
will not be new challenges for hegemony, but the new challenges of transnational 
interdependence’.66 A similar line is developed in Power and Interdependence where Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye outline the ‘neoliberal institutionalist’ approach, which 
‘emphasised the impact of interdependence, interaction, learning and regimes instead of the 
structural realist concepts of structure and the distribution of power.’67 Neoliberal 
Institutionalism does not claim that international cooperation is easy to reach or easy to 
continue. International institutions merely provide opportunities for negotiations, reduce 
uncertainties in others’ policies and affect leaders’ expectations about the future.  The liberal 
institutionalist sees the role of international organisations as that of a mediator and the means 
to find cooperation at the international level. It is recognised that sovereign states often have 
their national interest in mind while dealing inside of the international organisation, but they 
do believe that international institutions can alter the behaviour of state actors and in turn 
improve environmental quality.  
Liberalism has a number of faces in international relations theory. The three main lines 
are the importance of the freedom of the individual (Lockean tradition), the Kantian tradition 
of republican internationalism and the superiority of economic arrangements (commercial 
liberalism).  
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The Lockean tradition in the liberal school of thought is seen in modern liberal 
individualism, that claims states themselves have rights for political independence and 
territorial integrity. This thinking has provided the liberal foundations of international law. 
Furthermore in terms of domestic policies ‘Locke had the task of justifying both a duty to 
obey and the right to resist, a right that is inseparable from equality and freedom. To 
accomplish this task requires the ability to clearly distinguish the legitimate from the 
illegitimate exercise of power.’68 In international relations this translated to arguments of 
equality of states but also to responsibilities of a state in the international system. 
Kantian thinking theorized an internationalism that institutes peace among fellow liberal 
republics. The Kantian tradition has exerted greatest influence on contemporary liberal 
international relations theory, the idea of ‘democratic peace’ which incorporates to some 
degree both liberal individualism and commercial liberalism. It argues that liberal democracy 
leaves a coherent international legacy on foreign affairs: a democratic peace also called 
separate peace. Liberal states are peaceful with each other, but they are also prone to make 
war on nonliberal states. In Michael Doyle’s interpretation, Kant’s hypothetical peace treaty, 
from Kant’s book ‘Perpetual Peace’, shows how liberal republics lead to a dichotomous 
international politics: peaceful relations ─ a ‘pacific union’ ─ among similarly liberal states, 
and a ‘state of war’ between liberals and nonliberals.69 
Commercial liberal theories seek to explain the international behaviour of states based on 
the domestic and global market positions of domestic firms, workers and owners of assets. 
This line of liberal theories posits that changes in the structure of the domestic and global 
economy alter the costs and benefits of transnational economic exchange, thus creating 
pressure on domestic governments to facilitate or block such exchanges through appropriate 
foreign economic and security policies. The commercial liberal theories have provided the 
basis for neo-liberal institutionalism and one of its analytic concepts of interdependence. 
Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects 
among countries or among actors in different countries.70 Interdependence can refer to 
economic relations but also other types of interaction between states and other actors in world 
politics. For example power can be exercised, in the view of neo-liberal institutionalists, 
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through the question of interdependence; the more a state prefers a particular outcome, the 
more power others potentially have over it and vice versa. Often this is applied to commercial 
relations and so the line that Keohane and Nye represent can be considered to belong to the 
commercial liberal group of the liberal school of thought.  
As we will see in the next section, the emphasis on interdependence, progress and 
cooperation under all of these liberal approaches leads to a very different understanding of 
what constitutes a great power from that provided by a realist approach. 
?
Table 2.2 The Liberal  School of Thought in International relations 
 Lockean thinking (human 
nature and individualism) 
Commercial (societal 
and economic relations) 
Kantian (republican 
internationalist) 
View Point In the Lockean world of 
mutually recognized 
sovereignty... states should 
have more confidence that 
their existence is not 
threatened, creating room 
for processes of positive 
identification to take hold. 
The ability of states to 
create new worlds in the 
future depends on the old 
ones they created in the 
past.71 
An open international 
political economy, with 
rules and institutions 
based on sovereignty, 
provides incentives for 
international 
cooperation and may 
even effect the internal 
constitutions of states 
in ways that promote 
peace.72 
The best guidance 
‘Perpetual Peace,’ 
written in 1795, 
predicts the ever-
widening pacification 
of the liberal pacific 
union, explains that 
pacification, and at the 
same time suggests 
why liberal states are 
not pacific in their 
relations with 
nonliberal states.73 
Authors  Robert Keohane Michael Doyle 
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2.2.3 Viewpoint III : Constructivism  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s constructivism was established as an alternative to the 
two then predominant international relations rational theories, realism and liberalism. As 
Stefano Guzzini has noted, ‘New intellectual developments within an academic community, 
such as constructivism in IR, can always be seen as the product of a double conjuncture; on 
the one hand, they are embedded in historical developments outside the academic community 
and on the other hand, they reflect the structure and content of the debates that define the 
identity of an academic community itself.’74 This was the case with constructivism. The 
developments in world politics during the 20th century brought questions of identity both into 
social science studies as well as practical policy making questions. Empires broke, 
international rules made by great powers applied also to themselves not only to others, 
multicultural societies were formed. Structural changes in international relations were 
significant. Globalisation with withering borders became a challenge for sovereignty as 
understood in realism and liberalism. A big boost to identity studies was provided by the 
break up of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War.  
 ‘Anarchy is what states make out of it’ is a famous line from Alexander Wendt’s book 
Social Theory of International Politics (1999). The idea and phrase was first introduced by 
him in the journal International Organisations in 1992.75 It has been claimed that from a 
genuinely radical alternative interpretation of international relations, constructivism has 
become the acceptable middle ground for those that wish to find alternatives to the two 
mainstream American international relations theories.76 Steve Smith defined the situation: ‘A 
constructivist would be the acceptable face of reflectivism for rationalists and the acceptable 
face of rationalism for reflectivists.’77 In the late 1990s Stephen M. Walt went even further 
and suggested that constructivism has replaced Marxism as the main paradigmatic rival to 
realism and liberalism.78 Wendt himself saw the situation as follows: ‘A rationalist approach 
makes sense when state interests really are exogenous to interaction, which is sometimes the 
case. When they are not, however, it may ignore important possibilities and/or strategies for 
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cooperation, as well as misrepresent the latter's dynamics. It would be useful to discuss 
potential anomalies for the rationalist hypothesis, but ultimately it can only be assessed 
against its rival, which has not been adequately articulated in the literature. With a view 
toward theoretical pluralism, my goal herein is to formulate such a rival by reframing the 
collective action problem among states in terms that make interests endogenous to (or part of 
the problem in) interaction. In so doing, I hope to put in sharper relief the underappreciated 
implications of a rationalist assumption (exogeneity).’79 How did constructivism then argue 
its case and attempt to challenge rational choice theories?  
The two radical differences to realism and liberalism that constructivism argues is that 
the role of identities and beliefs matters in international relations and that an anarchical 
framework is a situation where norms can emerge. Realism in particular does not leave much 
space for the possibility of change. For the constructivists the world around is socially 
constructed. Constructivists would argue that it is not so much the brute fact of their existence 
that matters; rather it is the social context that gives meaning to that capability.80 
The criticism towards constructivism comes from both scholars that subscribe to 
constructivism and those belonging to other schools. Ted Hopf summarized the criticism 
towards constructivism in three main lines: constructivism as necessarily postmodern and anti 
positivist, constructivism’s own ambivalence about whether it can buy into mainstream social 
science methods without sacrificing its theoretical distinctiveness and constructivism’s failure 
to advance an alternative research program.81 Jeffery Checkel points out that theories of 
social constructivism tend to neglect agency and, even more importantly, they neglect the 
processes that tie the agents to the structures of meaning.82 Maja Zehfuss’ critique of 
constructivism in her book Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality 
points out how the basic assumption of constructivism, that reality is socially constructed, has 
sometimes been misunderstood in IR.83 For her ‘All constructivisms critiqued in this book 
posit “reality” as a significant point of reference : the “reality” of international politics for 
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Wendt, everyday “reality” for Kratochwil and “reality” as raw material for Onuf.’84 From 
Zehfuss’ perspective, this repeated essentialization of reality is a political move that stops 
short of constructivism’s critical potential. Next is opened up two ways to look at different 
divisions inside of constructivism. 
‘Thus, constructivism is clearly significant to IR (Theory) and its future developments. 
However we still lack clarity on what constructivism is. Critique usually starts with clear 
definition of its target. Although constructivism has been defined, explained, assessed and 
positioned, there is little agreement what it is’85 argues Zehfuss. Her book is a critical view of 
constructivism. At the same time she does a good job in identifying different lines inside the 
constructivist school. It is often the case that through a critical view of the subject in question, 
clarity of the subject can best be found. The three key constructivists that have contributed to 
the development of this school are Nicholas Onuf, Alexander Wendt and Friedrich 
Kratochwil. Accoring to Zehfuss, Nicholas Onuf’s book World of Our Making86 presented 
the first international relations constructivist theory. Alexander Wendt’s article ‘Anarchy is 
What States Make of it’ is credited with popularising the approach. Friedrich Kratochwil in 
an article co-authored with John Ruggie, made intersubjectivity one of the key concepts of 
constructivism and developed that further in his book Rules, Norms and Decisions.87  Since 
constructivism is very focused on how identities and interests are constructed, the best way of 
seeing the divisions inside the constructivist school of thought is also via that question, 
argues Zehfuss. Wendt’s central argument is that actors’ identities are not given but are 
developed and sustained or transformed in interaction.88 He argues that conceptions of self 
and other arise from interactions between states. Friedrich Kratochwil makes a complex 
argument about the role of rules and reasoning in international relations. He represents the 
‘normative club’ inside of the constructivist school that sees all political systems as remade or 
changed through actors’ practises. Kratochwil together with Rey Koslowski argues that the 
domestic level is as important as the international in constituting changes: ‘Rather, what is 
important is the way in which changed practises arising from new conceptions of identity and 
political community are adopted by individuals and the way which interactions among states 
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are thereby altered or vice versa’89 Finally, Nicholas Onuf’s constructivism relates to 
concepts of speech, deed and rules. His starting point is Anthony Giddens’ structuration 
theory. Central to Onuf’s ideas is that people and society construct each other: ‘Human 
beings with whatever equipment nature and/or society provides, construct society and society 
is indispensable to the actualization of whatever human beings may naturally be.’90 
Another way of seeing the divisions inside constructivism is to divide constructivism into 
structural, situational and aspirational constructivist. Alexander Wendt’s works on 
constructivism could be classified as structural constructivism. In structural constructivism 
the focus is on international structural factors. Their approach sees the international system as 
a source of national interests. In the structural constructivist view identity is a product of how 
the other views the self. National identity is based in this view on how a state is identified by 
another state. The situational constructivist sees identities as a social cognitive structure 
drawing from cognitive psychology. In the national identity and in the identity question 
situational constructivists see that the Other can also be something else than another state. 
Ted Hopf in his Social construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policy, 
Moscow 1955&1999 argues that Other for any given Self is an empirical question of the first 
order. Hopf’s purpose in his book is to examine how states understand themselves through 
domestic order, how state identities are constructed at home as well as though interstate 
actions.91 In the Durkheimian tradition Hopf argues that habits and practice are powerful 
mechanisms in the reproduction of identities. Iver Neumann in his definitions of what makes 
a country a great power subscribes to Durkheimian views too. Situational constructivism adds 
to Wendt’s structural constructivism domestic aspects regarding the question of other and 
identity formation. The aspirational constructivists draw from social psychology in an attempt 
to offer a synthesis that underscores the role of historical aspirations and human reason in 
constructivist explanations of identity and interests.92 Aspirational constructivism suggests 
that there is a logic of aspiration, that underlying aspiration is the human need for self-
esteem, playing a central role in the creation of national identities and national interests. 93  
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Table 2.3 The Constructivist School of Thought in International relations 
 Structural Situational Aspirational 
View 
Point 
International system as a 
source of national interests. 
Identity is the product of how 
an Other views the self. 
Identities are social cognitive 
structures. Explanations are 
solely based on ‘objective’ and 
‘primordial’ historical ties such 
as geography, culture, 
language and ethnicity that 
lead to fixed identities. 
National identities are subject 
to change by political elites. 
History is taken in the form of 
historical memory. Identity 
formation is a process and is 
not fixed at all. Underlying 
aspiration is the human need 
for self-esteem. 
Authors Alexander Wendt Ted Hopf Anne L. Clunan 
 
 
2.3 Great Power Definitions  
The understanding of what constitutes a Great Power, has been an important factor in 
Russia-West relations. Russia’s self-perception as a great power – Greatpowerness – does not 
always coincide with either academic or popular understandings of what constitutes a Great 
Power in the West. Differing perceptions of who is and who is not a Great Power is a broader 
issue in international relations, and contributes to disputes in several parts of the world. Since 
the fall of the Soviet Union much has been written about the ‘rising Great Powers’ – Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa, the BRICS. On the Western side the size of the 
economy has often influenced whether the country has been seen as a Great Power in world 
politics. The major advanced industrial economies which have clearly fallen into this 
category in the past have been the United States, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, France and 
Italy. The international organizations that are perceived as world powers, both the European 
Union and the United Nations, are in their own league. However, if the BRICS countries are 
perceived as rising powers, the Western countries and international organisations have been 
seen as declining in power.94 This rising and declining power aspect has affected the power 
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balance among the countries seen as Great Powers in world politics. New forms of 
competition, cooperation and conflict have emerged as a result. How great powers 
differentiate their behaviour in relation to each other as opposed to lesser powers is an 
important part of this changing picture. Understandings of what constitutes a great power are 
not unanimously agreed, however.   
In the context of rising or declining powers Russia emerges as a unique case. It was a 
traditional Great Power of the nineteenth century and one of the two superpowers between 
1945-1990. In that framework, how could Russia now be included in the category of rising 
powers? From the realist point of view Russia as a rising power does not work. In that 
framework Russia is a declining power which has lost territory and the ability to project 
power outside its borders. In the liberal framework Russia can now be viewed as a rising 
power, especially if the reference line is to the early 1990s. So from both the realist and 
liberal points of view Russia clearly did lose its Great Power status with the end of the Cold 
War. A wide range of Russia related literature supports this viewpoint, since the starting point 
has been that one of the most important Russian foreign policy priorities has been to seek 
Great Power status and return Russia into world politics as one of the major powers. In the 
constructivist framework, however, where identity is at the core of the analysis, a view that 
Russia has been, is, and will be a Great Power regardless of its economic and military 
strength or weakness, is possible. The key here is not some objective assessment of Russia’s 
status, but that Russians, from political elites down to the general population, consider that 
Russia has continued to be a Great Power without interruption. This is a question of belief or, 
in terms of this dissertation, a kind of ideology, which feeds into identity, but is a belief 
which hold independently of identity. The constructivist framework takes identities as given 
and so places less emphasis on belief, but is able to shed light on the biggest and perhaps 
deepest misunderstandings between Russia and the West. Self perceptions of a country and 
others’ perceptions of another country are harder to measure and analyse than military 
capabilities or economic performance. Differences in fundamental beliefs are harder to 
account for. 
 Most important from the point of view of this thesis is the Russian view of 
greatpowerness. But it is also necessary to look at how Great Powers are defined generally 
and in what ways Russia has been studied as a Great Power in Anglo-American international 
relations theory. Academic understandings of a topic such as greatpowerness do not 
necessarily translate directly into the attitudes of politicians and other key actors. But 
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differences in theoretical definitions do reflect different approaches in the actual world of 
international relations and go some way towards explaining competing Western and Russian 
perceptions of Russia as a Great Power.  
It is not a simple task to define the concept of power and therefore it is not a simple task 
to define what makes a country a great power. As Joseph Nye has put it ‘power, like love, is 
easier to experience than to define or measure.’95 This same applies to the concept of Great 
Power. Here three slightly different definitions and interpretations of a Great Power from a 
period of nearly 30 years are examined in detail as representative of the full range of 
definitions. They all give a slightly different picture and put a stress on different factors of 
what constitutes a Great Power. These differences are in line with the different approaches of 
the three schools of international relations theory already discussed. They have been selected 
as good examples of the full range of definitions, as their authors are well-known figures in 
international relations adhering to each of the schools respectively: Jack S Levy, Alliance 
Formation and War behaviour – An analysis of the Great Powers 1495-1975 (realist), Joseph 
S Nye Jr., Changing Nature of World Power (liberal) and Iver Neumann, Russia as a Great 
Power 1815-2007 (constructivist).  
Only Neumann’s work specifically takes Russia as a Great Power into its framework, but 
all three advance general definitions of a Great Power. These articles have been chosen as, 
firstly, they represent different times: the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. In the 1980s realism was 
still the dominant IR theory, in the 1990s liberalism/neo-liberalism and institutionalism had 
convincingly challenged realism. By the 2000s constructivism had established itself as a 
legitimate alternative to both realism and liberalism. Therefore the articles follow the 
evolution of IR during 30 years that have also changed the world significantly. This evolution 
is also central in understanding contemporary world politics and the interaction between 
states. 
Secondly defining a great power has proved problematic. Often the list of Great Powers 
from various historical epochs seems to be intuitive rather than based on agreed definitions. 
Kenneth Waltz defends such an intuitive understanding of Great Powers: ‘Historically, 
despite the difficulties, one finds general agreement about who the great powers of a period 
are, with occasional doubt about the marginal cases. Counting the Great Powers of an era is 
about as difficult, or as easy, as saying how many major firms populate an oligopolistic sector 
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of an economy. The question is an empirical one, and common sense can answer it.’96 Waltz 
thinks that the following factors all need to be present if a state is to be counted as a member 
of the club of Great Powers: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic 
capability, military strength, political stability and competence. 97 Martin Wight’s Great 
Power elements are slightly different to Waltz’s list: ‘The power that makes a power is 
composed of many elements. Its basic components are size of population, strategic position 
and geographical extent, and economic resources and industrial production. To these must be 
added less tangible elements like administrative and financial efficiency, education and 
technological skill, and above all moral cohesion.’ 98 Paul Kennedy in his book ‘The rise and 
fall of Great Powers’ defines a Great Power as a state capable of holding its own against any 
other nation.99 In Kennedy’s argument a Great Power can be properly measured only relative 
to other powers. Most analysts argue first and foremost that military might is an undoubted 
factor in being a Great Power, economic resources come perhaps in second place, but then 
arguments start to differ.  The factors mentioned in these rather broad considerations as to 
what constitutes a great power are all covered by the alternative definitions advanced by 
Levy, Nye and Neumann. The more detailed discussion of the definitions advanced by these 
three authors, each corresponding to one of the major schools of international relations 
theory, therefore covers all other definitions in general terms.  
Levy’s article focuses on alliance formation and asks questions as to whether alliance 
formation contributes to peace or to war. However the article gives a brief definition based on 
Levy’s own wider analysis that was developed in a book some years later.100 Levy defines a 
great power as follows: ‘A Great Power is defined as a state which plays a major role in 
international politics with respect to security related issues. Operational indicators of Great 
Power status include the following: possession of  high level power capabilities; participation 
in international congresses and conferences; de facto identification as a Great Power by an 
international conference or organization; admission to a formal or informal organization of 
powers (such as Concert of Europe); participation in Great Power guarantees, territorial 
compensations, or participations; and generally treatment as a relative equal by other Great 
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Powers, in terms of protocol, alliances, and so on.’101 The focus, then, is on military power 
but also on being part of the ‘club’ of great powers and being recognised as such. The realist 
assumption that states’ primary aim is to maximise their own power can be seen in the 
emphasis on security in this definition, but Levy also recognises that great power status is 
part of an interactive process between different powers. 
Iver Neumann does not dismiss these elements, but the emphasis is different in his 
description of a great power. Neumann begins from two definitions for a recognised great 
power; one based on Max Weber and the other based on Emile Durkheim. Then he goes on to 
suggest one more inspired by Foucault’s notion of art of government. This way Neumann 
gives three different elements for recognition as a Great Power; prestige, moral grounds and 
regime type.  Prestige can be tied to material factors such as the military or the economic but 
it can also include other elements. Prestige can also be connected to pride. ‘As long as there 
are states, so there will be national pride and nothing can be more warranted. But societies 
can have their pride, not being the greatest or the wealthiest, but being most just, the best 
organised and in possessing the best moral constitution.’102 Thus there is a subjective element 
to being a great power: what counts in this part of the definition is how the establishment or 
population of a country views its place in the world. But under the third, Foucaultian part of 
his definition, in order for a country to be part of the great power club it is not sufficient to 
have a great enough military or economic weight in the world (as in Levy’s definition). Such 
a power must also conform to certain types and standards of governance, to be recognised as 
an ‘advanced’ power in social as well as material terms.  
Neumann’s approach is, then, constructivist from two perspectives: in the first place, the 
self-perception of the country in question, which may be constructed from elements such as 
national pride, historic achievement, and political rhetoric among other factors, can lead a 
state and its citizens to view themselves as a Great Power. Secondly, however, as with the 
other definitions there is an element of recognition coming from other countries and from 
international organisations. In Neumann’s case, it is regime type and moral grounds as much 
as traditional power that leads to such recognition. Although Neumann does not develop this 
point, the possibility of a country seeing itself as a great power but not being recognised as 
such by others is a very real one. The potential for mismatched perceptions leading to 
troubled relations is also clear. We shall see in later chapters examples of precisely such 
mismatches, where Russia is viewed as ‘behind’ because of the slow pace of democratic 
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development and failure to fully embrace western norms, whereas Russians have not 
appreciated that these have any relevance to great power recognition. 
Joseph Nye’s article ‘Changing Nature of World Power’ gives us one more way to 
approach the concept of power and being a Great Power. If Jack Levy’s definition was based 
on influence, position and visible participation in World politics and Iver Neumann’s 
definition partly on resources, partly on moral accounts but mostly on governance, Joseph 
Nye stresses the interplay between soft and hard power. Hard power is resource based and the 
traditional way of seeing a country as one of the Great Powers. As Nye puts it, ‘Because the 
ability to control others is often associated with the possession of certain resources, political 
leaders commonly define power as the possession of resources. These resources include 
population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability, 
among others. The virtue of this definition is that it makes power appear more concrete, 
measurable, and predictable than does the behavioural definition. Power in this sense means 
holding the high cards in the international poker game’.103 This part of Nye’s view is very 
closely linked to Levy’s arguments although Levy’s argument stresses visible participation of 
a state in world politics. Nye sees also technology, education and economic growth as very 
significant in modern times as a source for being a Great Power. All of these can be measured 
and compared in order to provide, at least in theory, an objective assessment of the relative 
standing of the world’s powers which is independent of self-definitions or of recognition by 
other powers.  
However, as Nye goes on to recognise, it has been a growing trend in world politics that 
the forms of power and ability to be a Great Power cannot be measured only in terms of 
tangible resources,. The power to get others to do what you want them to do, can also be 
achieved by indirect ways, such as co-optive power behaviour. In this framework it is 
important to be the agenda or structure setter. ‘Co-optive power can rest on the attraction of 
one’s ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences 
that others express. Parents of teenagers know that if they have structured their children’s 
beliefs and preferences, their power will be greater and will last longer than if they had relied 
only on active control. Similarly, political leaders and philosophers have long understood the 
power that comes from setting the agenda and determining the framework of a debate. The 
ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as 
culture, ideology, and institutions. This dimension can be thought of as soft power, in contrast 
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to the hard command power usually associated with tangible resources like military and 
economic strength.’104 Thus, an equally important part of being a great power is a state’s 
ability to set agendas and exert cultural and other forms of influence beyond its borders, all of 
which can be achieved in a variety of ways.  
Nye’s article’s conclusion on being a Great Power relies on two concepts: command 
power and co-optive power. ‘The distinction between hard and soft power resources is one of 
degree, both in the nature of the behaviour and in the tangibility of the resources. Both types 
are aspects of the ability to achieve one's purposes by controlling the behaviour of others. 
Command power - the ability to change what others do - can rest on coercion or inducement. 
Co-optive power - the ability to shape what others want - can rest on the attractiveness of 
one’s culture and ideology or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a 
manner that makes actors fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too 
unrealistic.’105 This distinction between hard and soft power has now become widely 
accepted by academics. One possible source of soft power is the kind of governance issue 
highlighted in Neumann’s definition. Thus Nye’s article represents a position somewhere in 
between Levy’s, where there is more of a hard power emphasis, and Neumann’s.  
As with the other definitions, there are a number of parts to Nye’s definition which are 
not always compatible: the more tangible elements of hard power are common to all 
definitions. When it comes to soft power, Nye’s liberal perspective leads to a focus on 
agenda-setting within a particular milieu and where technology, education and economic 
growth are key factors. The focus here is clearly on the West and on organisations dominated 
by western powers. While in the unipolar world it is the US and its allies which are the key 
agenda-setters, it could also be considered that soft power often has a regional aspect or is 
exerted through particular cultural forms, and therefore is not necessarily easily universalised. 
 
The three articles open up the picture of what makes a country a Great Power but they 
also highlight the continuing difficulty of defining it. Neumann’s article raises good 
governance and domestic political realities, where the political elite’s possibilities and 
capabilities to do changes are the crucial determinant, as the central and defining issues. Nye 
on the other hand stresses the cooperation capabilities in the international arena, possibilities 
to set the agenda in international politics and the realities of world affairs. Levy adopts an 
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alternative position with his argument about potential and possibilities to inject power. All the 
articles list things that make a country a Great Power but naturally these lists are also subject 
to criticism since they do not show how all these factors are measured or defined, and 
therefore each of these definitions of a Great Power leave room for interpretation when it 
comes to their application to specific cases, especially marginal ones.  
Each of the definitions also contains at least two types of element, which do not always 
coincide. One of these is traditional, security-oriented power, particularly military power but 
perhaps also size and economic reach. This side of being a great power still dominates some 
academic discussions, including the debate concerning unipolarity already referred to at the 
start of this chapter, where much is made of the quantitative nature of being a great power, as 
measured by military capability. The attractiveness of this approach for comparative studies 
is, in part, that it is easily measurable. When it comes to other elements such as acceptance by 
formal or informal groups of great powers, regime type, and forms of soft power, it is harder 
to reach consensus and the possibility of different assessments by different international 
actors is evident. 
The disadvantage of definitions designed for comparative purposes is that they lose some 
value when it comes to the analysis of specific cases. This is especially the case when, as is 
argued here, a case like Russia’s is unique in that it has very recently been recognised as one 
of the superpowers in a bipolar world.  
 
2.4 Greatpowerness of the Great Powers 
Being a Great Power requires resources, as the previous part has shown. However while 
numerous authors have addressed definitions of a Great Power, from the resource and other 
points of view, and the consequences for the international system of the existence of a given 
number of Great Powers, few have paid attention to the effect on a state’s behaviour in 
international relations of its self-identification as a Great Power – referred to here as 
greatpowerness. One scholar who does address Great Power behaviour is John J. 
Mearsheimer. He adopts an explicitly realist approach – his aim is to show that, for Great 
Powers, realist thinking did not disappear along with the Cold War, so that “states still fear 
each other and seek to gain power at each other’s expense”106. Hence, the possibility of war 
between Great Powers at some point in the future cannot be ruled out, according to 
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Mearsheimer. As part of the picture he argues that international institutions have negligible if 
any effect on Great Power behaviour. In this picture, Great Powers seek to dominate 
international institutions and shape them to increase their own share in global power.107 
This approach is limited by realist assumptions about the aims of states in general and 
self-defined Great Powers in particular, but at least makes a distinction between the 
behaviour of Great Powers and other states, thus giving some initial substance to the notion 
of ‘greatpowerness’. Mearsheimer draws attention to possible challenges to the realist 
arguments through two examples where Great Powers appeared to be abandoning realist 
thinking – The Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, and the United States under President 
Bill Clinton.108 He claims that, in the former case, the weakness and costs of the Soviet 
empire forced the abandonment of confrontation with the West in favour of a more 
collaborative approach, which could be explained by realist interests. Without directly 
challenging the proclaimed priorities of the Clinton administration, Mearsheimer goes on to 
claim that realist politics continued to dominate the world in the 1990s by pointing to cases 
such as Germany and Japan and a rising China. 
While this thesis does not engage with the broader point about the aims of Great Powers, 
Mearsheimer’s analysis itself reveals some challenges to the classic realist assumptions about 
a Great Power’s behaviour. The fact that the United States returned to a more obviously Great 
Power dominant role under George W. Bush, when compared to the Clinton years, shows that 
Great Powers have more than one way of expressing their greatpowerness. China provides 
another contrast, with the focus since the early 1990s on economic growth and some forms of 
market domination, and this has not yet, in spite of heavy arms spending, transformed into 
Mearsheimer’s predicted move to regional hegemony.109 Germany and Japan meanwhile, in 
his analysis, are viewed as ‘potential’ Great Powers with capacity to become regional 
hegemons should the United States withdraw it military forces from Europe and North East 
Asia respectively, with uncertain consequences for regional multipolarity.  
The realist approach focuses on such hard power aims as regional hegemony, and 
therefore does not have much to say about different behavioural traits of various Great 
Powers. In the constructivist approach there are explanations of foreign policy behaviour 
which go beyond questions of power, including identity. For theorists of both personal and 
state identity, identity is socially constructed, meaning it is defined and understood through 
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interaction with others – in the case of international relations, through interaction with other 
states. Much of the literature on state identity rests on notions of the ‘Other’ through which 
state identities are defined – in the case of China, the Other is Japan, for Western Europe, it is 
Eastern Europe, while for Russia, it is the West -  primarily the USA.110 This social nature of 
state identity has, in turn, led to a focus on recognition as an important factor in many cases 
of state behaviour in international relations.111 
Michelle Murray has gone further in linking identity and recognition to greatpowerness. 
Taking the case of the development of the German Navy before World War One, she argues 
that, since this investment took resources away from land defence, it was sub-optimal in 
strategic terms and therefore contradicted realist assumptions of power maximisation. 
Instead, she proposes ‘a social theory of great power politics that argues that in addition to 
physical security states also want recognition’.112 Such recognition, a social act, is essential to 
a state’s identity since ‘when a state is recognized, its identity is brought into existence, its 
meaning stabilized, and its status in the social order secured’.113 On the other hand ‘if the 
international community does not recognize a state’s self-understanding, then it will struggle 
to obtain the recognition it needs to secure that identity, sometimes at the expense of other 
goals, like security.’114 
While Murray provides a convincing case for understanding the case of Germany at the 
start of the twentieth century, the general applicability of this theory is limited by her 
insistence that ‘states ground their aspirant identities in concrete material practises’115 – 
specifically, the acquisition of military hardware: ‘great powers have historically grounded 
their identity in particular capabilities – battleships, aircraft carriers, nuclear weapons – that 
were understood at the time to be emblematic of great power status. It is these specific 
practises that are constitutively linked to the establishment and maintenance of great power 
identity and are at the center of great power identity construction’.116 Reference to 
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contemporary examples of India’s nuclear weapons programme and China’s plans for aircraft 
carriers confirms that Murray considers this still to be the case.117  
While Murray does not offer any definition of a Great Power, this comes close to the 
classical realist definition. But all of the definitions of a Great Power discussed above suggest 
that material factors alone do not constitute a Great Power. Of particular significance when 
considering gaining recognition as a soft power in the contemporary world are claims to 
moral, cultural and other forms of non-military influence. The liberal tradition of 
international relations has contributed and highlighted notions of ‘soft power’ which 
complement the more realist hard power aspirations of states, and these are especially 
relevant when it comes to efforts at recognition: ‘If citizens of other countries wish to attend 
university in your country, speak your national tongue, watch your movies, emigrate to your 
country, or identify their political institutions or cultural values as being like yours, then your 
country has soft power…Soft power inheres in a country’s reputation’.118 This last point 
underlines a further important aspect of greatpowerness, in line with the literature on 
recognition and constructivist notions of state identity – namely, that it is not enough for a 
state to believe it is a Great Power, it needs that status to also be recognised by others.  
By using a broader concept of greatpowerness, international institutions can also be 
viewed in an alternative way – without denying that both great and small powers seek to use 
institutions to their own advantage, being not only a member but also a leading influence in 
such organisations can be an end in itself for the confirmation of greatpowerness and general 
prestige that such a status confers. Greatpowerness then, for the purpose of this thesis, is 
understood as a state’s self-image as one of the dominant powers in the world which can have 
a variety of impacts on that state’s behaviour. Such behaviour can be observed across a wide 
range of activities and includes measures not only to confirm Great Power status to the 
citizens of the state itself, but also to obtain and continually reaffirm the recognition of that 
status by the international community, and especially by other Great Powers. The focus of 
this thesis is on Russia which, as clearly demonstrated in chapter three, has never abandoned 
its self-image as a Great Power, a fact which influences its behaviour in relation to the 
international institutions discussed in the case study chapters five to seven.  
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2.5 Russia and International relations theory 
During the Cold War, the study of the Soviet Union and its political institutions was 
largely confined to the methods of ‘Kremlinology’. In terms of international relations, some 
authors such as Snyder, Hopf and Zimmerman did pay attention to the Soviet Union as part 
of the international system when it came to the development of their own theoretical models. 
But studies devoted solely to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union tended more often to 
stand apart from broader IR studies. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, general IR 
studies have included Russia more and more in their considerations as an important 
international actor, and the number of studies of Russian foreign policy which take IR theory 
as their starting point has been increasing. Of the three examples of definitions of Great 
Powers taken above, Iver Neumann has Russia as the main focus of his studies, while both 
Nye and Levy include Russia as a case in their discussions. More broadly, it is now possible 
to summarise an approach to Russia from each of the three international relations schools 
already discussed. 
In analysing Russia since the collapse of communism from a realist perspective, several 
different groupings and terms occur: Great Power pragmatism, statist view, Great Power 
balancing and new realism. The realist school of international relations has, at least until 
recently, been more dominant when it comes to Russia and the Soviet Union than the other 
traditional international relations schools of liberalism and constructivism. This extends from 
the academic world to the world of politics. One of the statements from a Western leader that 
significantly represented the picture of the Soviet Union as being explicable through the 
realist school of international relations is provided in Winston Churchill’s words ‘There is 
nothing they (Russians) admire so much as strength and there is nothing for which they have 
less respect than military weakness.’119 Statements by Western foreign policy leaders are one 
factor that has contributed to the fact that the Soviet Union and Russia are often seen through 
the realist paradigm. 
 Another factor that also speaks for a realist approach in Russia’s case is that realism 
embraces the ‘top-down’ approach in politics. Russia throughout its history has been a 
country ruled from the top down, and Russia’s leaders whether in the Imperial Russian or 
Soviet or post-Soviet time are assumed to be all powerful leaders. This picture certainly tells 
us something about some guiding ideas in Russian thinking but if it is seen as a proof of 
realist thinking dominating Soviet and Russian foreign and security policy the picture will 
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become inaccurate and the danger of misinterpretation of situations increases. Realism from 
Machiavelli to von Clausewitz and from Morgenthau to Waltz and Mearsheimer allows for 
very little possibility of significant change. All the same, neorealism is still the most popular 
framework of analysis of Russian foreign policy among the policy community and in Russia. 
As Pami Aalto has observed, amid the lack of theoretical debate about Russian foreign policy 
plenty of fine empirical works have been published and some level of consensus has been 
formed about the picture of Russian foreign policy today.120 However it has to be noted that 
most of the empirical works take the realist assumptions as the most influential school of 
thought into their studies of today’s Russian foreign policy.121 Consensus views on events in 
Russian foreign policy actions have also been found before122 but often the main stress is in 
the realist interpretation.  
When looking at Russia from the liberal point of view, at first glance, there seems to be 
very little compatible with liberalism, since liberalism applies and develops in a modern and 
more or less democratic environment. However, deeper examination will reveal that Russian 
foreign policy also has elements that can be understood through the liberal school of thought.  
The interesting point from the Russian perspective is that classical liberalism ‘begins 
with the recognition that men do what they will, are free; that a man’s acts are his own, spring 
from his own personality and cannot be coerced.’123 If the word man would be replaced by 
state, this is fully in line with how Russia is trying to argue its state position in the 
international order. Russia fiercely tries to defend the sovereignty of a state and its right to 
make decisions independently. A central belief in Russian Foreign Policy is that ‘Attempts to 
belittle the role of the sovereign state as a fundamental element of international relations 
creates the threat of arbitrary interference in internal affairs’.124 Russia seeks the freedom that 
comes through liberalism in international affairs even when it is not ready to apply it to her 
own internal politics. Russia as a nation state is a phenomenon of the 1990s but it has faced 
similar problems to those of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. It has had to fight for its 
existence, not so much for external reasons but because of its internal environment. The 
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challenges for Russian statehood have nearly always come from within.125 This has created 
an interesting relationship regarding the ideas of liberalism in external politics. The desired 
situation for Russia would be a world order where states should have more confidence that 
their existence is not threatened, creating room for processes of positive identification to take 
hold. The reason can be found in Russian domestic political challenges. Therefore, from the 
Russian perspective, it would suit best for Russia to be part of the ‘liberal world’ and enjoy 
the benefits of ‘perpetual peace’.  
In times of internal weaknesses, beneficial external relations are to Russia’s advantage. 
Alexander II’s Foreign Minister after the Crimean war, Alexander Gorchakov, saw two 
preconditions for Russia being able to rebuild its Great Power status in Europe after defeat in 
the Crimea: ‘To avoid any external controversies that are likely to divert some domestic 
resources, so halting internal developments of Russia, as well as to forestall any territorial 
changes or shifts in the balance of power in Europe’.126 So even if at first glance the realist 
framework seems to fit best in Russia’s case, liberalism has some strong advantages for 
Russia in international relations. In the domestic political arena liberalism is still waiting for 
Russians to see the advantages of it. This is a strong contradiction since the liberal school of 
thought, starts from the assumption that all states have similar state systems or that they have 
their own will to be part of the liberal world. Russia does want to be part of the liberal world 
in terms of international institutions, but at the same time wants to operate according to its 
own conditions and without liberalism touching its internal development in an uncontrolled 
way. 
The external environment operating according to neo-liberal institutionalism, and 
therefore also within the liberal framework, is also important for Russia to be able to promote 
its national interest, its economy and greatpowerness. For this it is important for Russian 
foreign policy makers to accept the maxims described by Robert Keohane concerning the 
importance of international institutions even if they are not always successful in world 
politics: ‘Superpowers need general rules because they seek to influence events around the 
world. Even an unchallenged superpower such as the United States would be unable to 
achieve its goals through the bilateral exercise of influence: the costs of such massive “arm-
twisting” would be too great’.127 Since one of the main arguments of Russian foreign policy 
is that Russia is a Great Power, it also needs to prove the correctness of its claim. For that 
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Vladimir Putin has emphasised the modernization process of Russia. This mostly means 
economic developments but also Russia catching up in the areas of technology and science. 
‘In the contemporary world Hobbesian states128 will not be able to reap the vastly expanded 
benefits of international scientific, technological and economic exchange, without which no 
state can longer remain a great power.’129 
For Russia this also means working within the framework of international institutions 
and, increasingly, in exploiting those institutions to further Russian interests. Russia can be 
seen not only as one of the ‘difficult cases’,130 but as a case which has proved remarkably 
successful at manipulation of international events in order to enhance the government’s 
prestige both at home and abroad. This has been most evident over the Kosovo conflict, but 
also in debates over NATO expansion and the EU. At the same time, international institutions 
provide a check on Russia’s activity, since they serve as a bridge between Russia and the 
other members of the international institution. In Russia’s case this is especially important as 
it would be politically unthinkable for one leading world power like the USA to dictate 
independently conditions for Russia’s behaviour in different internal or external matters 
without going through the apparently neutral medium of international institutions. In this 
light it is quite clear that Russia and the USA, as well as other leading western countries, do 
calculate benefits and costs. At present, Russia apparently sees the uncooperative line as 
bringing more benefits than costs (although quite what the benefits are is discussed later in 
this thesis). Institutionalism emphasizes, however, that especially international institutions 
and the mechanisms created within their frameworks are essential in creating lasting co-
operation and in helping to overcome the thresholds in different cases of co-operation.’131  
 
The complex interdependence model, which is very relevant for institutionalism and 
indeed in any study of international organisations, is characterised by allowing multiple 
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channels, connecting societies and removing military force as a dominating agenda in world 
affairs.132 Keohane’s and Nye’s model also includes three basic assumptions about the world: 
1. Societies are connected not only by interstate relations, but by transgovernmental and 
transnational relations as well. 
2. There is no hierarchy among issues in world politics, which means that military 
security does not dominate other issues. 
3. For the region or the issues wherein complex interdependence prevails, military force 
is irrelevant and inefficient to resolve disagreements 
 
These points have some connection to today’s world politics. Point two is of less concern 
especially in the world since September 11th and the age of war on terrorism. But points one 
and three have a strong relevance specifically in Russia’s case towards the rest of the world 
and especially in regard to international organisations and Russia. 
Keohane and Nye’s complex interdependence model, with its emphasis on 
transgovernmental and transnational relations,133 also has implications for the Russian case. 
‘In complex interdependence power resources specific to issue areas – such as manipulation 
of interdependence, or international organisations, or transnational actors will be most 
relevant.’134 If Russia is really to gain the status of a great power recognized by all actors, it 
needs to become a trusted partner in the network of international organisations. Russia 
already participates in NATO, EU, IMF, G7 (G8), UN and OSCE and later the WTO.  
In the framework of international institutions there is also an argument that ‘where 
international institutions exist, the post-Soviet leadership attempts to use them to gain access 
to resources and help stabilize their tumultuous political and economic relations’.135 This may 
be the case to some extent, but also this should be seen as a long-term opportunity to integrate 
Russia into world politics and create some basis for better cooperation and common 
understanding. 
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Many constructivist writers have drawn empirical evidence from Russia or tested 
assumptions in the Russian context: Ted Hopf, Iver Neumann, Jeffrey Checkel, Anne 
C.Clunan, Robert Herman136 etc. Specifically, the fall of the Soviet Union provided the big 
push for constructivists to show how identities, rules and norms matter and that reality is 
more complex than ‘rational theories’ tend to argue.  
In the Russian context constructivism fits rather well since the Russian discourse is 
strongly connected with the ideas of identity. ‘In the constructivist perspective, identity 
research is about development, evolution, construction; identity is treated as a process, an 
ever-evolving phenomenon that is based on a certain foundation of stable cultural attributes 
but open to adjustments and transformation’.137 In the case of Russia, the constructivist way 
of approaching identity is through self-identification. It is often done either following the 
method of breaking Russian political society into groups based on their ideological 
orientations or through the prism of otherness. On the one hand when looking at the question 
of otherness the West is the single most significant other. On the ‘other’ hand europeanness is 
often counted as part of Russian identity and the ‘other’ is outside that framework.  The 
Europe in Russia is reflected well in Gorbachev’s central foreign policy of the ‘Common 
European Home’.  Europe has not only been for Russia the other but Russia has been the 
other for Europe. 138 The academic community is quite united behind the thought that ‘Russia 
is in Europe but not of Europe’. Ted Hopf in his book Social Construction of International 
Politics comes to the conclusion that there are not only many identities influencing at the 
same time but also many different others.139 In Neumann’s definition of what constitutes a 
Great Power, the others’ acceptance is very central. That is also the weakest link in Russia’s 
own identification as a Great Power. Hopf looks at Russian identity through four different 
discourses and identities that constitute them and concludes that all four discourses 
appreciated the Soviet past for the Great Power status attributed to the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War. Hopf continues: ‘Presumably, states that accorded Russia that kind of status in 
1999 would be considered more favourably than those who denied such an identity’.140 
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The constructivist school of thought has definitely added to the Western understanding of 
Russian foreign policy thinking and behaviour. Andrei P Tsygankov has observed: 
‘Constructivists do not view foreign policy as a product of a unitary state’s advancing power, 
as in realism, or as a particular group’s pursuing modernization interests, as in liberalism. 
Rather, the role of a coalition is to put forward a particular image of national identity that will 
speak to the existing local conditions and be recognized by the significant other. Identity 
coalitions are broader and more fundamental than interest coalitions, and they seek to achieve 
social recognition, rather than to maximize wealth or power.’141 Precisely this aspect has 
contributed a lot to Western understandings of Russia and vice versa.  
 
2.6 Great Power Definitions applied to Russia 
While the definitions of a Great Power do not have any official status in international 
discourses (indeed there is no official status of a ‘Great Power’), the different approaches in 
IR literature are reflected in the assesments of different international actors. It is therefore 
instructive to examine how the academic definitions of a Great Power have been applied to 
the case of Russia. 
From the realist point of view, the assessment is fairly straightforward. Returning to 
Levy’s realist definition, he sees that in 1975 there were six great powers in the world: 
France, Great Britain, Russia/the Soviet Union, Germany, the United States and China. 
Russia/the Soviet Union had remained, in Levy’s view, a great power continuously since 
1721. By this realist definition even today’s Russia is accorded great power status, at least by 
virtue of its nuclear arsenal and military capability, and its clear place as the leading power in 
regional organisations embracing the former Soviet space.  
However, according to Neumann and others, in the case of Russia it can be argued that it 
does have national pride – greatpowerness – as well as the material attributes of a great power 
that are recognised by realists. Russia also seeks to reaffirm its great power status through its 
search for international prestige – recognition by the world community and particularly the 
Western powers the EU and the USA. But Neumann states that this quest has not been 
successful. ‘The persistence of the theme and the intensity of its presence in Russian identity 
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politics suggests that Russia’s quest for recognition as a great power has not been a 
successful one. This is because, if an identity claim is successful, it forms part of the horizon 
of the political debate rather than its substance. Recognition of Russia as a great power can 
only be given by great powers that are established as such.’??? His constructivist definition 
provides one suggestion as to what is missing from Russia’s status as a great power. In 
Neumann’s picture Russia would qualify as a great power on two out of three criteria. In 
Weber’s realist account relating to prestige through material sources and ability to project 
power, Russia as a great power holds at least since the end of the 18th century. Under 
Durkheim’s moral criteria, Russia is on weaker ground already but does still seem to fulfil 
them nevertheless. Russia’s Christian credentials and European civilisation tilts the Great 
Power status in Russia’s favour. However already in this category questions and doubts 
started to appear from the European side at the same time as Russia’s status as a Great 
European Power seemed to be consolidated at the end of the 18th century. The two faces of 
Russia became perhaps even a source of confusion in Europe as to what kind of a country 
Russia was and how it should be dealt with. One of the most famous of these early accounts, 
that did cast a shadow on Russia as a Great Power, is the Marquis de Custine’s Journey of 
Our Time that describes very critically the Russian society and state. He observed: ‘Do you 
know what it is to travel in Russia? For a superficial mind, it is to be fed on illusions; but for 
one who has his eyes open and added to a little power of observation, an independent turn of 
mind, it is continuous and obstinate work, which consists in laboriously distinguishing, at 
every turn, between two nations in conflict. These nations are Russia as it is and Russia as it 
would like to show itself to Europe.’??? 
Neumann’s argument sees the situation with Russia as follows: ‘On Weber’s criteria   - 
material resources and the ability to project power – there is no doubt that Russia was a Great 
Power by the end of the 18th century. Similarly, on Durkheim’s moral criteria – setting an 
example for how a state should be in the world – the socialization into the states system 
would appear to be strong enough for Russia to qualify’,??? but even by fulfilling these two 
criteria, according to Neumann, Russia has not been able to fully qualify as a great power in 
European terms. Therefore the third element and the most important in Neumann’s argument 
(inspired by Foucault’s ideas) is that regime type and governance style do in the end 
determine great power status. In European terms ‘Russia’s problem with being recognised as 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
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a great power is a social one. At its root is the question of relations between state and society. 
As seen from Europe, a great power cannot have state/society relations that are too different 
from those that at any one given time dominate European politics. In the final analysis, in 
order to achieve and maintain the status of great power, social compatibility is needed.’??? 
Neumann’s argument is a big claim and he leaves open who is the one that defines this social 
compatibility. This naturally points already to the direction that on its own this is a factor 
which can create tension in the Russia-West relationship. 
In the case of liberal approaches, it becomes even clearer that there is a gap between 
Russian perceptions and those of Western states when it comes to acceptance of Russia as a 
Great Power. Russian foreign policy has, throughout its history, been working towards it 
being an agenda setter and one of the founding members in international relations 
structures.??? Despite Russia’s hard work, according to the analysis of Nye, neither Imperial 
Russia nor the Soviet Union has been rewarded with either world leadership or military 
hegemony from the 16th century until the fall of the Soviet Union.??? In the post-Soviet world, 
the partial loss of military and other forms of power status were not made up for by advances 
in democratic development and embracing western values. The value gap not only leads 
directly to misunderstandings in Russia-Europe relations in particular, but also does so 
indirectly. Since Russia is not seen as fully compatible with European values and does not 
have the soft power instruments (beyond its immediate neighbourhood) associated with 
liberal conceptions of a Great Power, it continues to struggle to achieve any recognition of its 
great power status.  
To sum up, it can be argued that in Russia’s case undisputed factors, mentioned in all of 
the three articles, that make it a Great Power and are in fact sources of its own understanding 
of greatpowerness are its size (geography), military power, natural resources, cultural 
influence, history, ability to inject power and the potentials and possibilities that are related to 
Russia as a nation state. Areas where Russia then does not fully qualify, according to the 
definitions, are economics, soft power that relates to questions of authority and respect and 
the question of good governance with domestic realities. When it comes to the factor of being 
recognised by others the case is not quite clear either. Each of the three definitions leads to a 
different result: under the realist definition, Russia has been a Great Power for the past three 
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centuries and continues to be so; for liberals, Russia is far from being a Great Power in a 
sense which can be accepted by western powers; for constructivists, Great Power status is 
more ambiguous: Russia achieves the status on certain criteria, including those which are 
most commonly counted by Russians, but not on others. In the Western discourses of 
declining and rising powers in world politics, being recognised by others has grown in 
importance, sometimes even overtaking the material factors.  
The differences revealed in academic definitions of what constitutes a great power when 
it comes to Russia do not in themselves translate directly into international relations. But they 
do highlight the potential for a mismatch between the self-perception of greatpowerness by a 
one country and the failure to accept or recognise that status by other powers. When looking 
at cooperation between Russia and the West and especially in the framework of international 
organisations, the matter of being a Great Power can easily be politicised and the result can 
be that of hurting Russian greatpowerness, which is different from being a Great Power.   
 
2.7 Conclusion 
?
This chapter has discussed three schools of international relations theory, and definitions 
of a Great Power arising from each of those schools. Each of these schools has something to 
offer to the understanding of greatpowerness which informs the remainder of this thesis.  In 
contrast to sociological studies and some other disciplines, International Relations theories 
have tended to be viewed as incompatible with each other and, indeed, schools and sub-
schools have developed largely as a result of a series of polemical debates with each other. A 
more recent trend, however, has been to view different schools as contributing jointly 
towards understandings of the same foreign policy behaviour. As Neumann and Pouliot, for 
example, have put it ‘At the level of practice, both views [realism and constructivism] are 
obviously right, as politics seamlessly combine stability with change.’148 In his early 
assessment of the role of International Relations theory in the study of Soviet and post-Soviet 
foreign policy, Christer Pursiainen concluded that both neoliberal institutionalism and 
constructivism could contribute to the study of Russia’s foreign policy, while also developing 
‘a synthesis-like conceptual framework to be used both in defining the nature of Russian 
foreign policy decision-making and analysing particular cases of situational decision-
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
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making’.149 In her study cited above, Michelle Murray, while adopting for the most part a 
constructivist approach to the case of German greatpowerness, agrees that some motives are 
best explained by a realist approach. But it may be that such a combination of theoretical 
approaches is more common in the study of Russian foreign policy than in other cases. 
Without fully claiming uniqueness for Russia, it does become apparent that Russian decision 
making and actions are relatively inconsistent, unpredictable and difficult to pin down, in part 
because of the peculiar combination of bureaucratic and individual levels of decision-
making.150 
All three international relations schools have something to contribute to understandings 
of greatpowerness. Greatpowerness for Russia is a question of identity which involves 
matters of power and whose end is recognition by and membership of an elite group of 
Western democratic states. Hence the definitions of a Great Power provided by 
constructivists, realists and neoliberals contain more common elements than might otherwise 
be expected, yet each approach has its own emphasis. These differences help explain the 
conflicting understandings of what constitutes a Great Power between Russia and the West, 
which are discussed in the next chapter.  
In the three different definitions of a Great Power, each added something that was 
missing from the others. For the realist based definition presented by Levy, power, in its 
traditional meaning of physical strength, is essential. In Nye’s definition, representing the 
liberal institutional view, power has obtained some other forms than just physical strength 
through military and economic might. Nye’s soft power concept makes a Great Power more 
modern and emphasises common values. Neumann’s view of what constitutes a Great Power 
adds into the picture the concept of good governance and, related to that, acceptance by 
others.  
These definitions of a great power have been used by political scientists to categorise 
states according to their place in the world order. The categorisation of each power can then 
be used as one variable in explaining foreign policy behaviour. Russia is an unusual case in 
that it qualifies as a Great Power under certain criteria of each definition, but not every 
criterion of every definition. This serves to underline Russia’s ambiguous place in the post-
Cold War world.  
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Competing definitions of a great power help to illuminate the concept of greatpowerness, 
since the criteria are all understood to a greater or lesser degree by states. However, as with 
social scientists, states are not unanimous as to which criteria are the most important, which 
can lead to conflicts when it comes to recognition as a great power. Since greatpowerness is 
primarily a matter of state identity and self-perception, it is mostly the constructivist school 
that helps explain this aspect of Russia’s foreign policy behaviour. However, since both the 
hard power stressed by realists and the soft power taken up by neoliberals are taken up in 
Russian efforts to gain recognition and treatment as a Great Power, both schools contribute to 
the understanding of greatpowerness arrived at in this chapter. The most comprehensive 
discussion to date of greatpowerness has been applied to Germany prior to World War One 
seen as a case of a rising power seeking recognition as such. Russia, by contrast, has been a 
power that has clearly declined from its peak but which nonetheless, as the following chapter 
illustrates, has no doubts as to its continuing Great Power status. ?
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Chapter 3: Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy 
 
 ‘Foreign Policy is both an indicator and a determining factor for the condition of 
internal affairs. Here we should have no illusions. The competence, skill and effectiveness 
with which we use our diplomatic resources determines not only the prestige of our country 
in the eyes of the world but also the political and economic situation inside Russia itself’151  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Historically, one reason the identity question became so important in Russia was that 
many Russian intellectuals had a need to explain, especially to Europeans, what kind of a 
country Russia was. This meant that Russia had to be understood in comparison to other 
European countries, and it has widely been argued among scholars of Russian studies from 
all disciplines that Russia is ‘different’. However, in the discourse of Russian otherness the 
answer to the question ‘How is Russia different?’ has been difficult to find.  
Greatpowerness is a concept that Russians have used to describe their country, which is 
one way of linking Russia into a more universal system while maintaining that differentness 
which is at the core of Russian cultural and political self-understanding. Greatpowerness is 
an easier concept to define in the Russian context than democracy, totalitarianism or any 
other term in political science which characterises a state identity. Russians call it 
Derzhavnost. Robert Legvold explains the word: ‘Derzhavnost, however, has a meaning all 
its own, one missing from the English language, simply because the phenomenon is missing. 
Only the Russians in moments of distress revert to an affection of great-power standing – 
that is, to asserting their natural right to the role and influence of great power whether they 
have the wherewithal or not’.152 Where Legvold is right about greatpowerness in the Russian 
context, he perhaps misses the fact that greatpowerness does exist in all the Great Powers or 
in countries that see themselves as Great Powers.153  
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
151 Putin, 2011 
152 Robert Legvold, ‘Russian Foreign Policy During State Transformation’, in Robert Legvold (ed.), Russian 
Foreign Policy in the 21st Century &The Shadow of the Past, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 77-
143, p.114. 
153 See Hedley Bull, ‘Great Irresponsibles? The United States, The Soviet Union and the World Order’, 
International Journal, 35, 1979, pp.437-447 for discussion of different and similar approaches by Great Powers 
and countries that see themselves as belonging to the group of Great Powers. 
 
 
59 
What actually constitutes a normal country has not been defined. What unites some 
states is the similarity between them in terms of state identity. Sometimes state identity 
effectively replaces national identity. This is the case especially when looking at 
multinational states. But Russia does not fit into this pattern, and instead state identity, 
especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, has been a mishmash of everything. Through the 
concept of being a Great Power Russia has worked best with countries that share Great 
Power interests and also politics. The road has not been easy to be part of today’s Great 
Powers and this particular feature relating to the difficulties of state identity has been a 
source of cooperation and conflict in Russia’s relations with the Western countries, as Iver 
Neumann’s argument summarised in the previous chapter has shown. 
In this chapter the attempt is made to bring under the magnifying glass concepts that 
seem to be very persistent in Russian historical foreign policy discourse, while recognising 
that not all historical references necessarily translate to today’s world; ‘Discontinuity is as 
permanent a feature of history as continuity’.154  
Leading western historians of Russian national and imperial identity – Geoffrey Hosking, 
Hugh Seton-Watson, Vera Tolz and Ronald Suny - have identified a number of factors which 
have been a persistent part of the Russian great power thinking since the time of Ivan the 
Terrible, or the Napoleonic wars, or Peter the Great respectively: imperialism, expansionism, 
isolationism, multilateralism, and sovereignty.155 Liah Greenfeld further identified 
ressentiment as a part of Russia’s great power thinking from the late eighteenth century on.156 
As well as the late imperial period, historians identify each of these factors as present in 
Soviet foreign policy making at certain periods.157 Contemporary observers in the Soviet 
period also noted the presence of each of these factors,158 while political scientists and 
international relations specialists who refer back to trends already present in the Soviet 
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period, have also identified imperialism, expansionism, isolationism, sovereignty, 
multilateralism and ressentiment as continuing factors.159  
The notion that there are persistent factors providing continuity across the ages in 
Russian foreign policy is not a new one. In addition to the historians mentioned above, Alfred 
J. Rieber has written: ‘This chapter accepts the premise of continuity in Russian foreign 
policy but rejects single-factor, determinist theories’.160 His four persistent factors are 
economic backwardness, porous frontiers, multinational society and cultural alienation. All of 
these can be found in relation to greatpowerness and, while the persistent factors used in this 
chapter are differently formulated, Rieber’s factors can all be included. Rieber sums up the 
importance of such factors as follows: ‘Persistent factors have a long term horizon; they make 
up the geographical and cultural dimensions of Russian foreign policy’.161  
These are the factors in Russian great power thinking that are focussed on in this study, 
as each is related to Greatpowerness and is evident, to different degrees, in each of the case 
study chapters. They are not all present all of the time, and sometimes are in competition with 
each other. They do, however, run through the remainder of this dissertation: imperialism, 
sovereignty and expansionism appear in chapter 4; sovereignty, and multilateralism and 
isolationism posed as alternatives in chapter 5; isolationism, ressentiment and sovereignty 
play a part in chapter 6, along with the liberal notion of norms and values and the realist 
notion of interests; multilateralism again plays a role in chapter 7, while sovereignty comes 
into conflict with international obligations, until both are trumped by the politics of 
ressentiment. 
Russian foreign policy searches for its sources from past experiences that are not 
dependent on time, state system or ideology. Since the concepts can be tracked far back in 
history, it can be stated that they are the cornerstones of Russian state identity in 
international relations. All the concepts have their own specificities. They are used 
simultaneously but their position in the foreign policy priority list keeps changing depending 
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on time. This makes reading of Russian foreign policy challenging. An increasing literature 
of the analysis of continuity and change has been appearing from 2000 onwards.162 
For the attempt to uncover Russian foreign policy behaviour in its encounters with 
international organisations it is essential to understand the underlying concepts that have 
been influencing Russian foreign policy making for centuries. So it is central to our 
understanding of current Russian foreign policy to be aware of how Russia uses concepts of 
international relations and, indeed, what translates from the past into current policies. 
 
3.2 Russian foreign policy schools 
?
The direction and the nature of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation since the 
break up of the Soviet Union has been debated both in domestic discussions in Russia, and 
by analysts and academics in the West and elsewhere. The debates reflect visions of what 
kind of a state Russia should be. The nature of the state is essential when it comes to the 
selection of foreign policy orientation as well. 
Traditionally Russian foreign policy thinking has been put into three different categories 
that have then competed in the foreign policy establishment for the leading place. Alla 
Kassianova has observed: ‘Most authors who have written on the evolution of the foreign 
policy discourse in Russia follow the method of breaking Russian political society into 
groups based on their ideological orientations, and comparing their respective narratives on 
key topics of Russian domestic and foreign policies.’163 Both domestic and outside factors 
have influenced how the different groups have been in the leading place and then changed 
places. The common way of breaking the political society into groups is to define three 
categories.164 The categories according to Andrei Tsygankov are westernisers, statists and 
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civilizationists.165 Igor A Zevelev’s equivalent groups are liberals, Great Power balancers and 
nationalists.166 
Bobo Lo has argued that this categorization has its drawbacks. In his view the most 
important drawback is inflexibility, once a label has been given to a person it tends to stick. 
This categorization gives insufficient account to changing allegiances of participants seduced 
one way or another by self-interests and short term political imperatives. Furthermore Lo 
argues: ‘Labels are also highly normative, and often reflect the commentator’s biases as 
much, if not more so, than those of the subject.’167 Lo’s point is very relevant but it does not 
undermine the bigger picture where different lines for Russian foreign policy orientation are 
visible. Individuals can change camps and analysis can enhance their own preferences but the 
overall picture remains the same. Furthermore, it can be argued that the three different groups 
have something in common in the Great Power identity. The concepts looked at here can be 
found in all of the groups but arguments are framed differently. Nevertheless, it is useful to 
consider the viewpoints of the different camps while at the same time bearing in mind Lo’s 
cautions. 
Russian statists come closest to the Western realist thinking, and are also known as 
eurasianist or liberal nationalist. This group could be broken down further along a variety of 
different lines. Statists believe that foreign policy should be guided by national interests 
defined realistically with regard to the Russian geopolitical security situation, domestic 
economic objectives and available resources. During Vladimir Putin’s presidency this line 
was also called pragmatist. It can be argued that the statists are the most influential group in 
Russian foreign policy. They see the state as a central actor governing and preserving the 
social and political order. For statists one important defining concept in foreign policy 
making is the notion of external threat. The concept of external threat is also seen in domestic 
politics. Ressentiment is one of the ways this characteristic translates into policies.  
The Russian school of Westernisers (zapadniki) have been called atlanticist, liberals, 
democrats and even ‘international institutionalist’. For this group the West was the referent 
for Russian evolving state identity. Russian discourses of modernization have roots in this 
thinking, Russia needs to become a modern state in the Western style. Westernisers 
emphasise the Russian similarity with the West and view the West as the most viable and 
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progressive civilisation in the world. For Westernisers the ideas of multilateralism and 
international cooperation are essential elements of international politics. 
The last group – civilizationists - are also known as slavophiles (slavyanofily) or 
nationalists.168 This group seek their arguments from what they call Russian inheritance and 
values. They see the international environment as hostile. For them the West is a threat to 
Russian values and the vast land mass as essential for Russian greatness. Those subscribing 
to this group often circulate isolationist ideas. Their foreign policy discourse exploits 
mythologised narratives of Russian civilisational uniqueness and ‘mission’. For 
civilisationists the idea of the ‘Russian Empire’ has been in the core of thinking. The 
civilizationists object to both Western and Asian influence in Russia, seeking Slavic unity. 
 In Russia’s policies towards the West and especially Europe three main groups of 
foreign policy thinking can be identified. They can be named as Europhiles, Eurasianists and 
Europhobics  (see table 1.). This follows the lines of the three main Russian schools in 
relation to foreign relations. 
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Table 3.1 Russian foreign policy orientations towards Europe 
 
Russia 
 
 
Europhiles (also known as 
westernisers, liberal 
internationalist, atlanticist) 
Eurasians (also 
known as 
pragmatic 
nationalist, 
statist) 
Europhobes (also known 
as civilizationist, 
slavophiles, patriots) 
Russia’s relations to 
Europe 
Integral and undivided 
part of Europe 
Semi-integral 
part of Europe 
Separate cultural entity 
European values 
(rule of law, human 
rights, democracy) 
Russia should adapt 
without questions to those 
values 
Russia should 
pick up those 
parts that fit 
Russia 
Different values 
(Collective thinking and 
spiritual unity) 
Russia’s position in 
Europe 
Great Power through soft 
power elements 
Global Great 
Power  
Global Great Power 
Identity European Multinational Russian 
The form of state Democratic state with 
strong president and rule 
of law 
Semi-democracy, 
centralized 
power, weak 
institutions 
Autocracy with people’s 
forum. Leader listens to 
people 
Central national 
interests 
Economic policy Security policy Social and regional 
policy  
Foreign policy Eurocentric – Russia is a 
European Great Power 
Great power 
politics, USA, 
China equals 
with Russia 
Slavic unity, Russia as 
the protector of the 
slavic cultural 
inheritance a unique 
Great Power 
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These three dominant lines of thinking on foreign policy can be seen as a fact of 
continuity in Russian foreign policy. Arguably it could be stated that these factors have been 
present as a type of a philosophy in Russian foreign policy thinking since the Russian 
adoption of Orthodox Christianity in 988, although it took centuries before the idea of ‘third 
Rome’ was introduced in the 15th century and became an active concept during the reign of 
Ivan IV (the terrible) who was first crowned as the Tsar of all Russians in 1547.  
The Russian leading political elite, individual leaderships and the outside world have 
had influence on which group has had the leading position in Russian foreign policy. This 
change of power balance in the Russian foreign policy philosophies has often been viewed in 
the West as a change in foreign policy orientation. The groups have different emphases, 
rhetoric and methods to go by, but the underlining fact is that all of them have at least one 
unifying notion and that is the notion of Russia as a Great Power whether it is in a European, 
global or regional context. The different lines can also exist simultaneously even relating to 
the same topic but in different forums. This confuses the picture even further. 
 
3.3 Derzhavnost -  Great Power thinking uniting Russian foreign policy groups 
For Russians, derzhavnost’ is more like an emotion, it is a craving for a status which 
most Russians strongly believe is theirs by right, by virtue of the enormous size of the 
country, its resources, its history. In the past this feeling has been expressed ideologically in 
terms of Russia as the defender of Christendom or as the guardian of international 
communism. However, its roots are deeper than these obsolete ideologies. Russia’s leading 
role in the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century and its place as one of the two great 
superpowers for much of the twentieth century have left the impression that Russia is, and 
should be treated as, at least on a level with the world’s other great powers.  
Russia’s greatpowerness is based on its large size, military might and cultural impacts, 
and yet it still does not translate into the economic power that has been the aim of Russian 
foreign and domestic policy for centuries without success. Furthermore Russia has been too 
weak to survive on its own and too large to have natural allies. The importance of 
derzhavnost’ as a key element in Russian state identity with important impacts on foreign 
policy making has been recognized by scholars for some time. In a statement of this 
relationship, Margot Light has argued that ‘Russia was clearly not a superpower; indeed, it 
was questionable whether it was a great power. Yet to ordinary people, as well as to 
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politicians, it was unthinkable that Russia could be anything less than this. The insistence that 
Russia should be regarded as a great power became an important theme in foreign policy 
statements and discussions and it remains an important driver of foreign policy’. Light goes 
on to argue that ‘…Russia’s identity could be established by defining its foreign policy 
principles’.169 
George Friedman stated after president Putin’s speech at Munich’s security forum in 
February 2007 ‘The Cold War has not returned, but Russia is now officially asserting itself as 
a great power, and behaving accordingly’.170 While the war with Georgia in August 2008 was 
the most extreme manifestation of a new, more assertive direction in Russian foreign policy, 
most observers had noticed this new direction long before, with the Munich speech clearly 
marking a watershed regarding how Russia argued about itself in the world arena. As Dmitri 
Trenin put it at the beginning of 2008, the Munich speech was a signal of ‘Russia’s return to 
the traditional status of an independent player on the international stage, unencumbered by 
any relationship of “complex subordination” to the West’.171 This was not mere rhetoric. As 
another observer noted in a review of Russian foreign policy for the year 2007, it was ‘the 
year Vladimir Putin implicitly compared the United States to the Third Reich. It was the year 
Moscow threatened to target its missiles at Europe and was accused of carrying out a cyber-
attack on a NATO member. It was the year Russia pulled out of a key arms-control treaty and 
resumed strategic-bomber patrols. And it was the year that…the last remnants of the vaunted 
strategic partnership between Russia and the West appeared headed for the dustbin of 
history’.172 
The shift led some commentators to talk of a new Cold War,173 and while this never fully 
materialised the differences were clear. Beforehand, Russia’s leading politicians concentrated 
on the need and aspiration to become a great power again, but with his Munich speech 
president Putin defined Russia as a great power. For example, in his 2000 State of the Nation 
speech Putin argued:  
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The only real choice for Russia is the choice of a strong country. A country that is 
strong and confident of itself. Strong not in defiance of the international community, not 
against other strong nations, but together with them.174 
and again in 2003:  
Now we must take the next step and focus all our decisions and all our action 
on ensuring that in a not too far off future, Russia will take its recognized place 
among the ranks of the truly strong, economically advanced and influential 
nations.175  
The underlying message here is that Russia has been a great power, it has had its weak 
moments but it is a great country by potential and the future will show to those that cast a 
doubt over this claim that Russia will again be recognized as a great power. On other 
occasions Putin did not admit any doubts about Russia’s great power status. In an interview 
with the newspaper Welt am Sonntag in June 2000 it was put to Putin that ‘there is some 
concern in the West about renewed Russian claims to the status of a great power’, to which 
he replied: ‘Russia is not claiming a great power status. It is a great power by virtue of its 
huge potential, its history and culture’.176 President Medvedev has since the start of his 
presidency used the term ‘Russia as a Great Power’ on every possible occasion, from 
speeches in the domestic political arena to talks with the presidents of China, France and 
other nations. Russian greatpowerness can also be viewed as primarily resting on nuclear 
weapons, as Sergei Kortunov from the committee on international affairs of the Duma’s 
upper house described it: 
Russia is a great power in terms of its political importance, intellectual might 
and influence on global affairs, including as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council and corresponding responsibilities. Apart from this, as well as 
the geopolitical situation and the existence of nuclear weapons (Russia is a 
military superpower without a doubt), other proof of Russia’s great power status 
are its current and future opportunities of a resource provider, its hard-working 
and intellectual population, and the high scientific and technological potential. 
These factors (territory, technological and human potential, and the existence of 
nearly all types of raw materials and resources) objectively make Russia a major 
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world power.177 
 This description underlines a major feature of Russian claims to greatpowerness, 
which was also present in many of Putin’s earlier statements – potential. 
 The undoubted source of Russian greatpowerness has been the Russian military and 
nuclear arsenal as well as characteristics of imperialism. The characteristics of imperialism, 
weak or not, functioning or not, bring with them a notion of greatness too. As Richard Pipes 
has put it:  
Russia is torn by contradictory pulls, one oriented inward, hence isolationist, 
the other imperialist. The population at large, preoccupied with physical survival, 
displays little interest in foreign policy, taking in stride the loss of empire and the 
world influence that went with it. People pine for normality, which they associate 
with life in the West as depicted in foreign films and television programs. 
Depoliticized, they are unresponsive to ideological appeals, although not averse 
to blaming all their troubles on foreigners. But for the ruling elite and much of 
the intelligentsia, accustomed to being regarded as citizens of a great power, the 
country’s decline to Third World status has been traumatic. They are less 
concerned with low living standards than the loss of power and influence, 
perhaps because inwardly they doubt whether Russia can ever equal the West in 
anything else. Power and influence for them take the form of imperial splendor 
and military might second to none.178 
In this conception the empire has more to do with the size and influence of the country 
than with being a classic imperium with colonies. Russian imperial character still lies in its 
image of a military power and a status that it has automatically through the size of the 
country. According to Pipes’ argument, for the ordinary people the status of a great power is 
not as important as it is for the elite and intelligentsia. However, recently opinion polls have 
shown a slightly different picture.  
In an August 2008 poll conducted by FOM, 60 percent of those that answered saw 
Russia as a great power, in comparison to 21 percent in 1996. The most popular view of 
respondents regarding the sources for Russia greatpowerness concerned the size of the 
country (large territory), its strength (strong state), natural resources, ‘Russia has always been 
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a great power’, Russia is feared, its voice is heard and it has a say in important international 
matters, Russia has authority in international matters and its army is powerful.179 Also 
noteworthy is the fact that 72% of all respondents place Russia among the 10 most important 
countries in the world. Out of those 44% see Russia belonging to the five leading countries 
and 7% place Russia as a leader of the world.180 This opinion poll is only one example of 
how Russian people view their own country’s position in the world order. One of the main 
themes of Putin’s official speeches throughout his presidencies was Russia’s belonging to the 
group of great (Russian velikaya) nations. Towards the end of his second term in office, Putin 
dropped the conditionality and claimed Russia to be a great power. The opinion poll shows 
that this message has been delivered well.  
The fact that Russian greatpowerness has been a part of its identity, and has often been a 
uniting factor for the nation in hard times, also has a downside. The thirst for greatpowerness 
has had its costs. For the political elite it has been important to maintain the picture of Russia 
as a great power but the drive to play a part in global politics and also be influential in the 
world has made some domestic developments suffer as well:  
One legacy passed on to us from our Soviet foreign policy was a 
‘superpower mentality’ and a subsequent striving to participate in any and all 
more or less significant international developments, which often bore a greater 
domestic cost than the country could afford.181 
The problems that Russia has had during its history regarding reforms and modernisation 
efforts have often had their roots in the drive for great power status, either to maintain or to 
gain it. Russia has often embarked on the road to reforms when it has detected some 
weaknesses in its own system and the understanding has been that without reforms Russia’s 
great power status might be questioned. However, the limits of the reforms have also been 
defined by the framework of a great power status. Wars, the inflexibility of political 
structures and the fear of losing Great Power status have then worked in the opposite 
direction. One of the best examples is Gorbachev’s Russia. The reforms started precisely 
from the view that if the Soviet Union will not reform/modernise, it will lose its superpower 
status. The reforms then turned out to be half hearted due to the fact that they led to the 
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Soviet Union’s great power status being questioned. This is well illustrated, especially 
regarding the thinking in the ranks of military leaders and security service elite, by Mar L. 
Haas in his book ‘The Ideological Thinking of Great Power Politics 1789-1989’.182 Soviet 
reactions to the events in Riga and in Vilnius in early 1991 provide good examples, as do the 
wars in Chechnya and the five day war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, of the 
consequences of a state reacting on the basis of the view of itself as a Great Power. 
 The fundamental problem of Russia’s great power status has always been Russia’s 
economic structure as compared to the Western economies and its style of governance. 
Celeste A. Wallander and  Eugene B Rumer have argued:  
What defines a great power if not a colossal geographic expanse, rapid 
economic growth, a vast nuclear arsenal, a permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council, and the unique ability to obliterate the United States at the flick 
of a switch? With all of these traits, plus vast quantities of energy resources and 
vital raw materials, wide-reaching political influence, and a dynamic leader, 
Russia appears to have what it takes to be a great power. The reality, however, is 
that these very elements that scholars and observers readily identify as key 
attributes are actually sources of weakness for Russia and thus significantly limit 
the country’s ability to act as a desirable partner for managing the global 
challenges of terrorism, proliferation, underdevelopment, and instability.183  
 As Wallander and Rumer show, Russian great power status is contradictory, on the one 
hand, it has it, and on the other hand, a shadow has been cast over it. The great power status 
is often an asset in Russian domestic politics and at the same time a stumbling block in 
domestic reforms. 
 
3.4 History and national interest 
   National interest plays a great part in discourses of Russian politics, as it does in other 
countries. But what defines the national interest? Contemporary understandings of the 
national interest, at least in Russia, are strongly linked to the past through continuity and/or 
current perceptions of the past. Russia’s past has largely been that of a great power, and so 
those interests are the interests of a great power. History is a subject that is highly regarded 
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in Russia and people are proud of its history. ‘We (Russians) are attracted to history. As 
respected Soviet academician Pokrovsky has said, history is politics which is created through 
the past. Historical analogues are used a lot in Russia.’184 Russian Great Power identity finds 
many of its building materials in the past and in the light of what history has always meant to 
Russians, history has also become an essential element of Russian self-perceptions as a Great 
Power. This is also very visible in Russia-West relations today. 
The Russian imperial past has cast a shadow over its nation-state building, in fact it can 
be argued that history and the imperial past as a building block for Russian greatpowerness 
very much stand in the way of Russian modernisation projects. Since the rulers of Russia 
were most of the time interested in the first place in maintaining the power of their dynasty, 
state building or development occurred only when a leader felt there was a need for it. The 
need could be internal or external, but most of the time the external was used for internal 
purposes.  
There was a separation of different classes in imperial Russia. ‘In what might be called 
the “imperial imaginary” rulers did not so much want the ruled to identify with them but 
rather emphasized the distance and difference between monarchs, nobles and ordinary 
subjects’.185 This created a situation where people identified themselves primarily with 
locality, religion and family. This distance of power from the people in the early 19th century 
marked empire and differentiated Russia from the nation-state building of future centuries.186 
But to hold an empire together a bigger framework was needed and became important in 
times of invasions or offensives. By using the concept of Great Power, Russia has been able 
to form a functionable national and state identity.  And to push the argument a bit further, 
Russians have especially in times of trouble sought unity in the concept of greatpowerness as 
national strength. This is regardless of which school of foreign policy you belong to. 
 The three different foreign policy schools have slightly different interpretations of the 
past and especially disagree over when have been the greatest moments of Russian history. 
For the westernisers what has moved Russia forward is its interactions with the West, in 
particular with Europe, and the leaders to remember are those that have brought reforms to 
Russia: Peter the Great, Alexander II and Gorbachev. For statists the times of Russian 
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expansionism and great alliances are the times to remember and leaders like Catherine the 
Great, Alexander I and III as well as Stalin are those that should be looked up to. For the 
slavophiles the times before Peter the Great, when the Orthodox Church was still strong and 
the Byzantine world had a strong position are the times when the real Russia existed. In 
alliances the slavophiles see Slavic brotherhood as the workable concept. Their historical 
figures are Tolstoy, Solzhenitsyn and Ivan III. 
The influence of historical continuity on current foreign policy making is still very 
understudied in general, although often stated, and in Russia’s case too often foreign policy 
analysts rush to conclude that ‘it is a Soviet type of thinking’ or ‘the Russian empire is back’, 
without further explanations. Former Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov has written about 
the past and foreign policy as follows: ‘No state can recreate its foreign policy from scratch 
simply because of particular domestic political changes, even if such change is profound. 
Foreign policy objectively reflects the characteristics of how a country – its culture, 
economy, geopolitical situation - have historically developed, and therefore is a complex 
alloy, comprising elements of both continuity and renewal, which defies expression in an 
exact formula. It is common that what appears to be a fundamentally new direction for 
foreign policy actually turns out to be yet another variation of a traditional policy repackaged 
in a form more in line with the spirit of the times’.187 Ivanov’s statement clearly shows how 
state identity takes building blocks from the past. This naturally translates to all the states 
from their own perspectives. 
Part of the Western understanding of Russia has been influenced by two very famous and 
over used statements. The often quoted words of Winston Churchill ‘Russia is a riddle 
wrapped up in a mystery inside an enigma, but there is a key and that key is Russian national 
interest’ counter balances Tjuchev’s vision of Russia, that it cannot be understood with 
reason. The interesting factor here is that they were both constructed in times when Russia 
has been regarded as a Great Power in European politics and they both in the end help very 
little to understand the strategic thinking of Russian foreign policy. 
In the 2000s under president Putin the policy of pragmatism was introduced into Russian 
foreign policy. With the ‘policy of pragmatism’ Russians have wanted to show that precisely 
national interests are the guiding lines for Russian foreign policy, the Winstonian way of 
explaining Russia. The problem with that naturally has been that national interests are not an 
easily defined concept.  
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The core ideas of national interests are based on basic needs of a state; to guarantee its 
external and internal security and territorial integrity. The assumption is that all other policies 
are subordinated to these two main lines. It seemed that even in the mid 2000s president Putin 
still viewed that the main Russian challenges were external and internal security and 
territorial integrity; ‘We need armed forces able to simultaneously fight in global, regional 
and -  if necessary - also in several local conflicts. We need armed forces that guarantee 
Russia’s security and territorial integrity no matter what the scenario’.188 Many might agree 
with the president’s analysis. Why this is significant is that for the purposes of maintaining 
Russian greatpowerness there has been a strong need to argue, whatever the historical period, 
that Russia is faced with several external and internal security threats. 
The historical perspective shows that to uncover Russia is not to only identify Russian 
national interests but to understand how they are formed and shaped. National interest 
formation can be seen as a result of interactions with the world and in Russia’s case 
especially as a result of its interactions with the West, through both multilateral and bilateral 
relations. National traditions, current concerns and state capacity as the general causal 
mechanism of national interest formation can also be identified.189 Thereby they do also play 
strongly into Russia’s behavior in international organizations.  
The influence of the past is also strongly present in national interest formation. Alfred J. 
Rieber has argued that the Russian national interest has been shaped by four factors that have 
been present in Russia for centuries: economic backwardness compared to the Western 
world, porous or vulnerable frontiers, Russian multiculturalism and cultural alienation that 
refers to geographical, and political and historical factors that have contributed to the fact that 
Russia is engaged with but distinctive from Europe.190 Also in Rieber’s argument outside 
factors play a very significant role in national interest and foreign policy making. He sees 
seven external factors that have strongly influenced Russian national interest formation and 
foreign policy choices during the 20th and 21st century.  
The first is in the first half of the 20th century the rise and expansion of Germany and 
Japan, secondly the emergence of the United States as a world power, arguably replacing the 
United Kingdom, after the second world war, thirdly the reunification of China in 1949, the 
fourth significant factor was the decolonization and birth of new sovereign states, the creation 
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of nuclear weapons had a significant impact in international and national policies, and since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union the most significant challenges Russian foreign policy 
making has had to face are the sixth and seventh factors: NATO expansion and the presence 
of the United States in the area of the former Soviet Union.191 Finally a factor that has to be 
mentioned as influential for Russian foreign policy and national interest formation is the 
factor of leadership.192 All of these factors are one way or other present in current Russian 
policies. The factors that exert most influence in the case studies of this thesis are the factor 
of leadership, NATO expansion and the role of the USA in Europe and in the former Soviet 
Union. 
Robert Cooper has put it ‘to understand the present, we must first understand the past, for 
the past is still with us’.193 Russian greatpowerness has been built on the Russian historical 
past, sometimes with selective understanding of history for the purposes of the state power. 
This factor is one of the most important factors when trying to understand Russian Great 
Power identity.  
 
3.5 Imperialism and Expansionism  
There has been a great deal of discussion of imperialism and expansionism in the 
context of Russian politics. The goal in both is an empire. As Ronald G. Suny has defined 
empire: “Empire was a polity based on conquest, difference between the ruling institution 
and its subjects, and the subordination of periphery to the imperial center.”194 Historical 
Empires can be compared with today’s Great Powers. Expansionism, according to Jack 
Snyder, is a central myth of empire and is justified by the idea that  it is the only way of 
safeguarding the state’s security.195 A central belief of those statesmen and strategists that 
have aimed to strengthen the state has been summed up in the words of a minister of 
Catherine the Great: “That which ceases to grow begins to rot”.196 
In a classic formulation by Johan Galtung, Imperialism is defined as ‘a special type of 
dominance of one collectivity, usually a nation, over another’. Galtung concluded that there 
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were five types of imperialism: economic, political, military, communication and cultural 
imperialism.197 Especially in the postcolonial era, then, imperialism can be conducted 
through non-military means and without direct political subordination. The connected 
concept of expansionism refers to the tendency to increase a state’s territory either directly or 
through influence. While it is perhaps anachronistic to talk about imperialism and 
expansionism in the classical sense today, related tendencies can be seen especially in 
Russia’s attitude to its ‘near abroad’ – the other post-Soviet states which in aggregate formed 
the historic Imperial territory of both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Those 
countries which joined the Commonwealth of Independent States, i.e. excluding the three 
Baltic states, constitute an important and distinctive focus of Russian foreign policy. 
These two concepts are closely associated with Russia. Russia has been the third largest 
empire in human history, and the largest for most of the last four hundred years. It was also 
an autocratic state for centuries and expansionism has been one of its state building forms. 
Russia’s search for raw materials and seaports and the continuing need for secure borders 
have created in Russia something that Emil Pain calls ‘an imperial syndrome’. The Imperial 
syndrome has several basic elements. The first element is ‘the imperial body’, the territories 
that have been included in the Russian empire and then the Soviet empire. The imperial 
principle calls for the retention of these territories. The second element is ‘imperial 
consciousness’ that includes a continuing hope for a ‘wise tsar’ to lead the country and also 
the division of peoples between ‘big brothers and younger brothers’. The third element is 
‘imperial power’ that is estranged from society.198  
All of Pain’s imperial syndrome elements have an influence on foreign policy making. 
The imperial syndrome is also a very significant part of the Great Power thinking that exists 
in Russia. Russia’s need to maintain some kind of hold on the ‘imperial body’ which it has 
held for the past three centuries has caused many foreign policy headaches for Western 
countries, but especially Russia’s neighbours, in their dealings with Russia and vice versa. It 
has confused Putin’s otherwise very pragmatic looking foreign policy agenda to the extent 
that many western analysts have started to talk about empire building in Russian foreign 
policy. Perceptions are still in evidence that echo Britain’s foreign secretary Lord 
Palmerstone in 1860: ‘The Russian government perpetually declares that Russia wants no 
increases of territory, that the Russian dominions are already too large. But while making 
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these declarations in the most solemn manner, every year it adds large tracts of territory to 
the Russian dominions not for the purpose of adding territory but carefully directed to 
occupation of certain strategical points, as starting points for further encroachments or as 
posts from whence some neighbouring states may be kept under control or may be 
threatened with invasion’.199  
The imperial body element is the one that gets most attention, since its implications are 
the most concrete ones, but the elements of imperial consciousness and imperial power are 
far more important when trying to understand Russian foreign policy decision making and 
behaviour. It is very important to keep in mind that while talking about imperialism, it is not 
a determinist theory and does not make Russia an enemy. Both imperialist thinking and 
expansionist actions have been dismissed at all official levels as not playing a part in Russian 
foreign policy. Putin himself has said, ‘a fundamental aim of our policy is not to demonstrate 
imperial ambitions but to ensure an external environment favourable to Russia’s 
development’.200  
After the break up of the Soviet Union the first two years passed in trying to come up 
with a new form of Foreign Policy for the Russian Federation. ‘There is no reason to doubt 
the good intentions of the policy’s authors: they sincerely wanted to advance Russian foreign 
policy to a new level of relations with the civilized nations of the world and transcend the 
traditional framework of geopolitics and strategic balances and they sought to found these 
relations on common values and international law’.201 The road proved to have many 
difficulties. The domestic situation turned against liberal policies. People started to grow 
more and more dissatisfied towards reforms and the effect on foreign policy was that Russia 
started to promote a more nationalistic line. This had an especially profound effect on 
Russia’s relations with the former Soviet republics.  
The CIS itself as well as Russian policies towards the CIS region stand out as a grey 
area of Post-Soviet politics. The idea of forming the CIS was good and stressed, with or 
without intention, the new situation and Russian willingness to work in a multilateral 
framework. At the same time it echoed voices from the past. The issue that has become a 
problem in the cooperation among the CIS states in the CIS framework is that Russia does 
want a dominant position in the former Soviet space, which does undermine genuine 
multilateral cooperation. Since 1992 Russia’s ‘near abroad’ has been held up as one of the 
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top priorities of Russian foreign policy, at least as far as the rhetoric goes. Already in 
February 1993 President Yeltsin appealed to the UN to delegate to Russia the mission of 
ensuring stability and carrying out peacekeeping operations within the geopolitical space of 
the former Soviet Union.202 
David Lake has argued in regard to Russia’s relationship to CIS countries: ‘The theory 
[that autocracies will tend to possess an imperial bias in their foreign policy] provides a 
sketchy road map for the future. Most pointedly, it suggests that at least some of the 
successor states are likely to be reintegrated into an informal, if not formal, Russian empire 
either voluntarily, in order to realize scale economies while minimizing the expected costs of 
opportunism, or by force, especially if the antireform forces prove politically triumphant in 
Russia’.203 
The different Russian foreign policy schools all saw the area of the former Soviet Union 
as one of the priority areas of Russian foreign policy. However some differences can be 
found. The statists took the agenda to protect Russia as their strongest line and gained 
popularity with that. It meant that the instabilities and conflicts in the area of the former 
Soviet Union were indentified and it was argued that Russia needs to get involved and 
increase their influence in the area to protect Russian security. 
The CIS region has always been a very touchy subject for Russians. Yeltsin, in his State 
of the Nation speech in 1996 stated that ‘We are disturbed by attempts to oppose Russia’s 
interest in the Commonwealth of Independent States, during efforts for a Yugoslav 
settlement, and on the questions of achieving a balance of conventional arms in Europe and 
preserving the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems 
(ABM Treaty). Hotbeds of local conflict persist along Russia’s borders’.204 He continued to 
stress that the integration process within the CIS was deepening. From these statements it is 
easy to get the picture that CIS policy was coherent and solid from Moscow, but this was not 
the case. Many inside of Russia argued at the time that Russia should pull out of the CIS’ 
institutional development and first take care of its internal problems and concentrate on the 
Russian economy.205 The difficulties associated with the reunification of West and East 
Germany had not gone unnoticed in Russia, a lesson which further discouraged any moves 
towards fuller integration between economically unbalanced countries. Even today many 
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seem to think that Russia should not integrate with CIS states but first look after itself.206 At 
the same time concerns were raised about the disorganised manner of Russian foreign 
policy-making, claiming with some reason that there was virtually no well-considered long-
term policy in regard to bilateral relations with the CIS states, let alone the CIS as an 
organisation.207 These views were, though, whether based on a softer or tougher approach, 
scaled-down versions of the traditional Soviet and Imperial Russian policies of expanding 
the imperial perimeter at the expense of weaker neighbouring nations.208 
In world history, when an empire breaks up, the ‘parent country’ itself must, one way or 
another, come to terms with the new situation. The British Empire, through its strong 
economic relationships, language, education system and its regal symbols, has managed to 
maintain a position of respect in countries that were part of the empire. In Turkey, the 
remains of the Ottoman Empire still have their own areas of interest and the keenness to teach 
Turkish-based languages extensively beyond the present borders. Even in Italy, the heart of 
the Roman Empire, an imperialist attitude can occasionally be seen. Imperialism takes many 
forms. Broadly speaking, imperialism can be divided into four main categories. Traditional 
strong imperialism is based on the occupation of another country and ruling it. There is the 
concept of so-called liberal imperialism, which is based on Robert Cooper’s ideas, and relies 
on economic strength. Soft imperialism is achieved through culture and language. De facto 
imperialism is where the other country is not occupied, but other means are used for the 
decision-making to be dictated by the ‘parent country’. 
Since the Yeltsin era seems to be remembered as a time when their country lost some of 
its geopolitical role in the world, in Putin’s Russia the attention towards the CIS only 
intensified, but arguably this time through Geo-economics along the lines of Cooper’s idea 
of liberal empire. One of the most notable elements of this geo-economics is two energy 
companies that have been expanding and buying themselves intensively into the markets of 
the CIS area. Russia has made use of the Gazprom gas company and the Unified Energy 
Systems (UES) in its economical and political disputes with Kiev, Minsk and Tbilisi. 
‘Formally, these disputes – particularly with Belarus and Ukraine - have been about 
integration, its format and scale, but in reality they have been about Russia’s participation in 
the privatisation projects within the CIS, its role and influence on the economics, and to a 
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lesser degree on the politics of the CIS countries’.209 As noted earlier in this article there has 
also been a growing aim, on Russia’s initiative, to establish new multilateral integration 
structures and reshape old ones in the CIS area, particularly in the economic and also the 
security fields. This is one way to try to ensure continuing Russian dominance in the area. 
The colour revolutions that have occurred in the CIS area - the Rose revolution in Georgia in 
2003 and the Orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004 - have made it clear that in case Russia 
still wants to maintain its dominant status the only way is to create an attractive Russian 
economy that ties in the neighbouring countries as well as a cooperative approach to Western 
organisations, especially to the EU, and embracing the idea of promoting democracy in the 
CIS states. It seems that some of the peculiarities and almost irrational behaviour by 
Russians in regard to the foreign policies towards the CIS countries can be best understood 
from the position of its imperial past and present. The growing stress in studies of Russia’s 
international relations on its position with regard to the near abroad underline the Russian 
assumption that it has exclusive prerogatives in the region which come close to the post-War 
concept of ‘spheres of influence’. This is one other way in which Russians have assumptions 
about their country’s Great Power status, which are not necessarily shared by other countries. 
 
3.6 Sovereignty made in Russia 
Sovereignty is a concept that is very much in the first place associated with the realist 
school of international relations. John Ruggie’s traditional definition of sovereignty as 
‘institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains’210 
represents the most widely accepted understanding among IR scholars. However the 
changing nature of international relations has also changed the ideas behind sovereignty. In 
globalised thinking the importance of the concept of human rights in international relations 
has tended to reduce the nature of sovereignty from being legally fixed towards being a 
subject of changing interpretations, as Barkin and Cronin have argued.211 Robert Keohane has 
argued though that sovereignty is a useful concept especially in today’s international relations 
and should be viewed as an institution.212 Sovereign statehood as an institution has a set of 
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persistent and connected rules prescribing behavioural roles, constraining activity and 
shaping expectations. Traditional sovereign statehood was an international institution 
prescribing fairly clear rules of behaviour. 
 Sovereignty was the central institution of international society between the late 17th and 
the mid 20th centuries and continues to be so in much of the world. An especially important 
time for the legal definition of sovereignty was the creation of the holy alliance in 1815. This 
was the time the concept of ‘legitimate state’ became an important principle in maintaining 
the balance of power in Europe, the nation became subordinated to the state.213 However 
traditional sovereignty did not take into consideration the large-scale economic exchange 
under conditions of high interdependence which came to be a major force in the 20th century 
world. This drive to maximise economic profits (as well as the experience of World War II) 
has been one of the driving forces for institutionalism.  
The concept of sovereignty is also a core notion in Russian foreign policy. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union was, among other things, a crisis of Russian statehood. To defend the 
principles of sovereignty has been one of Russia’s national interests, in fact it is in any 
country’s national interests. But with the state identity crises caused by the fall of Soviet 
Union, the sovereignty principal became all the more important. Its significance has been 
increasing at the beginning of the 21st century, at exactly the time when the new Russian 
Federation has been looking for its place in world politics and slowly but surely getting back 
to its feet after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Alexander Sergunin has observed: ‘As these 
concepts (realism and geopolitics) refer to national interest, national security, national 
sovereignty and territory they seem a reliable theoretical basis for searching for a national 
identity. Russian and other countries’ experience shows that these concepts may provide both 
society and the political elites with some intellectual support for building a foreign policy 
consensus’.214 
The concept of sovereignty is itself a complicated one. With globalization the idea of 
sovereignty has been questioned, some argue that the meaning of sovereignty has been 
decreasing, others that it has been sustained.215 The concept has been used by different 
disciplines but in slightly different ways. In political science in the cases of neorealism and 
neoliberal institutionalism sovereignty has been treated as a set of analytical assumptions and 
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states are assumed to be rational, unitary and independent actors. For constructivism, 
sovereignty is a set of normative principles into which statesmen are socialized.  
When looking at sovereignty from the Russian point of view in its interactions with 
international organisations, it comes closest to the understanding of sovereignty by 
international lawyers. They see states as basic building blocks of the international system. 
The states are sovereign in the sense that they are juridically independent and can enter into 
treaties that will promote their interests as they themselves define them.216 The Russian 
emphasis on sovereignty can often be seen, as a realist perspective would suggest, as a 
justification for Russian actions or an excuse to avoid international interference. But the 
constructivist approach is also relevant, as ideas of sovereignty are clearly internalised but 
also contradictory to the exteny that the restrictions on sovereignty imposed by globalisation 
are at odds with notions of greatpowerness. The strong emphasis on international law in 
Russian foreign policy rhetoric is connected to defending the principals of sovereignty. It 
also clearly has connections to the ideas of sovereignty defined by the Holy Alliance in 
1815. In the system of Nicholas I, however, explicit primacy was given to the great powers, 
who pledged to assist each other in the event of internal disturbances and external threats. 
The same level of sovereignty was not to be guaranteed for lesser powers, an important 
distinction whose legacy can still be seen in Russian conceptions today.  
Krasner identifies four different types of sovereignty: domestic sovereignty, 
interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty.  
Domestic sovereignty is the oldest way of using the concept of sovereignty; it involves 
organisation of both authority and control within a given state.217 This reflects the slavophile 
ideas inside of the Russian foreign policy schools. Interdependence sovereignty is more 
about control over and power of regulation over different movements across borders: goods, 
capital, ideas, individuals and diseases.218 This category fits then the school of westernisers 
in the Russian context. International legal sovereignty has its basic rule in recognising 
political entities’ status in the international system, meaning also that for states with that 
recognition comes also territorial and juridical autonomy.219 Westphalian sovereignty 
denotes that external authority structures should be excluded from the territory of a state. 
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Sovereign states are not only de jure independent; they are also de facto autonomous.220 
Maintaining the Westphalian type of sovereignty has been a growing concern of the Russian 
authorities since the beginning of the 1990s and therefore has also played an important role 
in Russia-West relations. This type of sovereignty translates into the statist way of thinking 
about sovereignty. 
In the case of Russia, in the overall picture, sovereignty is an obscure factor. For the 
Russian Federation to be born, the Soviet Union needed to be abolished. For Ukrainians, 
Georgians and Estonians the Russians had been the imperialist masters, but for Russians the 
situation was quite strange; they had been liberated from Russians.  
Ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Union came down to the power struggle of Yeltsin 
and Gorbachev, but few Western analysts have used the discourse of sovereignty or national 
independence or decolonization to describe the political battle between Russia and the Soviet 
Union.221 As Michael McFaul has argued the discourse of sovereignty was the method of 
Boris Yeltsin to frame the power struggle as a fight about sovereignty. Boris Yeltsin himself 
stated ‘The problem of the (Russian) republic cannot be solved without full-blooded political 
sovereignty. This alone can enable relations between Russia and the Union and between the 
autonomous territories within Russia to be harmonized. The political sovereignty of Russia is 
also necessary in international affairs.’222  
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the gaining of international recognition as a 
sovereign state the notion of sovereignty has played an important role in Russia’s self-
identification both domestically and internationally. McFaul’s argument is that while seizing 
domestic and international legal sovereignty Russia paradoxically lost some of its 
Westphalian sovereignty. It has, however, had difficulties coming to terms with this loss. 
This is a very important point especially when examining Russia’s behaviour and 
interactions in and with international organisations and why the concept of sovereignty has 
become so important for Russians in international relations in general. For Russians, 
sovereignty is part of the great power status and equality principle. 
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President Vladimir Putin has nearly throughout his presidencies stressed the sovereignty 
principle: ‘You well know that we constantly advocate the supremacy of international law, 
and also its basic principles such as respect of territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-
interference in internal affairs of other countries. We are absolutely convinced that truly 
equal partner relations can only be founded on these principles.’223 The fact that should be 
kept in mind with the Russian use of the sovereignty concept is that their view differs from 
the commonly understood meaning of sovereignty.  At a formal level, for Russians state 
sovereignty is the same as foreign policy independence, possibility to compete in economic 
terms in the global markets, control over natural resources in Russia, domestic consensus and 
independent military strength.224 But at times two contradictions can be found in the Russian 
approach. In the first place, while it is recognised that membership of international 
organisations involves a certain surrender of sovereignty, and this is accepted in relation, for 
example, to the European Court of Human Rights, sovereignty has also been raised in 
opposition to outside interference of organisations to which Russia has formally delegated 
such a right of interference, such as the OSCE. Secondly, there is evidence presented in the 
case study chapters that sovereignty is not viewed as something universal, but as something 
to which great powers have a special claim. 
 
3.7 The concept of ressentiment  and Isolationism   
After empires break up there is a problem of finding a new reason for unity and this is 
much more problematic if we are looking at places with an imperial inheritance, without 
developed institutions and with a state system in flux. In the late nineteenth century the elites 
of the Russian Empire resorted to state sponsored xenophobia and exclusivity as the 
foundation of political order. Sometimes the politics of ressentiment go down better with the 
population than openly isolationist or imperialistic rhetoric.225 
The politics of ressentiment accuses outside forces for every problem that occurs on the 
domestic front. It is not at all a new phenomenon in Russian history. It was frequently used 
during the Soviet era. One good example can be seen in Nina Andreeva’s famous letter ‘I 
cannot Give up My Principles’ in Sovetskaya Rossiya on March 13, 1987. The article 
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claimed that the attacks on the dictatorship of the proletariat and the former political leaders 
in the heat of glasnost must owe their origin to professional anti-communists in the West, 
who have long advocated ‘the so called democratic slogan of anti-stalinism’.226 Another 
more recent example of the same type of argument can be found in Putin’s speech on 4th 
September 2004 ‘We winked at our own weakness, and it is the weak who are always beaten 
up. Some want to tear away a large part of our wealth, while others help these aspirants in so 
doing. They still believe that Russia poses a threat to them as a nuclear power. Terrorism is 
just another instrument implementing their designs.’ In statements of this kind today it is 
unspecified who is the ‘foe’ of Russia. During the Soviet era it was clear that it was the West 
and the capitalist system. Illarianov also warns about the influence from outside: ‘It is critical 
for Russia to breed immunity against destructive ideas, which are occasionally imported 
from countries generally viewed as advanced and developed’. Illarianov calls for a selective 
approach to ideas that come from the West - some are good and some are bad for Russia. He 
points out that not only freedom of the individual, the market economy and democracy have 
entered Russia from the West, but also Marxism and Socialism.227 
Building a strong identity is seen as important and national unity as a crucial element. 
The Russian Sergei Markov has stated that ‘the Russian mentality is by nature defensive, and 
has been thus for hundreds of years. The myth that Russia is surrounded by enemies is 
widespread, and politicians use this to their advantage.’228 Ressentiment is a typical 
characteristic of a state governed by an elite, in which the institutions have not developed. 
Ressentiment-type behaviour in Russia are the government’s accusations of Russian 
oligarchs living abroad trying to weaken the current Russian government and create a 
detrimental image of it in the West, and claims that citizens’ organizations, particularly those 
getting funding from abroad, are hotbeds of anti-government political activity. Georgians 
have been made the scapegoats for the growing hatred towards foreigners, and international 
terrorism is regarded as a threat to Russia’s unity. Some major western firms have also been 
accused of trying to hijack Russia’s important raw material resources for themselves. 
The concept of ressentiment is of use to the understanding of Russian foreign policy 
since it highlights Russian suspicions towards anything that comes from outside its own 
society. This feeling has deep roots in the Russian historical past where in order to survive, it 
needed to defend itself against many aggressions. This is something that has often been 
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forgotten when talking about Russian foreign policy. In the Western discourse Russia is the 
aggressive one with traditional imperialist ambitions and Great Power mentality. The 
concept of ressentiment is in its extreme form very dangerous but also very helpful to 
explain Russian foreign policy where great power ambitions exist at the same time as the 
mentality of an occupied country.  Muzykantsky further explains this suspicion, using 
sociologist Igor Yakovenko’s definitions about the Russian mentality, that part of the 
Russian mentality according to Yakovenko is that of Manicheanism. Manicheanism sees the 
world as an arena of the external struggle between two forces – light and darkness, good and 
evil. In this struggle there are ‘us’ and ‘them’. A Manichean mentality needs an enemy, real 
or imaginary. In interstate relations, stereotypical enemies of the Manichean type are: a 
hostile environment, imperialist circles, backstage intrigues or simply ‘forces of darkness’ 
that are out to destroy, dismember or take control of everything’.229 This type of a world 
view feels like something straight from 19th century Russian literature, but the evidence of 
even the official statements speaks for itself that Russian ruling elites divert into the politics 
of ressentiment when it is too difficult to say ‘we don’t know what to do’. Because it has 
such deep and historically long popular roots, this tactic is often successful. 
From the concept of ressentiment can follow a trend of isolationism. Isolationism is a 
diplomatic policy whereby a nation seeks to avoid engagement with other nations. Most 
nations are not in a political position to maintain strict isolationist policies for extended 
periods of time, even though most nations have historical periods where isolationism is 
popular. The concept of isolationism can be understood in many ways and so it is very 
important to understand the idea of isolationism in the Russian context correctly. The 
starting point is what president Putin said in 2000 ‘Russia cannot be isolated from Europe 
and the rest of the civilized world since Russia is a part of European culture’.230 However the 
claim that Russian foreign policy has had growing isolationist tendencies during Putin’s 
second term in office as a president of Russia gives a reason to examine closely what 
isolationism is and where does it come from in the Russian context. The two terms that have 
been used often in the Russian context are Pacifist isolationism and constructive 
isolationism. Pacifist isolationism has been seen as characterizing Russian thinking far more 
than either imperialist militarism or great-power nationalism.231 A policy of constructive 
isolationism has been argued for as the best choice for Russia in the short-term historical 
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perspective. According to Nikolai Shmelev ‘This does not mean that we [Russians] should 
become more self-centred. On the contrary – we should develop active cultural and 
economic relations with the external world. At the same time, we should pursue a policy of 
predominant non-interference in those developments beyond the national borders that are not 
directly connected with us or the spheres of our traditional influence (the CIS)’.232 
 The word isolationism has also been used in debates about Russia’s international place 
since 1992. It has been argued that one of the most dangerous things that could happen is 
that Russia would go down the road of isolationism (for example, in discussions about 
Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe). Also in the context of the Russia-EU dialogue 
the idea that Russia will be pushed aside or will pull away in case cooperation with the EU 
fails have been raised.233 The official Russian line is indicated in deputy foreign minister 
Chizov’s answer to the question about Russia’s isolation: ‘Isolation is not a threat for Russia. 
Russia was and is an important player in world politics’.234 Here also the fear of isolationism 
can be seen. It can be argued that both the Russian worldview of multipolarity and the more 
current version of it, the multivector foreign policy, are aimed at ensuring that Russia would 
not be isolated from world politics, even if fundamental problems would occur in Russia-
West relations. But the continuing presence of ressentiment rhetoric does not sit easily with 
the denial that isolationism is a possibility for Russia. 
Even if Russian Isolationism is not seen as an option in Russia especially in the official 
statements and it is viewed also in the West as something dangerous, there are those that 
speak seriously in favour of it. Mikhail Yuryev, president of the Evrofinance group and 
former deputy speaker of the Russian State Duma, sees a policy of isolationism as a quite 
feasible option for Russia. He defines isolationism as follows: ‘Isolationism means a national 
mode of existence where the state builds a relatively small number of external contacts, as 
well as a relatively limited interaction with it in all spheres of life – economy, politics, 
culture, ideology and religion. Thus the influence of external forces is incomparably smaller 
than that of the internal forces’.235 While clearly linked to ressentiment, this attitude reflects 
also the specific fear that was planted among the Russian ruling elite by the colour 
revolutions that outside influences might make Russian society also rise up against the ruling 
elite. Yuryev’s argument is based on his view that in the past 50 years Russian foreign policy 
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has either been a bitter confrontation with the West or full capitulation and servility to the 
West. The policy of isolationism in his view would give a healthy start to developing an 
independent Russia. In his view only after a period of isolationism is it possible for a nation 
to grow into a world power.236 As amazing as it sounds, this view, which is not adopted in 
official statements, also has one thing in common with the official line: Russia has to 
become a world power. On the other hand Andrei Illarionov, Economic Advisor to the 
President of the Russian Federation, contradicts Yuryev’s view by arguing that international 
engagement is essential for the attainment of great power status: ‘There is no country in the 
world that can exist in international isolation, especially a country that seeks to advance its 
economy, attain high growth rates and become a respected member of the global 
community’.237 
The politics of ressentiment and expressions of possibility towards isolationism are both 
deeply rooted in the past. Some of the emotional and even angry Russian foreign policy 
reactions and statements can be more effectively examined within a framework where the 
concept of ressentiment and isolationist ideas are better understood. The influence of 
ressentiment and isolationism are contradictory when it comes to Russian efforts to integrate 
and promote its own status as a Great Power in the world community. Hence the question of 
whether to engage internationally or not, or to what extent and with what level of 
commitment, has always made integration problematic and has led to fluctuations in policy. 
 
3.8 Multilateralism and multipolarity in the Russian context 
Multilateralism as we understand it today is a 20th century phenomenon, but with some 
precedents at least in the nineteenth century.  Multilateralism refers to a system of 
coordinating relations between three or more states in accordance with certain principles of 
conduct. As a policy, multilateralism is a deliberate action by a state, in concert with others, 
to realize objectives in particular issue areas.238 Today’s multilateralism differs substantially 
from the 19th century examples of multilateralism that involved a concert of big powers 
cooperating to redraw the map of Europe and attempting to reduce great power conflict and 
promote internal stability. Multilateralism is often connected to the westernisers but is 
supported also by statists and to some extent the slavophiles. 
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After the Second World War the character of international relations changed 
significantly in two ways: the Cold War brought the balance of power and bipolarity into the 
world order and the horrors of the Second World War highlighted the need to promote 
instead bloc-based structures to create more multilateral mechanisms in world politics. 
Because of the Cold War the bloc structure based model was the dominant one and the 
multilateralism concept as we know it today was mostly developed in the West.  
In the Eastern bloc multilateral structures also existed, but they worked in a hierarchical 
way; by contrast, the present day model of multilateral action works through a complex 
scheme of interaction where everything is interconnected by a system of agreements and 
protocols and where there are no friends or foes but rather partners formulating and 
upholding their own interests.  However it can also be argued that a strong state in a 
multilateral context can influence more the decisions and actions taken than a weaker and 
smaller state. In the multilateral context, Russia wants to belong among those states that 
‘matter’, the Great Powers, in international decision making.  
For the statists quite often the multilateral cooperation model still means a hierarchical 
way of conducting cooperation. For the slavophiles the alliances and groups that participate 
in multilateral cooperation are important. Slavic brotherhood ideas are incorporated in the 
slavophile approach to multilateralism. 
When trying to make sense of understanding multilateralist thinking in Russia the 
concept of multipolarity often pops up, and sometimes in a very confusing way. In the 
Russian context you often hear that ‘Multilateralism is used in the same way as 
multipolarity’.239 Even in former foreign minister Igor Ivanov’s book that reflects Russian 
foreign policy doctrine from 2000 he uses multipolarity and multilateralism in overlapping 
ways. He talks about the constructive solutions between the permanent UN security council 
members and see this as evidence that Russia does not want to create a multipolar world to 
be in opposition to the West but to try to find a way to create a mechanism which can 
respond collectively to the challenges posed by the modern world.240 Multipolarity is a type 
of system structure with at least three ‘poles’ or actors being identified as predominant. This 
domination is dependent upon the idea of capability or power potential as the essential 
defining possession of the ‘poles’. The actors that dominate a multipolar system need not be 
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states: blocs or coalitions may qualify.241 The proverb a ‘beloved child has many names’ 
could be adapted to make a saying ‘multipolarity has many meanings in Russia’. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia arguably did not have any experience of 
functioning effectively in a genuine multilateral system as the western understanding of it is. 
A genuine multilateral system does not give veto rights to one or some countries.242 
According to Bobo Lo, Russia views multipolarity as a plutocratic multilateralism and so 
does not have any commitment to multilateralism, if we are talking about the 
democratisation of international relations where big and small are making decisions on an 
equal basis.243 This is also the reason Russia does not push the idea of its membership in the 
EU, it does not want to be one member out of 27, and many problems between Russia and 
the EU are down to the fact that Russia does not like the fact that countries it views as 
insignificant in international decision making would have any say in how Russia should 
conduct its affairs.  
This attitude can also explain to some extent Russia’s views about its difficulties with 
smaller EU countries. Looking at the statements on Chechnya, for example, Russia takes a 
calmer approach if it is France or Germany or Great Britain that criticises Russian actions 
than if it is the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia or Finland. The equality principle is one of 
the guiding principles of Russian foreign policy. While it works well for Russians inside the 
idea of multipolarity, Russians do face some difficulties inside the international institutions’ 
framework. Russia still seeks to belong and be one of the ‘bigs’ inside the international 
organisations.  
The Council of Europe example illustrates this well. Russia has been playing by the 
Council’s rules during the first decade of its membership, however all the time seeking to 
find ways to change agendas and unwritten rules.244 Russia has wanted to take its place 
among the ‘big’ countries in the Council, thus seeking a status of superiority of the Great 
Powers. The Great Power mentality, as mentioned earlier, is a strong one and it is deeply 
rooted in foreign policy behaviour in the multilateral context as well. Despite this attitude it 
can also be argued that Russia does very much understand and is acquainted with today’s 
multilateral structures and mechanisms and how multilateralism works in theory. 245  
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The multilateral system provides a chance and forum for Russia to create a leading role, 
especially in regard to the organisations where Russia has a dominant position like in the CIS 
and UN or organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The case of the 
OSCE is an interesting one since there Russia has both demonstrated the willingness to work 
with and use in conflict situations the multilateral framework and also at the same time has 
opposed the involvement of the organisation (e.g. the case of Chechnya). The troubles that 
the OSCE has had with Russia or vice versa are also to do with the two dominant trends, the 
principle of equality and superiority of the great powers. The tension between these two are 
creating a deadlock in Russia’s behaviour in the OSCE. This translates also to the general 
framework of Russian foreign policy creating a clear tension between Great Power thinking 
based on the realist view and the equality principle that has a base in institutionalism and 
also elements of democratic peace theory. 
In the Russian view of multilpolarity the principle of equality is strongly present but 
only succeeds in playing a role in Great Power relations. When Russians are talking about 
multipolarity in the West, it has raised a lot of questions. What is quite widely known in the 
West is the Primakov doctrine of multipolarity from 1997. The less known fact is that 
multipolarity was already present during the years when Kozyrev was the foreign minister of 
the Russian Federation. Kozyrev’s vision of multipolarity was more along the lines of the 
1815 Concert of Europe concept, the early stages of multilateralism. He saw multipolarity as 
great powers dealing with big issues together, in a manner a bit like today’s G8. One of 
Russia’s high foreign policy priorities in the 1990s was to gain equal status in the G7. 
Kozyrev wrote in 1994 about his world views and about the nature of Russian foreign policy. 
The following long quote reflects on the whole the complexity of the concept of 
multipolarity, multilateralism and the possibilities for misunderstanding:  
‘By now it has already become quite clear that in the 21st century world there will not be 
a ‘Pax Americana’ nor any kind of bipolar order. It will be multipolar. First of all, the USA 
through the use of all its resources can still not deal alone with all the issues in the world, 
and indeed if it did play that role it would overstretch its forces. Secondly Russia, even if it is 
going through a period of difficult transition, remains as a world power, not only because it 
has nuclear weapons and a complete military capability, but because it even has the latest 
technology, not to mention its natural resources and geostrategic location. Thirdly, there are 
other centres of influence, which are striving to obtain a more independent voice in global 
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affairs. Fourth and finally, the actual character of today’s international problems makes it 
preferable to search for solutions on a multilateral basis. 
I wish to be understood correctly: I was not in any way talking about the USA, Russia or 
any other country refusing to include national objectives in their foreign policy or of handing 
anything over to a foreign or supranational ‘subcontractor’. Bill Clinton also spoke against 
this in his speech to the UN. 
 
The dilemma in front of the world community consists of something else. If it takes a 
highly ultra nationalistic and egoistic road, then the world will present itself as a storm of 
competing national interests. Then it would be thrown back to a new kind of ‘self-destructive 
horror’ like it was in the international system in 1914’.246 
This clearly argues that Russia is a Great Power and reflects Gorbachev’s new thinking 
foreign policy formulations. As Larson and Shevchenko have argued Gorbachev and his 
advisors recognized that military power alone did not bring the Soviet Union political 
influence or acceptance. He was pursuing a new status for the Soviet Union as the moral and 
political leader of a new world order. The Soviet Union would have had a Great Power status 
based on ‘soft power’ rather than hard power.247  
When applying the social identity theory (SIT) that Larson and Shevchenko have used in 
analysing Gorbachev’s New Thinking to the readiness to gain great Power Status, it can be 
stated that people will try to achieve a superior position for their group even when it costs 
them potential material benefits.248 Gorbachev’s New Thinking did not include multipolarity 
or multilateral thinking as such, it was still based more on ideas of bipolarity, but many ideas 
from the new thinking did appear in Kozyrev’s foreign policy formulations. The Russians 
started to use the multipolarity concept at the beginning of the 1990s with the recognition 
that with the collapse of the Soviet Union the cold war balance of power and bipolar world 
had disappeared. 
 
 The new Russian Federation needed to find its place in the world community again, a 
bit like in 1917, and to formulate its foreign policy interests in the post-communist world. To 
gain Great power status became one of those interests. As argued earlier, that was the goal of 
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all different foreign policy groups in Russia. In this framework multipolarity became a very 
useful concept. In it the different ‘poles’ are Great Powers and also regional hegemons in 
world politics. This is a theme that appears in all of the forms of multipolarity in Russian 
foreign policy arguments from Kozyrev, Primakov and Ivanov to Lavrov. In multipolarity 
the ideas of all different Russian foreign policy groups merge. 
Primakov’s multipolarity, however, has a different face from Kozyrev’s and his is the 
most commonly understood Russian use of the multipolarity concept. Primakov’s doctrine of 
multipolarity was like a ghost from the past, like a continuity with the old Soviet Doctrine of 
counterbalancing the United States whenever possible. The anti-american element of 
Primakov’s multipolarity has led to the need for a great deal of explanation by Igor Ivanov 
and Vladimir Putin as well as Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Ivanov, who all stress in different 
arenas that Russia is not driven by imperialism in its foreign policy and that it is not targeted 
towards the USA. This has in fact resulted in the new concept of a ‘multivector foreign 
policy’.  
According to Yuri Fedorov, Russian foreign policy under Putin contains three major 
changes compared to the policies of his predecessor. Geostrategy has been replaced by 
manifestations of geoeconomics; threat perceptions are more towards international terrorism 
and the consequences of local conflicts than the ‘rise of the unipolar world’ (Primakov 
doctrine); and Putin seldom if ever uses the concept of multipolarity. Multipolarity has been 
replaced by Putin’s idea of a multivectored foreign policy.249 In March 2004 Putin himself 
outlined the multivector policy: ‘We shall build a multivector foreign policy, we shall work 
with the United States, and with the European Union, and with individual European 
countries. We shall work with our Asian partners, with China, with India, with countries of 
the Asia-Pacific region. Due to its geographical position Russia is both a European country 
and an Asian country simultaneously.’250 This cannot be seen as anything else than yet 
another variation of a traditional policy repackaged in a form more in line with the spirit of 
the times as Igor Ivanov has formulated it.  
Putin combined the two previous visions of multipolarity in an attempt to unite the 
different groups in the foreign policy elite. From Kozyrev’s definition he did take the idea of 
a ‘Concert’, of big powers dealing with big issues and this applies very much to the 
economic policies of Russia. It was a big victory for Russia when the G8 announced in June 
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2002 that Russia will host the presidency of the G8 in 2006 and so will also be a member of 
the organisation.251 G8 was the only ‘club’ where Russia was included until joining the WTO 
in 2011. It still stands outside of the EU and OECD. Russia’s situation as an outsider looking 
in has clear economic disadvantages. Russia spent a long time seeking membership in the 
WTO and OECD and has sought closer cooperation in the economic sphere with the EU. It 
also badly needs foreign investment and economic cooperation to strengthen and develop its 
economy. Furthermore the WTO membership negotiations have been a learning ground for 
Russians as to how small countries matter in the international arena and how to deal with 
them through the equality principle.252  
Keohane and Nye have characterized international regimes for trade and money as a 
‘club model’, which meant that a small number of rich countries’ trade ministers controlled 
the agenda and made deals.253 This argument seems to apply well to the way the Russian 
foreign policy administration wants to see its role in the ‘clubs’. Irina Kobrinskaya concludes 
from her analysis that Russia sees the G8 as a substitute for world government and so also 
for multipolarity.254  
Putin’s multipolarity also includes the second concept, however. If strengthening the 
Russian economy and membership of the ‘clubs’ as serving Russia’s foreign policy interests 
are inspired by Kozyrev’s views of multipolarity, the aspect of creating a tool for advancing 
bilateral relations with other world ‘poles’ and also diverting foreign policy to really 
becoming ‘multivector’ has been influenced by Primakov’s doctrine. Especially during 2004 
the word multipolarity turned up more often than in 2000-2003 in Putin’s speeches, and it 
has been especially often used during Putin’s visits to China, India and Brazil, and also in 
discussions with France - if not always by Putin, then by analysts.  
The success and the reason why Russians use the word multipolarity more is because the 
countries in question themselves use the concept of multipolarity and feel comfortable with 
it. In the contexts where multipolarity is used, there is present a feeling of resentment against 
unilateralism in world politics and so it can be interpreted as unhappiness about US world 
politics. However the anti-Americanism that can be found in the concept of multipolarity is 
to limit US unilateralism but is not, as Primakov’s doctrine could be interpreted, a racist type 
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of anti-Americanism. The drive towards great power status and an important role in world 
affairs seems to be the main task of multipolarity more than the essence of ‘anti-
Americanism’. 
Russia has been interested in Western international organizations. There is one 
international organisation in the Russian eyes that stands above all others – the United 
Nations. The role of the UN in Russian foreign policy argumentation has steadily grown. 
Russia has always stressed the importance of the UN but in Putin’s multivector and 
multidirectional foreign policy programme the UN has gained an even bigger role. ‘In the 
course of Russia’s realization of its foreign policy programme, the United Nations has begun 
to play an extremely important role. In the Russian view, the UN represents the central 
collective mechanism for shaping the multipolar world order and regulating world politics. It 
is the backbone of the emergent international system based on international law, the UN 
Charter and multilateral approaches to global and regional problems’.255 
 The UN is an organisation Russia does not need to seek membership of as it is already a 
member. What is more important is that from the beginning Russia has been in an influential 
position to shape the organisation. It also suits its views as to how Great Powers should be 
able to manoeuvre inside of an international organisation. With the veto right given to all the 
permanent members of the UN security council, Russia among them, UN decisions can 
rarely be unsatisfactory for Russia. Russia, or rather the Soviet Union, has been a member of 
the UN longer than any other significant global organisation, and this experience can only 
contribute to the preferred Russian view of multilateralism: great powers have a special 
status and their interests can not be overridden by the interests of smaller powers or treated 
on the same level as them. 
Multipolarity seems to be a different way of defining multilateralism. Multipolarity as it 
is used in Russian foreign policy is multilateralism with a Great Power mentality and veto. 
This view clearly also fits with Putin’s pragmatic statist approach: when it is in Russia’s 
interest, all means are useable. This type of diplomacy is not at all new in Russian foreign 
policy. First of all Russia does seek to go via multilateral frameworks but when Russians do 
not get what they wanted they turn to a different strategy. One good example from the past is 
the treaty of Rapallo in 1922 when Russia and Germany signed a bilateral treaty, having both 
been frozen out of the post-War Versailles process. It was important for Russia then to get 
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rid of any type of compensation claim that World War I might have created.256 The treaty 
was signed during the Genoa Economic Conference. The meaning of the Genoa Conference 
was to present a united front to the Soviets on the issue of debts and to the Germans on the 
issue of reparations. Chicherin, the foreign minister of the Russian Federal Soviet Republic, 
managed to persuade the Germans into a bilateral treaty since the British and French had not 
been prepared for the bilateral option.  
 The mixture of promoting multilateralism and diverting to bilateralism in Russian 
foreign policy makes it difficult to interpret. Russian foreign policy makers seem to accept 
the maxims described by Robert Keohane concerning the importance of international 
institutions even if they are not always successful in world politics: ‘Superpowers need 
general rules because they seek to influence events around the world. Even an unchallenged 
superpower such as the United States would be unable to achieve its goals through the 
bilateral exercise of influence: the costs of such massive ‘arm-twisting’ would be too 
great’.257 But at the same time Russians find it very difficult to cooperate with the 
multilateral agreements and protocols where Russia would be one among others, small and 
big countries alike, and furthermore the multilateral format of international organizations and 
forums makes it possible for Russian diplomacy to actively create a wide circle of supporters 
for its conceptual approaches to the issues.258 
 The Russian understanding of Great Power status does not include equality among all 
states or any possibility for interfering in the state affairs of a Great Power. As much as it 
looks that Russia understands the use and meaning of international organisations and 
international relations in the multilateral context, the influence of the past centuries of 
Russia’s international status still lurks in its actions and views about how international 
relations should be conducted and foreign policy statements follow accordingly. 
The idea of multipolarity reveals the unifying factor among the different foreign policy 
schools in Russian foreign policy thinking on multilateralism – the status of a great power 
has to be maintained by all means.  This is in the interest of the Russian state and of the 
power elite. It also appears that popular opinion agrees with this approach. Even those in 
opposition to the Russian government and presidential administration are also worried about 
Russia’s status and image in the international arena.  
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 Multipolarity also shows us that Russian foreign policy conduct towards each of those it 
regards as a great power, or one of the power poles in the world, is very similar. On the other 
hand it adopts an even-handed stance towards each of the smaller countries. So the US is 
treated on the same level as China, while Azerbaijan is treated equally to Armenia.259 Many 
Russian academics and analysts have repeatedly stated that the ‘Russian mentality is a great 
power mentality’.260 This ‘Russian mentality’ that strives for the Great Power status, 
according to Alexander Muzykantsky, Head of the World Politics department at Moscow 
State University, is a product of three centuries of Russian politics. He argues  
‘despite different historical circumstances and conditions, similar foreign policy 
paradigms and mechanisms are being reproduced. In some way or other, they reflect the 
fundamental characteristics of core cultural values that influence the formulation of doctrinal 
foreign policy concepts. For Russia, the philosophy of syncretism261 plays a decisive role and 
manifests itself by a tendency to reduce the entire range of international relations to a 
confrontation between a small number of alliances or blocs, identifying the ‘poles’ of 
influence and staking out the zones of special interests’.262  
Under this view the world is seen in great power terms, big states among themselves 
creating the rules of the game and the smaller countries bandwagoning.263 Muzykantsky’s 
understanding also supports Igor Ivanov’s view that ‘Foreign policy objectively reflects the 
characteristics of how a country – its culture, economy, geopolitical situation- have 
historically developed, and therefore it is common that what appears to be a fundamentally 
new direction for foreign policy actually turns out to be yet another variation of a traditional 
policy repackaged in a form more in line with the spirit of the times’.264  
Multipolarity and multilateralism are concepts that give backbone to Russian foreign 
policy thinking in the era of globalisation and integration. They are tools to ease off the 
Russian ‘hangover’ from its imperial past during its transformation, and to face up to the 
challenges of world politics without losing the country’s identity and dignity. It is also clear 
that despite some differences the different foreign policy schools see the cooperation model 
in either multilateralism or multipolarity as a workable framework. But greatpowerness also 
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colours understandings of multilateralism, with the UN providing a model, in Russian eyes, 
of how multilateral organisations should be constructed and function. How Russia should use 
these frames is still sometimes under disputes. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
The question of persistent factors in foreign policy making is not an easy one to tackle in 
the context of any country. Far too often different concepts that can be traced back in history 
can also be misused and give an idea of a deterministic path of foreign policy making. In the 
Russian context this is also the case. Different concepts that are still in use have a different 
meaning than 200 years ago, but they can still play a very central role in foreign policy 
behaviour and making. The features listed above are known from the past but are today 
central to Russian foreign policy thinking. Many of them are different from Western thinking 
and therefore put the West and Russia on opposite sides. However, some positive outcomes 
of Russia’s fondness for looking back to her own past can be observed: embracing 
multilateralism, even if based on notions of Great Power status, is one. 
 If in Western foreign policy analysis and assessments, the influence of persistent 
factors, especially in the form of Great Power state identity, would be taken more often 
under examination, we would find more tools to explain and understand Russian foreign 
policy behaviour. If the Western understanding of these concepts would include the Russian 
point of view, the tensions between the West and Russia would be easier to reduce. The fact 
that Russia is looking for forms of cooperation at the multilateral level also ensures that 
Russia will be more and more integrated into the mechanisms and diplomacy of the 
multilateral setting, which could make Russia less unpredictable. The negative experience of 
isolationism has left its imprints on the Russian collective memory, and so with the Russian 
drive to be an important part and player in world affairs the idea that Russia would be left on 
the periphery is seen as very unattractive. This in its turn will encourage cooperation in the 
multilateral setting. 
The imperial syndrome presented by Emil Pain and the analysis of Russian mentality by 
Alexander Muzykantsky offers us an insight into possible influences from the past on both 
the practice and rhetoric in today’s foreign policy making in Russia. Tendencies from 
Russia’s past, such as imperialism, expansionism and ressentiment, are subject to differing 
levels of influence as Russian foreign policy develops in the context of both shifting 
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domestic priorities and the demands of a globalised world. These three concepts have caused 
a lot of damage and left an atmosphere of mistrust in the Russia-West relationship. It seems, 
however, that imperialism, expansionism and ressentiment, are more connected to the 
internal politics of the Russian Federation, than to foreign policy directly. However the 
frequency of their usage and their effect on Russia’s foreign relations first of all show clearly 
the link between domestic politics and foreign policy, and secondly serve as good 
illustrations of how rhetoric can become reality. Table 3.2 at the end of this chapter shows 
how the concepts introduced here are viewed by the different foreign policy schools in 
Russian internal debates, which then impact on foreign policy. The schools have been named 
more according to the European conception, but they do follow the Tsygankov line. 
To recognise some of the repeating notions that have connections with Russia’s history, 
some analysis of the Russian mentality and foreign policy making traditions is important, so 
that the reading of foreign policy statements and speeches can be put into context. It is clear 
that the domestic political context is seen to be a crucial determinant of foreign policy 
because this is where politicians’ political ideas are formed and decisions are made.265 
Robert Putnam’s argument that political leaders can be seen as trying to achieve their goals 
in the domestic and international arenas simultaneously, applies well to the Russian contexts. 
This is seen in the case studies of Russia’s interaction in international organisations in the 
context of the Chechen wars, where domestic and international messages and priorities are 
frequently entangled. The determinants which define these priorities and are exercised in 
Russian foreign policy have strong domestic roots in part because of their prevalence 
historically. 
This chapter has emphasised the influence of the persistent factors playing an important 
part in foreign policy formation. In the Russian context greatpowerness and concepts relating 
to it play a particularly important role in foreign policy. In relations towards the West the 
multilateral context is one of the central frameworks where Russia would be keen to operate. 
The Great Power identity is the ‘ideology’ Russia seems to operate from. At the beginning of 
the 1990s, when the Russian Federation started to form its foreign policy lines, the first 
challenge to its greatpowerness came from within – the wars in Chechnya. This challenge 
shaped Russia’s relations with the West significantly and set the tone for its foreign policy.  
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Table 3.2 Views of different Russian Foreign Policy schools towards key concepts 
 
Russia 
 
 
Europhiles (also known as 
westernisers, liberal 
internationalist, atlantacist) 
Eurasians (also 
known as 
pragmatic 
nationalist, 
statist) 
Europhobes (also known 
as civilizationist, 
slavophiles, patriots) 
Historical aspects Russian historical path is 
towards integration with 
the West 
Russian history as 
a Great Power 
gives Russia a 
Great Power 
status and so 
Russia should act 
in world politics 
Russia’s attempts to get 
closer to the West have 
failed and so the West 
should be seen as 
something bad for 
Russia. Russia should 
find solutions to all her 
problems from 
russianness, not to seek 
answers abroad 
National interests Strengthening Russia via 
economic means and 
market economy in 
democracy 
Protecting 
Russia’s position 
in the world 
through sovereign 
democracy with 
some state control 
in the economy, 
especially in 
natural resources 
Distribution of wealth 
coming from natural 
resources to Russians. 
Democracy creates 
chaos. Traditionally 
Russia is led from 
above. The ‘good tsar’ is 
the best option. 
Multilateralism Russia as an equal partner 
with Western powers. 
Modern way to conduct 
international relations. 
Russia will be 
involved in 
everything but 
will not accept 
majority vote 
Hierarchical structure 
and with Slavic allies 
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Multipolarity Russia as a regional 
hegemon and one of the 
poles in the world 
Russia as a 
regional hegemon 
and one of the 
poles in the world 
Russia as a regional 
hegemon and one of the 
poles in the world 
Sovereignty Interdependence 
sovereignty 
International 
legal sovereignty 
and Westphalian 
sovereignty 
Domestic sovereignty 
Imperialism Interdependence and 
liberal imperialism can 
only be good for Russia 
Buffer zone 
around Russian 
borders. Greater 
integration in CIS 
area under 
Russian 
leadership 
Russian heartlands 
extended with Ukraine, 
Belarus and Northern 
Kazakhstan 
(Solzhenitsyn line) 
Isolationism  It is not good for Russia 
and nobody wants it 
External 
influence needs to 
be controlled by 
Russian state but 
no doors should 
be closed (foreign 
investment). 
Resistance as much as 
possible to outside 
influence. Strong 
internal market. 
Ressentiment Complains often that 
Western critics are actually 
undermining the 
democratic developments 
in Russia 
Seeks to present 
the “other” as a 
threat. Tries to 
find unity through 
a common enemy 
West presents a threat to 
Russian civilization. 
Socialism was also a 
Western ideology that 
did not fit Russian 
conditions, so is 
democracy 
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Chapter 4: Challenge to Russian Greatpowerness – the Two Chechen Wars 
 
 
‘Through its treatment of Chechnya, the Russian Federation actually defines itself’266 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The greatest challenges to Russian greatness and greatpowerness have come from Russia 
itself. Smaller scale wars and bigger scale revolutions and state system changes have shaken 
the state and affected its image abroad. By contrast, big wars like the Napoleonic war in the 
early 19th century and the Second World War have played to the advantage of Russian 
greatpowerness. The fall of the Soviet Union was the ultimate challenge and many argued 
that the Russian Federation hardly qualifies as a successor of similar status and influence as 
the Soviet Union even at its weakest.  
A smaller scale war that brought a serious challenge to Russian greatpowerness in the 
1990s was the conflict with Chechnya. The effects of the wars in Chechnya are more far 
reaching than the newspaper and news headlines  that they frequently gave rise to, usually 
after bloody terrorist attacks connected to the Chechen conflict or in the form of election 
coverage.267 The effects of Chechnya on Russian society are still to materialize in full, but 
some signs are already identifiable. One example is the Russian media laws and the 
tightening control over the mass media by the state. Furthermore, the trend of the growing 
power of security interests can also be linked to the same issue. The issue of Chechnya has 
dominated in at least two presidential elections and also through those has had a long-term 
effect on Russian political culture development. But the effect this study is interested in, is 
the challenge to Russian greatpowerness and state identity as well as what kind of impact the 
wars have had on Russia-West relations, especially with Europe.  
The challenge Chechnya has presented to Russian greatpowerness can be framed in 
terms of each of the three international relations schools presented in the first chapter, in 
terms of the actual policies pursued by Russia with regard to Chechnya and, more 
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importantly, in terms of Russia’s international standing. For the realist the challenge to 
greatpowerness can come through a struggle for power and zero-sum game. The wars in 
Chechnya, from the Russian point of view, are theoretically won but in practice the victory is 
bleak. The image of a weak and backward army cast a shadow over claims to Great Power 
status. To enhance the strong image relating to Great power identity Russians wanted to 
frame the second Chechen war in terms of a war on terrorism.  
In terms of the liberal school and ideas of soft power on the other hand, Russia has 
failed, although it is trying to argue the opposite and also engage in international cooperation 
in some cases. Russian policies of ‘Chechenisation’ in Chechnya were aiming to use soft 
power, to win the game of hearts and minds. However the steady numbers of terrorist attacks 
in Russian territory, especially inside the North Caucasus republics, tell the grim story of 
failed policies. The aid money pumped into Chechnya has not reached the local population 
and the image of Russians is not good in Chechnya. From the liberal point of view Russian 
policies which should have promoted economic growth, material aid and the restoration of 
order, have not reached the population and instead of Moscow being seen as a desirable 
centre to belong to, militant Islamic trends in different forms have gained strong support in 
the whole North Caucasus. Thereby it can be stated that this failure of improving the living 
standards of the area between the wars and after the war, undermines Russia’s modern Great 
Power image. The Russian attitudes towards the two wars reflect very much the liberal ideas 
relating to greatpowerness.  
In the case of the constructivist framework, there are two discourses to focus on: one that 
sees Chechnya as a separate entity that should have the right to self determination as an 
ethnically separate state from Russians, and the other discourse that falls into the category of 
Great Power identity: Chechnya is and will be an inseparable part of Russia, no matter what. 
The fact that Chechnya wanted to become an independent state but that Russia prevented it at 
great cost, shows how important the great power status is for Russia. The domestic 
argumentation for the reasons to start the war highlight this identity discourse. 
In the previous chapter the persistent aspects and determinants arising from domestic 
situations influencing foreign policy thinking were examined. In this chapter the aim is to 
track how the two Chechen wars impacted on Russia’s state identity as a Great Power. 
Chechnya, an internal conflict, came to define Russia’s state and nationhood and therefore 
also had a major impact on Russia’s image especially in the West. In the case of the Chechen 
wars, the persistent factors come to the surface. Great Power sovereignty, ressentiment, 
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expansionism, imperialism, even multilateralism are present in the domestic and international 
dimension of the wars in Chechnya. 
The challenge for Russian greatpowerness was tackled by Russians in international 
cooperation, through argumentation and actions in different international organisations. This 
analysis will be illustrated more closely in the case-study chapters. This chapter does not 
present a comprehensive history of the causes and process of the two wars.268 Rather, the two 
Chechen wars are gone through in the context of the domestic political determinants, the 
international war on terrorism, and different attitudes towards the wars. In all of them the 
theme of Russian greatpowerness is present. 
 
4.2 Chechnya and the War on Terrorism  
 
 ‘11 September was the wand that transformed Russia from its ugly ducking condition 
into, if not a swan, then at least a fully fledged member of the community of civilized 
nations.’269  
 
The first Chechen war was portrayed as a war against a national separatist movement 
trying to break away from Russia. In the light of the democratisation process that was 
ongoing at the time in Russia, and arguably still is, the start of the first Chechen war needs to 
be seen as Yeltsin’s attempt to use armed conflict to show that he is able to make decisions, 
reverse his own notion ‘as much power to the regions as they can handle’ in favour of a more 
centralised state, and also as an attempt to consolidate public and elite opinion behind a 
united nationalist line. This argument is also advanced by Mansfield and Snyder.270 Their 
contention that countries undergoing democratisation are more prone to warfare belongs to 
the realist school. In essence the argument is about power and methods used to maintain the 
elite’s position of authority. 
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268 For detailed accounts of the first Chechen War see, for example, Matthew Evangelista: ‘The Chechen Wars-
Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union’, Brookings Institution Press, 2002; Gall, Carlotta and Thomas de 
Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War, Basingstoke: Picador, 1997. 
269 Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, 
p.116 
270 Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, ‘Democratization and War’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995, Volume 
74, no.3, pp.79-97, p.90 and the argument was developed into a book, Electing to Fight – Why Emerging 
Democracies Go to War, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005. 
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The first war in Chechnya was planned to be a bliktzkrieg, that would show that the central 
authority in Russia had the country under control. This thinking is very much along the lines 
of power politics, with the aim to show who was in charge. Somehow it seems that the 
lessons from history were forgotten by Yeltsin and perhaps also by Putin. War is seldom 
quick and results often unexpected and unwanted (the example of Iraq also highlights this). 
Russian tsar Nicholas II was persuaded by his interior minister Viacheslav Pleve in 1904 that 
‘a quick and victorious war’271 would boost the popularity of the tsar. The result was quite the 
opposite and so it was also in the case of the Chechen war, apart from some short moments 
when Yeltsin’s popularity managed to recover (during the presidential elections of 1996). 
The first Chechen war was not only designed to boost Yeltsin’s power and show his ability to 
coerce Russian society, it was also promoted by the Russian military that had suffered badly 
from the break-up of the Soviet Union. The defence minister Pavel Gratchev who had helped 
Yeltsin to maintain his power in the conflict between the parliament and president in autumn 
1993, was one of those that lobbied for the war. It is interesting to note that during 1993-2000 
despite the humiliating failures of the Russian military, Russia’s army was the public 
institution that enjoyed more trust than any other public institution in Russia.272 This was 
very much down to the fact that the Russian public saw the military as a crown jewel of 
Russian greatpowerness. 
Arguably the first Chechen war started the vicious circle that Russia has difficulties to 
escape from – democracy and war seldom go well hand in hand. The first Chechen war 
started in the environment created by regime breakdown and at the beginning of a process of 
democratisation, but itself became a major factor in preventing further democratisation. 
The first Chechen war enjoyed little public support after the shortcomings exposed by 
the first days of the invasion. The military defeats and the inability of the Russian side to see 
a route to eventual victory combined with the lack of support domestically led Russia to 
reach a peace agreement with the Chechen republic of Ichkeria in August 1996. However the 
regime consolidation in Russia as well as in Chechnya was far from completed. The first 
Chechen war had left the Russian military bitter and the peace agreement divided factions 
among the Chechen elite as well as in Russia. Furthermore since the ‘old’ elite in Russia 
started to gain a footing in the Yeltsin administration, the seed for the war on terrorism was 
planted. The first Chechen war was not portrayed by the Russians as a war against terrorism 
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272 Public Opinion survey conducted by VTsIOM in Valerie Sperling, ‘Opposition to the War in Chechnya: 
Antimilitarist organizing in Russia’, PONARS Policy Memo, no.224, December 2001. 
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but some of the methods of the Chechen fighters like the hostage taking in Budyanovsk in 
1996 made the Russian authorities use the word ‘bandit’ and also the word ‘terrorism’ began 
to appear. Already in 1994 Russian criminal law was amended regarding terrorism.273 The 
first federal law on the fight against terrorism came into force in July 1998. And the 
ressentiment-thinking in the form of an outside threat for Russia started to take shape. 
There had been a chance to restore stability and development to the area of Chechnya on 
the basis of the Khasaviurt Agreement, signed in August 1996, and the Treaty on Peace and 
Principles of Mutual Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of 
Ichkeria, signed in May 1997. The Chechen Presidential election in January 1997 and the 
election of Aslan Maskhadov were seen as positive signs especially in the West. The 
government in the war-torn area was, however, unable to get the territory under its full 
control without financial help for the reconstruction of its infrastructure and was unable to 
provide employment opportunities. Moscow was very unwilling to provide this help, above 
all because it was struggling with similar problems itself. The other reason looking at the 
events retrospectively seemed to be the knowledge that Russia was preparing for the second 
war. 
Less explicable were Moscow’s measures to prevent any international organizations 
from assisting. The OSCE Assistance Group was pushed aside. In the Russian view, since the 
war was over, the need for any international assistance was also over. Chechnya became a 
place of lawlessness and anarchy. The fact that some Chechen groups reverted to kidnapping 
and that everybody including Western citizens were targets did not help the Chechens win 
much international support and opened up for Russia the opportunity to link terrorism and 
Chechnya. 
The role of land military power is significant in discussions of Great Power status274 and 
it fits into this picture. If Russians claim that the NATO invasion of Kosovo was fulfilled 
because NATO needed a mission after its lost identity with the end of the Cold War, and that 
the EU’s interest in being involved in Moldova is also down to the fact that the EU needs a 
mission to promote its security identity, then the similar claim can be made that the Russian 
military needed a mission, especially in the early 1990s, but also at the end of the 1990s.  
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Chechnya was presented to them as such an opportunity. An interesting feature is that the 
initiative for the renewal of hostilities did not come from the Defence Ministry but from the 
Interior Ministry. The kidnapping of an interior ministry official in March 1999 made the 
Minister of the Interior Sergei Stepashin call for a new mission in Chechnya.275 It was also 
clear that the military had its own agenda relating to Chechnya: ‘Chief of the General Staff 
Anatoly Kvashnin gathered a group of combat generals (Konstantin Pulikovsky, Gennady 
Troshev, Viktor Kazantsev, Vladimir Shamanov) driven hard by the desire to take revenge 
for the humiliating defeat in 1996’.276 In Daniel Treisman’s view the incidents that began the 
second war had been planned for months on both sides.277 
That picture, the picture of ‘war strategy’, is also supported by the claim by Putin in his 
first meeting with president Clinton in the summer of 1999 that al-Qaeda had troops in 
Chechnya and that they were planning action against Russia.278 Furthermore the fight against 
terrorism was also raised in the CIS summit in Minsk June 1999. The CIS-countries signed a 
document for cooperation in the fight against terrorism.279  
In August 1999, Chechen forces led by Basaev and Khattab launched an invasion of 
Dagestan, and bombs exploded in Moscow apartment blocks. This made the start of the 
second Chechen war inevitable, while it also suited the purposes of the newly appointed 
Prime Minister of Russia and heir-designate to the Russian presidency to demonstrate a show 
of strength. The broader aims of the war started to be clear: ‘In fighting in the south, Russia 
not only hopes to restore constitutional order and, of course, reassert its territorial integrity in 
the region, but also to send a warning shot across the bows of anyone who might have 
thought that Russia would quietly slip away from the region, like a thief in the night. As 
Russia has been a key player in the area, for better or worse, for over 300 years, it is not 
going to quietly slip away.’280 The Russian public very much shared this view. Opinion polls 
showed that the Russian population supported overwhelmingly (73% in favour) the war still 
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in March 2000.281 The second Chechen war started in September 1999. In Putin’s words of 
October 1999 for Russians the matter of Chechnya was everywhere ‘Wherever one looks, one 
sees Chechnya’.282 
The Russian presidential administration started to argue more clearly and consistently 
about the threat of international terrorism in the international arena. The picture of the enemy 
had to be reinforced. Russia was not only fighting with a small backward mountain people 
but well organised and equipped international terrorists. For a Great Power this image was 
more acceptable. The foreign minister Igor Ivanov spoke for international cooperation against 
terrorism in the 54th general assembly of the UN in September. In October 1999 the UN 
security council passed two resolutions, one regarding the action against the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan and one about international cooperation against terrorism283. 
Once elected president of Russia, Putin continued to talk about the threat of international 
terrorism. When he met with leaders of the EU and US, he continuously brought up the issue 
of the growth of terrorism in Afghanistan and he warned about links between the terrorist 
camps in Afghanistan and groups of Islamic fundamentalism in Europe.284 The fight against 
terrorism had become one of the major priorities of the Russian state. All the major foreign 
and security policy documents stressed the danger of terrorism; the Russian national security 
concept saw international terrorism attempting to weaken Russia and split Russia, in the 
military doctrine terrorism was named as the most dangerous factor threatening  Russia’s 
internal unity and the Russian foreign policy doctrine stressed the importance of international 
cooperation in the fight against international terrorism. All three major foreign and security 
policy documents were published in 2000.  
The second Chechen war and the war against terrorism united for the first time since the 
break-up of the Soviet Union the Russian political lines - liberals, communist, nationalist – 
while the army and security institutions as well as public opinion moved to support the 
Russian president and his government. Only a very few newspaper writings questioned the 
operation in Chechnya. Jevgeni Krutikov wrote in Izvestia newspaper ‘Why do we Russians 
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do all this and what exactly do our leaders want to gain by using all this force?’285 Specialist 
on security issues and still a member of the Duma in 1999 Alexei Arbatov warned ‘Never 
step into the same war twice’ in an article in Obshchaya Gazeta.286 It looked already then that 
the war might become a long one. Defence minister Igor Sergeev stated at the end of October 
that Russian troops would never leave Chechnya.287  
Putin needed a tool to mend the things that had been problematic during the Yeltsin era 
and had stood in the way of the economic reforms - the resistance of the army and security 
forces, the hurt image of a Great Power and the lack of unity in Russian society. The wars in 
Chechnya did not fulfil this task alone but the war on terrorism arguably has benefited Putin 
in his task. 
The roots to the claim that Russia is fighting terrorism in Chechnya are in the first 
Chechen war, but the claim was seriously and systematically used during the second Chechen 
war. The Chechen government headed by Aslan Maskhadov was not able to prevent the fact 
that power in Chechnya slipped into the hands of so-called field-commanders, such as the 
slave traders Arbi Barayev and Ruslan Khaikhoroyev and terrorists Salman Raduyev and 
Shamil Basaev, and the Jordanian Islamic fanatic Khattab, who many asserted was an ally of 
Osama bin Laden.288 This information was emphasised in the West by respected 
commentators such as Sergei Kovalev, a biologist and former political prisoner and well 
known human rights activist from Russia. As well as being used to influence opinion abroad, 
this was all the information the Russian public needed to fully and truly support Putin in his 
actions in Chechnya.  
As the second Chechen invasion was launched the Russian government was keen to 
prove to the international community, almost more than to its own people, that the operation 
was legal and justified. The then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced on 30th 
September 1999 ‘Chechnya is Russian territory, and our troops can be deployed wherever we 
want’.289 Russian officials gave a new meaning to the word terrorist, as Kovalev puts it: 
‘Thus, the word “terrorist” quickly ceased to mean someone belonging to a criminal 
underground group whose goal was political murder. Now the word came to mean “an armed 
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Chechen – anywhere”’.290 Military reports started to use the word ‘terrorist’ commonly in any 
context. The war itself was to be called an ‘Anti-terrorist special operation of the Russian 
troops’. Russians stressed also the international terrorist dimension, and as part of the official 
justification comparisons were made to other similar events in the world, including the 
USA’s missile attacks against Osama bin Laden’s guerilla camps in Afghanistan after bombs 
exploded in US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, and NATO’s bombing of 
Serbia with civilian casualties in June 1999. Furthermore, some Russian newspapers 
enhanced the international dimension too. Rossiiskaya Gazeta reported in September 1999 
that Osama bin Laden, who two years later was to become a household name throughout the 
world, had personally visited camps of Chechen militants and that he was sending arms and 
equipment to the Chechen rebel leaders Basaev and Khattab through the Afghan Taliban. The 
same article stressed that the high-ranking Chechen rebel leader Amir-al-Khattab came from 
Jordan, and that under his command was a Pakistani national Abu Abdulla Dzhafar. Clearly 
the point being made here was that Russia was involved in an international conflict, and even 
the Russian Internal Affairs Minister Vladimir Rushailo emphasized that mercenaries from 
certain countries in the Middle East were fighting in Dagestan.291 Thus with these kind of 
arguments Russia itself pushed for the Chechen war to become an international issue as well. 
Here, however, lies a strong contradiction with the other official line that Chechnya is a 
domestic matter of Russia and Russian territorial integrity needs to be respected. Thomas de 
Waal has summarised this dual nature of Russian thinking regarding Chechnya: ‘Chechnya is 
a front in the international war on terror and our policies there deserve unreserved western 
support; however, it is a domestic political issue and no international organisation can be 
involved.’292   
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington on September 11th 2001 changed in ‘one big blow’ the security challenges, 
coalitions and priorities in world politics. Russia, and especially president Putin, was quick to 
seize the opportunity and announce that Russia was an ally with the USA and the West in 
their efforts to fight terrorism in the world. During the previous decade Russia appeared to 
have been struggling to improve its worldwide image and to rediscover a suitable place for 
itself as an actor on the global scene. Now it found an opportunity to be seen and heard with 
the United States as the other great power suffering from the threat of terrorism. Russia saw 
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itself as a possible go-between, a constructive mediator, between West and East (Islamic 
world) and it was facing security challenges together with the West that Russia had claimed 
to have faced already for close to a decade from the Russian ‘South’, meaning especially 
Chechnya. ‘The events of September, retrospectively, appear to have justified Russia’s 
longstanding claim that the West was not only underestimating international terrorism but 
also ignoring the existence of an arc of Islamic fundamentalism from Kosovo to the 
Philippines’293 writes John Russell. Indeed it could be said that after 9/11, from the Russian 
point of view at least, it was not so much Russia that joined the US-led War on Terror as the 
rest of the world that joined a war Russia was already waging. The eerie resonance of the 
destruction of New York’s Twin Towers with the bombing of Moscow apartment blocks two 
years earlier, while not directly exploited on the Russian side, inevitably lent a retrospective 
sense of justification to everything Russia had done in Chechnya. In the realist framework 
great power alliances are created based on mutual interests. The war on terrorism was a 
common issue. It did not take long for the impact of September 11th to leave its mark on a 
new direction in international alignments, and it certainly had an effect on how Russia was 
viewed. 
The way in which Russians already connected Chechnya and international terrorism 
before 9/11, was a success for Russian diplomacy. Nobody can deny that an element of 
international terrorism was involved. But it is good to keep in mind that the reason for the 
second war had as much to do with the way Russians handled the conflict in the first place as 
with the threat of international terrorism. Every single terrorist attack that was linked, 
however vaguely, to international terrorism through dodgy internet pages or some money 
flows did back Putin’s words and strengthened the excuse to use force in Chechnya. Since 
9/11, this approach was largely successful in stifling international criticism. With the 
subsequent shift in focus of international human rights organisations to US behaviour at 
Guantanamo Bay and in prisons in Iraq, even the human rights aspect of the Russian 
military’s behaviour was no longer under the same kind of scrutiny as previously. In the end 
Russians did also manage to get Chechens onto the international list of terrorists with US 
backing. The war on terrorism contributed to the strengthening of Russia’s international 
image as a Great Power. 
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4.3 Russian attitudes towards conflict in Chechnya – uniting Russians but losing the 
West 
The international context of outbreaks of the Chechen Wars was interesting both times. 
The timing of the first Chechen war is very intriguing from the point of view of Russia’s 
international standing and cooperation with the West. The year 1994 looked very positive in 
terms of foreign policy opportunities for Russia. In March the IMF approved a loan worth 
US$ 1.5 billion to Russia and so indicated the West’s keen interest in trying to keep Russia 
on course to a market economy. Russia became a member of NATO’s partnership for Peace 
Programme in 1994.  In the summer of 1994 Russia had signed a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement with the EU in Corfu, when Yeltsin himself stated ‘Our country has 
made a strategic choice in favour of integration into the world community and in the first 
instance, with the European Union’.294 In July the same year Andrei Kozyrev attended the G7 
meeting in Naples and there were hopes in the Russian camp of the G7 becoming the G8. 
Russia was also in negotiations over membership of the Council of Europe. The current 
towards Russian Western integration was strong. All of these positive developments for 
Russia in international terms, did not give a reason to jeopardize her international standing by 
launching a controversial war.  
 Furthermore, the decision to use force in Chechnya itself was very peculiar in terms of 
international cooperation and would have been so even if the outcome had been a successful 
blitzkrieg. During 1994 Russia signed two OSCE documents which committed her to giving 
advance notice of troop movements and taking measures to minimise civilian casualties: the 
Vienna document on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) and the OSCE 
Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of security, which was signed at the Budapest 
summit on 5th and 6th of December.295 The launch of the Chechen war violated these 
agreements, and the nature of the whole case broke general OSCE norms and rules. The 
peculiarity of launching the first Chechen war from the point of view of Russia’s 
international standing can be explained by the fact that the underlying arguments for the first 
Chechen war advanced the domestic factors not the external ones. Therefore the huge impact 
the first Chechen war had on Russia’s external relations was not considered beforehand. It 
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can be argued that the Great Power identity in Russian politics did not see Russia as weak 
and could not see that war inside the federation’s borders could cause an international outcry 
the way it did. Only a few commentators anticipated the negative international impacts of the 
war, specifically in relation to the International Monetary Fund (page 122). 
The situation was quite different in the build up to the second Chechen war. The timing 
of the second Chechen war made far more sense than the first given the international climate. 
The arguments were parallel to those of NATO and the United States’ on Kosovo. The 
bombings of Kosovo and Serbia in the summer of 1999 marked a significant change in 
attitudes in the international arena. The Russian military used the bombing as an argument for 
their own actions: ‘If NATO can shell civilian objects in a sovereign country for the sake of 
political aims we can do the same in our own country.’296 It seems that while the main 
reasons for launching the war were internal to the Russian Federation, the precise timing was 
provided by NATO. This rhetorical frame, of two Great Powers doing what they see best for 
world order, suited the Russian home audience. 
 
4.3.1 Public Opinion 
 William Zimmerman’s book The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and 
Mass Perspectives, 1993-2000, is a comprehensive piece of research about public opinion. 
Zimmerman comes to the significant conclusion that the general public in Russia has a 
modest but real role in Russian foreign policy, and tends to be either nationalistic or 
isolationist in their foreign policy thinking.297 Public opinions on foreign policy, however, do 
not touch so much on specific questions, but need rather to be understood in a broader 
context. They reflect public understandings of their own country. Professor Konstantin 
Khudoley, from the School of International Relations, University of St.Petersburg, has argued 
that Russian people are uninterested in foreign affairs, and that they already have enough to 
think about in the everyday reality of the domestic field.298 It seems, however, that there are 
two broader contexts that are important to the Russian people and that are reflected into 
Russian foreign policy rhetoric, and to some extent into actual actions. The first of the two 
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tendencies is, according to Andrei Melville: ‘If one thing is to be mentioned as the most 
important dimension of public political orientation in Russia today it is definitely the longing 
for order.’299 The other is related to another feature of Russian foreign policy. ‘Russian 
foreign policy is geared to the fundamental goal of redoing Russia as a Great Power in 
modern conditions.’300 In the case of the two Chechen wars the two central factors in public 
opinion, order and Russia’s Great power status defined by Melville, come together. At the 
same time the two seem to be factors that have made a rift between Russia and the West. 
Public opinion regarding the Chechen wars seems to reflect the quest for order and a 
high status for Russia. If in the first war the emphasis was on order, in the second one the 
international dimension was important also for the general public. In the first Chechen war 
the public quite clearly thought that the war activities lowered the respect of Russia in world 
politics. After two years of the war, 51% of the respondents thought so, while only 11% 
believed that the war would gain some respect for Russia. 301 In the same poll 74% of the 
respondents saw the war as a tragedy for the whole Russia.302  Furthermore 63% were against 
the war in Chechnya, while only 23% were supportive. 303 The general attitude seemed to be 
that the Chechen war would have to be paid for, at least in the international context. Izvestia 
of January 10th 1995 ran an article titled ‘What the Chechen war will Cost Us’ in which the 
speculation was that the mission from the IMF which arrived in Moscow on the 16th of 
January would decide against more support for Russian reforms. ‘But the most serious 
economic losses may now be in store for Russia not in the theatre of military operations but 
in peaceful Moscow offices’.304 Two days later Izvestia published an article titled ‘The 
Chechen factor could mean abandoning the concept set in the Current Budget’.305 Sevodnya 
ran an article titled ‘State investment falls under the impact of the operation in Chechnya’.306 
On the 10th of January and on the 9th of February the same newspaper claimed ‘The military 
operation in Chechnya has probably caused the IMF mission to doubt that the budget’s basic 
economic indices can be achieved’.307 The element of lost respect and a suffering Russian 
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image was present in the first war but then the reaction was more to seek restored order by 
stopping the violence. 
In the Second Chechen war the public opinion was overwhelmingly behind the 
intervention unlike its opposition stand in the first Chechen War. The first war did leave an 
image that in the end through negotiations Russia had looked weak and order was still not 
accomplished. So the memory of the first war and the feeling of insecurity that was created 
during the NATO  bombings in spring 1999 could easily be exploited for internal use and the 
explosions at housing blocks in Moscow only increased that feeling. Even in mid-March 
2000, 73% supported the renewed war in Chechnya and the number was higher during the 
first months of the invasion.308 Partly the strength of support can be put down to the state’s 
strong control of much of the media. And partly it was down to the new leader Prime 
Minister Putin, who showed strength in leadership which had long been missing in Russia. 
Interestingly also, according to a VTsIOM survey, the army was still the most trusted of 
Russia’s institutions. Between 1993 and 2000 Russians expressed slightly more confidence 
overall in the army than in other institutions, including the Church.309 The voices of non-
governmental organizations such as the Committee of Soldier’s Mothers and Alternatives to a 
Militarized Patriotism had almost no influence. However there were some dissenting voices: 
in addition to the articles by Krutikov and Arbatov already mentioned, former Prime Minister 
Primakov believed that any ground operations in Chechnya could escalate into a protracted 
and costly war.310 However, in Arbatov’s own words ‘When it comes to the Chechen 
question all our political parties, all branches and echelons of government, military men and 
civilians, the general public and the intelligentsia, are in agreement these days’.311 
 
4.3.2 The State Duma  
The State Duma of the Russian Federation represents the third element (along with the 
President and the government) in the creation of Russian Foreign Policy. It is not an actor as 
such, but provides a platform for discussion where alternative Foreign Policy orientations 
have been put on display for the population, and cannot be wholly ignored by the two 
executive parts of the administration. On the question of whether the Duma even matters in 
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Russian politics Duma deputy Sigtkin has argued: ‘I do not agree with the notion that the 
Duma would not have independence in Russia. In principal we do support the president and 
most of the reform programmes are introduced by the president. But there are also 
disagreements and not all laws go through just like that. The President has though the 
public’s support for his policies and that is also our job, to drive policy that the public 
supports. The notion comes when people do not know what is going on before for example a 
law or decree comes to the Duma floor. Often there are serious and strong disagreements. It is 
not pleasant but the fight happens during the pre-work, not in the Duma floor. But it has to be 
pointed out that the country does not go forward if we are not effective. Disagreements do 
take time and in my opinion it is a waste of time.’312  
During Yeltsin’s presidencies the Russian State Duma was often in disagreement with 
the presidential administration. As Sigutkin pointed out when the Duma and presidential 
administration did not work together, things moved forward in Russia very ineffectively.  
The decision to go to war in Chechnya in 1994 appeared to go against the 1993 Russian 
constitution, which recognized that obligations under international law must be followed– 
pacta sunt servanda (article 15.4). As the result of a Duma initiative during 1995 a court case 
in Russia raised the question of whether the Chechen war was unconstitutional and President 
Boris Yeltsin was cleared. Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the State Duma’s Committee on 
International Affairs, claimed in 1995 that Russian foreign policy was at its lowest levels 
since 1982. He saw the Chechen crisis as resulting from Russia’s total loss of fear or respect 
in the eyes of the world.313 
If a majority of the Duma was in the first Chechen war in open opposition to the 
presidential stand, in the second one the president had the Duma’s full support for the actions 
in Chechnya. In September 1999 the Duma voted for a resolution that was targeted at 
combating terrorism. It included increased expenditure for defence and security in the 2000 
budget, amendments to the Criminal Code instituting liability for aiding terrorists and ‘self-
proclaimed bodies of government’ and a law establishing a special status for Stavropol 
Territory (which borders on Chechnya). The resolution was fully in line with Prime Minister 
Putin’s proposals, which he presented to the Duma a day before the vote.314 
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In a rather paradoxical way the Duma has played a very significant role in Russia’s 
image in the world. During the first Chechen war it showed the weaknesses of the Russian 
president in internal politics and thereby made Russia look like a very unstable country. 
During the second Chechen war the support the Duma gave to Vladimir Putin, made Russia 
look very authoritarian. Slowly but surely the arguments from the Western side relating to a 
values gap started to emerge. 
 
4.3.3 The Military Establishment 
 In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the military establishment saw its own 
power weakened. Ultimately their calculations regarding the ‘short and victorious war’ failed. 
With the first Chechen war the Russian military establishment fell into an even more difficult 
position than before the wars; ‘Most amazing are the Russian attitudes towards the army, a 
sacred institution for Russians throughout centuries. It is now an accepted norm to avoid 
compulsory military service, as well as to defect from military units in Chechnya’.315 It 
seemed that sometimes even the army itself questioned the reasons why they were fighting in 
Chechnya, which then resulted also in poor military success and morale in the army. 
The year 1999 could be labelled the ‘golden year of the Russian military’. With their 
fierce statements about Kosovo they had already gained some influence, the military doctrine 
was going to be rewritten and more funds were made available for it. Perhaps the 
‘compromises’ the Russian military establishment made regarding the Kosovo war in some 
ways speeded up the second military intervention by Russians into Chechen territory. The 
military was categorically against any cease-fire negotiations. In late October 1999, Defense 
Minister Igor Sergeyev said that troops would never leave Chechnya.316  The military officers 
were fostering a myth that if the civilian leaders had not intervened during the first war, there 
would have been a totally different outcome.317 It seemed that the public and political 
establishment as well as economical elite was behind the strengthening of the Russian 
military. Anatoly Chubais, widely known for being pro-western, commented on the Chechen 
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intervention: ‘I really do believe that the issue being decided in Chechnya today is not the 
Chechen problem but something incomparably more important than that - in Chechnya, the 
Russian army is being reborn….Now, for the first time in all these years, the army is 
regaining its proper status. And this fact, in my view, should be welcomed by democrats and 
nondemocrats alike – by all segments of the political spectrum.’318  
The second Chechen war, military intervention onto Chechen territory, seemed in some 
ways to be Russia’s answer to NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia. But at the same 
time it was a battle of Russia as a Great Power in the eyes of its own people and outside 
world. To consider a political solution to the conflict was unthinkable. One reason for this is 
that the military establishment was strongly opposing it and support from the general public 
only strengthened the argument to press on. Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev stated: ‘the 
Armed Forces are completely satisfied with the support they are getting not only from the 
country’s political leadership but also from the general public.’319 The other reason is that in 
the post-imperial situation, while trying to define the state identity, political negotiations with 
a small, historically complex nation, was not anymore after the first war possible even in the 
public’s eyes. Chechnya and in fact the whole North Caucasus had become a place where 
terrorists planned their attacks on Russians. A Great Power does not negotiate with terrorists. 
The military establishment’s desire to redefine the Chechen independence war into a war of 
terrorism had worked. 
 
4.3.4 The Foreign Policy Establishment and the Government 
 In the first Chechen war the foreign policy establishment found itself time after time 
cornered about the issue. Even the Foreign minister Kozyrev, who has been labelled a liberal 
westernist, had to excuse Russia from having to account for her actions before the world in an 
interview in October 1995: ‘Generally speaking, it is not only our right but our duty not to 
allow uncontrolled armed formations on our territory. The Foreign Ministry stands on guard 
over the country’s territorial unity. International law says that a country not only can but must 
use force in such instances ... I say it was the right thing to do ... The way in which it was 
done is not my business.’320  Already in January  1995 in Rossiiskiye vesti an article by the 
Russian Foreign minister called the international reactions to the Chechen war hasty and 
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declared their readiness to constructively cooperate with international human rights  and 
humanitarian organisations. Furthermore he accused the West of being unfair: ‘ …to our 
regret, such rhetoric [western reactions] evokes memories of the recent and very sad past of 
our relations with the West. In a number of instances we are observing a syndrome in which 
chronic reflexes are being triggered and long standing stereotypical ways of reacting to 
events associated with Russia are returning’.321 
It could be argued that even if there were some doubts in the air between Russia and the 
West as to the direction the matter had been taking since the fall of the Soviet Union, up until 
the first Chechen war, all doors were still open. The way Russians handled the first Chechen 
war both militarily and rhetorically gave the West reason to doubt Russians’ sincerity to 
pursue democratic reforms.  
While still Prime Minister and the head of the Russian government, Vladimir Putin stated 
in September 1999: ‘we can’t sit around whimpering and whining, we all have to act 
decisively, resolutely and energetically, and this applies to every level - the President, the 
government and the Federation members alike. We must choke this abomination off at the 
roots.’322 With the first Chechen war the government had been making decisions behind 
closed doors and the military involvement came as a surprise to the Russian people as well as 
to the outside world. With the second Chechen war the job, at least from the propaganda 
point of view, was done properly. The government’s task was to unite everybody under the 
same flag. For his part Foreign Minister Ivanov was out to gather the international 
community to fight a common fight – against terrorism. In the UN General Assembly’s 54th 
session, also in September 1999, he included in his speech a draft proposal and adopted a 
declaration of principles of mutual assistance among states with a view to stepping up the war 
on terrorism.323 
The foreign policy establishment that had managed to create an image in line with 
westernisers as described in the previous chapter, lost it during the first Chechen war. This 
complicated Russia’s relations with the West. It contributed to the fact that Russian foreign 
policy was often described as inconsistent and in flux.  Thereby the public, military and 
foreign policy establishment and the state Duma with their opinions about the two Chechen 
wars revealed wider Russian understandings of Russia’s position and state identity in world 
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politics. In this way the idea of a modern Great Power using soft power in conflict solution 
failed. 
 
4.4 Chechnya and domestic reasons for the war  - state identity at stake 
The link between domestic factors and foreign policy is often seen as one of overlap, the 
one being a continuation of the other. But the alternative view is that foreign policy can been 
seen as quite separate from the domestic context, at least when it comes to decision-making. 
There seems little doubt that at least in Russia’s case the former holds good; as Bobo Lo has 
written: ‘One of the most noteworthy aspects of Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet era 
has been the extent to which it has been shaped by domestic factors’ 324 
During the Cold War era the domestic factors were always there but not as strongly 
taken into account. One of the reasons was the dominance of realist thinking in international 
relations. The literature on the relationship between domestic factors and foreign policy 
started to increase towards the end of the1980s when constructivist approaches on how ideas 
and beliefs affected policy making started to be formed and discuss in the IR-framework.  
The domestic political context is seen to be a crucial determinant of foreign policy since 
politicians’ political ideas are formed and decisions are made there.325 Robert Putman has 
taken the question ‘How does domestic politics matter?’ as a starting point for his analysis. 
He argues that political leaders can be seen as trying to achieve their goals in the domestic 
and international arenas simultaneously. He discusses the two faces of a policy arising from 
the same social base and argues: ‘A more adequate account of the domestic determinants of 
foreign policy and international relations must stress politics: parties, social classes, interest 
groups (both economic and non-economic), legislator and even public opinion and elections, 
not simply executive officials and institutional arrangements’.326 The two-level games 
literature that was started by Putnam’s article in 1988 has been extensive during the 1990s.327  
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A significant amount, according to James D Fearon, of  research in the field of 
international relations during the 1990s advanced the proposition that domestic politics is 
typically a crucial part of the explanation for a state’s foreign policy. He coded 193 article 
abstracts in International Organisations journal for the years 1987-1996 and found that more 
than a third of them were advancing arguments about the influence of domestic political or 
domestic factors in foreign policy making.328  
Since the two Chechen wars have had so profound an effect on both Russian internal 
societal and political development as well as being one of the defining factors in Russian 
foreign policy making since the start of the first Chechen war 1994, the ideas and beliefs 
effecting the formation of Russian state identity can be seen in the arguments over the causes 
of the two Chechen wars. Among the reasons advanced, the notion comes up strongly that 
Russian state identity is very much connected with the ideas of greatpowerness presented in 
the previous chapter. 
One can find different ways to categorise the different reasonings behind the first war in 
Chechnya, but here the classification adopted by Matthew Evangelista has been chosen as a 
starting point: the historical and structural legacy of the Soviet system; strategic arguments; 
domino theory and spill over effect; leadership politics, personalities and elite battles.329 
These categories of reason also apply somewhat to the second war, either directly or 
indirectly. 
 
4.4.1 The historical and structural legacy of the Imperial and Soviet systems 
The first domestic political reasoning for the first Chechen war has long historical roots. 
This is a good illustration of how arguments, beliefs and perceptions from centuries back can 
have a strong influence even in the modern world. As a result of the cultural and social 
formation of the highland Chechens, as well as the relative inaccessibility of their 
communities, Chechens have always demonstrated resistance to the imposition of Russian 
rule. 
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 They formed an important part of the Caucasian highland resistance to the Russian 
conquest in the mid-nineteenth century, and frequently rebelled against Soviet power in the 
1920s and resisted collectivisation in the 1930s. The Soviet federal system, under which a 
Chechen Autonomous Republic was created in 1924, encouraged the promotion of local non-
Russians and certain elements of national culture and identity, while simultaneously 
restricting the real power of the republics and, from 1930 onwards, promoting the superiority 
of the Russian nation.330  
In 1944, on the pretext of punishing instances of collaboration with the Nazis, but more 
likely in order to settle once and for all the troublesome Chechen issue, Stalin and Beria 
ordered the deportation of all Chechens from the Caucasus by train, to be resettled elsewhere, 
mostly in Kazakhstan. This act of retaliation against a small but persistently troublesome 
people is an example of how strong the great power identity in Russian state identity has been 
and still is. 
Although the measures against Chechen national identity were launched with the idea to 
destroy once and for all the Chechen resistance, in the end it had the opposite effect: the 
trauma of deportation and the experience of collective exile reinforced bonds of solidarity 
and identity which the deportees and their descendants took back to Chechnya once return 
became possible from the end of the 1950s.331 Shortly before and after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, the suppressed national identities resurfaced, not only in Chechnya but also 
other parts of the former empire. Ethnic separatism is one of those causes most strongly 
associated with the Chechen conflict, and it is the only republic that has mounted a claim to 
independence. With the claim of an ethnic war the Chechens have also been able to win 
considerable sympathy and support from the outside world, at least in the first war.  
There is, however, a big question mark over this factor as the cause for the second 
Chechen war. With the first Chechen war the case was much stronger, with true unity in the 
fight for independence. In the later situation the fight for independence seems to have become 
more declamatory and to have come mostly from those now linked to terrorist attacks, than as 
a real aim with a realistic background and objectives. 
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With this Russians versus Chechens framework the Russian side had to revert to Great 
Power identity as a state identity in order to be able to argue their actions in Chechnya now 
and historically. If two separate ethnic groups become enemies, do not get along and one of 
them is significantly stronger than the other, we can start talking about a state relationship in 
an imperial framework suggesting Great Power thinking as a policy guide.  
 
4.4.2 Strategic arguments 
Chechnya was seen as a transport junction between Russia and the rest of the Caucasus 
with its important oil refining industry and oil transit pipelines. The arguments concerning the 
oil trade seemed to have taken on greater force when President Putin, on the eve of the 
second Chechen presidential elections in August 2003, promised to give all revenues from the 
oil transit trade to the full use of those trying to govern Chechnya. This was a total opposite 
line to that of Yeltsin’s Russia.  
 The federal government ended subsidies and cut oil shipments to Grozny’s refinery. 
Moscow then imposed a trade embargo. Together with the federal government’s actions and 
the incompetence of the Chechens’ own administration there was a 75 percent drop in per 
capita income between 1991-1993 in Chechnya.332 Before the first war in Chechnya Dzhokar 
Dudaev was trying to make a deal with Yeltsin’s central government. If Moscow would 
surrender all rights to oil exports, the Chechens would pay Moscow for using their pipeline. 
This deal was not acceptable to Yeltsin. In the interwar period 1997-1999, in internal 
Chechen politics there were conflicts over the nature of the Chechen state and competition, 
both internal and external, over the control of oil.333 In some analyses oil is advanced as the 
main reason for the start of the second Chechen war. 
Boris Kagarlitsky has written about the role oil played in the Caucasus – Dagestan and 
Chechnya: ‘…the reluctance of Moscow to recognize Chechen independence, aided the 
formation of a criminal economy. This suited the Moscow oligarchs, who used Chechnya as a 
site to conduct their “unofficial” business.’334  When the war shut down the oil pipelines it 
made the price of oil go up. It has been claimed that the battle between the companies Sibneft 
and Transneft over Caspian oil was a triggering factor in the Chechen military incursions into 
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Dagestan, which then gave the Russian authorities an excuse to launch the second invasion of 
Chechnya.  
It seems that whatever the truth about the oil and strategic importance of Chechnya is, 
the belief that oil had much to do with the warfare lives deep in Chechnya. One official who 
wanted to remain anonymous explained in an interview with Finnish journalist Susanna 
Niinivaara as follows: ‘Oil is a curse, for that the Chechens have to pay a high price. Oil has 
effected greatly to all wars in Chechnya. In Chechnya the battle for control of oil has been as 
strong as in Iraq.’335 
If the Chechen interpretation of the reasons for the wars has put the emphasis on oil, 
Russians have not emphasised the strategic aspect, but from Moscow’s point of view it has 
been the strategy of not letting Chechnya control an economic resource that might make 
Chechnya survive without Moscow’s help. 
 
4.5 Domino theory or spill over effect 
One of the theories of the underlying causes behind both Chechen wars (but especially 
the first one) was the so called ‘domino theory’. The argument in this domino theory was - 
and to some extent still is - that if Chechnya were to be given the right to leave the Russian 
Federation and pursue formal independence recognized by the international community, then 
the other ethnic republics within the Federation would soon follow suit.  
In particular it was argued that Chechnya’s neighbours in the North Caucasus - 
Ingushetia and Dagestan - would be the first to follow Chechnya’s example, and in the end 
the whole North Caucasus region would break away from the Russian Federation to unite and 
form its own Islamic North Caucasian Federation along similar lines to its short lived 
predecessor in the 1920s. If this domino effect were to occur it would – among other things – 
deny Russia access to and influence in the South Caucasus. This domino theory had more 
relevance and explanatory power in the period right after the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
especially during the first Chechen war and the inter-war period when, according to 
Malashenko and Trenin, the central authority was at its weakest vis-à-vis the regions.336 
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 Even then, however, poor republics like Ingushetia and Dagestan were so dependent on 
Moscow that serious moves to independence were unlikely, and in the event no serious 
secessionist movement ever emerged. Rather than separate themselves from Russia, these 
republics distanced themselves from their Chechen neighbours’ aggressive bid for 
independence. Ingushetia voted in a referendum in 1992 to stay in the Russian Federation and 
in Dagestan local Dagestanis opposed the invading Chechen fighters and the Islamic militants 
together with the Russian army in August-September 1999. The largest republic, Tatarstan, 
did look a serious candidate for secession up to 1994, but Yeltsin was able to negotiate a 
bilateral treaty with Tatarstan. Thus it seems that Chechnya was an exceptional case, and it 
was unlikely that separatism would develop elsewhere as strongly as it had in Chechnya. 
Nevertheless, the horrors of the two Chechen wars have taught a lesson to all those regions 
and republics in Russia who might harbour separatist tendencies about the high price they 
have to pay if they wish to leave the Federation against Russia’s will. As Dmitri Trenin and 
Aleksei Malashenko have argued ‘The Chechen independence movement has become a 
vaccine against Separatism’.337  
There was, however, a price to be paid for Tatarstan’s acquiescence, in the form of 
allowing the republic virtual self-rule. The invasion of Chechnya can therefore be interpreted 
as a warning that Tatarstan and other republics should not try to push this advantage too far. 
Since Putin rose to power the trend of re-centralization has gathered back much of the power 
lost to the regions and republics into the tightening grip of the Kremlin. By the second 
Chechen war, the ‘domino theory’ referred not so much to the spread of separatism (which 
there were no signs of at the time), but to any sort of resistance to greater centralisation. 
The spill-over effect of the Chechen conflict is a different, but related phenomenon, 
which has much more relevance to the current situation in Chechnya than does the domino 
effect. This spill-over effect has been of particular concern to Georgia, where it was feared 
that fighting between Russian forces and Chechen fighters would escalate across the border 
into Georgian territory and especially the Pankisi Gorge. In many respects this Chechnya-
card was Russia’s tool for putting more pressure on Georgia up until 2008.  
But the spill-over of the conflict also takes place inside the boundaries of the Russian 
Federation, where Chechnya’s immediate neighbours Dagestan and Ingushetia have been the 
hardest hit. Examples of these are numerous - from Budyonnovsk to Kizlyar and the raid by 
militants in June 2004 into Ingushetia. The hostage situation at the Beslan school in October 
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2004 spread the conflict into North Ossetia. The problem of refugees has also troubled 
Chechnya’s neighbours. Kabardino-Balkaria has not been uneffected either. 
In order to contain and counter the spill-over effects, the Russian authorities were forced 
to use extraordinary methods in other North Caucasus republics, for example installing an 
unpopular former FSB official Murat Zyazikov as president of Ingushetia in a Chechen-type 
election, and tightening internal security in Karachaevo-Cherkessia in order to react to the 
challenge of the local Islamic militants.338 Perhaps most serious was the central government’s 
plans in 2006 to reorganise the system of ‘consociational’ ethnic politics in Dagestan, which 
had proved successful in maintaining peace and order in the multi-ethnic republic for many 
years. These measures may not, in fact, have been a result of the Chechen conflict, but more 
the product of general centralising tendencies on the part of Putin’s administration. But 
because of the proximity of Chechnya, such moves could prove dangerous. These tougher 
Russian actions caused dissatisfaction and suffering that in turn formed a breeding ground for 
more radicalism and sympathy for the separatist ideas on the Chechen model. In this way, 
renewed impetus or re-birth could be achieved for the domino effect, originating not from the 
independence of Chechnya, but rather from the large-scale repressive policies implemented 
by Russia throughout the Caucasus.  
The situation creates a paradox that the Russian leadership has found it difficult to escape 
from. While Russian policies for the North Caucasus give a picture of central government 
trying to exercise its power over its subjects, its inability to do so undermines the 
international image of Russia as a modern Great Power. But the over-riding factor here was 
that, after the break-up of the Soviet Union the Russian Federation could not tolerate any 
further loss of territory. To do so would have dealt a massive blow to the feeling of Great 
Power status that was linked to Russia’s imperial past. The legacy of the imperialist and 
expansionist features of Russian foreign policy meant that allowing Chechen separatism to go 
unchallenged was unthinkable. 
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4.6 Leadership politics and personalities 
In regard to the first Chechen war Galina Starovoitova, shortly before she was murdered, 
wrote: ‘Chechnya was a unique case, containing an over determined number of strategic and 
historical-institutional factors pointing towards secession, but also one that did not need to 
result in war’.339 She made the point that a face-to face meeting between Dudaev and Yeltsin 
might have prevented the outbreak of the war. Furthermore, internal power battles in 
Chechnya also gave a boost to the line Russia adopted. In regard to the second Chechen war a 
significant role was played by Yeltsin and his ‘family’ that had gathered around him. It 
should also be kept in mind that Putin’s victory and popularity in the presidential elections of 
2000 owed much to the tough image he had achieved by dealing with Chechnya. Being tough 
on Chechnya was seen as a symbol of Putin’s policy on the whole. He was to restore order 
and security in Russia.  
The Wars in Chechnya were meant to reinforce the picture of strong leadership of Russia 
but instead Chechnya became a symbol of the fact that Putin was not as strong as he seemed 
and a constant reminder that a large country like Russia cannot be kept peaceful with forceful 
policies. The role of the military fits into the same picture, with the wars in Chechnya 
fulfilling an analogous role for the Russian army as the mission to Kosovo did for NATO, or 
mediation in Moldova did for EU security policy. Chechnya presented the Russian military 
with just such an opportunity to justify its own role.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The two Chechen wars illustrate well how domestic political unity can alienate Russia 
from the West. Furthermore, they show how the different Russian foreign policy schools 
figure in domestic politics as well. What does unite Russians is the desire to see their country 
as strong and influential. 
In the case of the first Chechen war the internal threat and domestic factors were the 
defining factors initially, and the international dimension crept into it, rather to the surprise of 
the Russian decision makers. However unintentionally, the result of the wars was a 
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weakening of the position of Russia in the world arena. Chechnya became a question of 
Russian state identity internationally as well as domestically. 
The second Chechen war showed that the Russian leadership had learned a lesson, so 
that the war was better planned and the international dimension was already in place. The war 
on terrorism was a success for the Putin administration on the one hand, but at the same time 
it failed to reinforce Russia as a Great Power of the 21st century. 
This chapter has shown how Russians argued about the two Chechen wars. The argument 
here has been that the two wars had a significant effect on Russia’s relations with the West 
and also in its internal developments. The Great Power state identity framed the second 
Chechen war more strongly than was the case with the first one. The war on terrorism pushed 
Russia into cooperation with the West in an interests-based matter, but at the same time 
locked the poles of Russia and the West into opposite sides. Modern and traditional 
greatpowerness were mixed in the Russian argumentation and views on Chechnya. 
The way how the Russian foreign policy, political and military establishment viewed and 
argued about the wars in Chechnya confused and complicated Russia’s relations with the 
West. The reasons and reasoning relating to the two wars led to the fact that Russia was 
defining its state identity in terms of being more of a traditional Great Power than a modern 
one. This had strong implications for years to come in the Russia-West relationship.  
The underlying feelings of the Russian general public in support of arguments by the 
political leadership relating to restoring order and Russia as a strong state brought the 
question of a value gap into discourses between Russia and the West, and put at least 
temporarily a stop to any kind of ideas of integration. On the other hand the issue of 
Chechnya also became a matter discussed in several international organisations. By Russia’s 
own requests but also on the West’s initiative Chechnya became both a point for cooperation 
and a bone of bitter disputes between Russia and the West, depending on the organisation. 
Russians felt that in the matter of Chechnya the West was challenging Russian 
greatpowerness. 
In the following chapters this tension will be tested through the case studies, where the 
three different foreign policy groups prevailing in the previous chapter are presented in three 
different arenas of international cooperation.  
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Chapter 5: Russia and the Council of Europe – the success of 
institutionalism 
 
 
‘Today, the way of Europeanization is institutional. Democracy, rule of law, a 
functioning market economy, or good governance can be achieved only by accepting and 
adopting international rules and values as established in the World Trade Organisation, the 
European Union or the Council of Europe’340 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The Council of Europe (CoE) is generally neglected as a significant international 
organisation when compared to other European bodies. It was created in 1949 to take up the 
issues that were seen as causes of the division in Europe before the Second World War and so 
provide Western Europe the upper hand in the battle of ideologies - democracy versus 
communism and fascism. It was regarded as a very important element of Western European 
unity to have some common norms and rules as well as defined values in democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law, the holy trinity as some CoE officials call the ground that the CoE 
was built on. The initiative for forming an organisation like the CoE came from France and 
Great Britain. Winston Churchill stated in 1948 in Zurich that for a prosperous Europe the 
way forward would be to create a United States of Europe: ‘What is this sovereign remedy? It 
is to recreate the European fabric, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a 
structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety, and in freedom. We must build a kind 
of United States of Europe.’341 One essential fact that affects the organisation’s mechanisms 
and abilities was already decided then. France and Great Britain wanted a slightly different 
kind of organisation. France even suggested the name ‘European Union’, but this was 
rejected by the British on the grounds that the term was too loaded. The British view was that 
the new body would work better if it was more of an organisation that provided general 
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guidelines and acted as a forum for the exchange  of opinions than if it was able to force its 
decisions on it members. The general feeling was that human rights, the rule of law and the 
understanding of democracy were too difficult subjects to be agreed on and forced upon 
countries in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War in Europe and the rest of the 
world.  
The organisation had an important role in criticising countries of the Eastern bloc and 
their state management. During the Cold War period the role of the CoE in relation to the 
communist states was mostly limited to condemning the human rights situation and 
authoritarian rule. At that time Europe’s inability to agree on a mechanism for imposing its 
decisions did not matter so much. But since the Berlin wall came down and the organisation 
expanded, taking in new members that had previously been under authoritarian rule, it 
suffered from the lack of a mechanism that would have reinforced its own authority and 
ability to promote more efficiently the democratisation process going on in Eastern Europe.  
With the founding of the European Union and its expansion in the 1990s, less attention 
has been focussed on the CoE and its role in European cooperation. The EU has included to 
its agenda many of the issues that are at the core of the CoE’s functions. This created an 
interesting situation. The EU has 28 members dealing with many of the same issues as the 
CoE. The CoE has 47 members, 19 of which do not belong to the EU, most of them countries 
from the former Eastern bloc and former Soviet Union. This has opened up the possibility of 
dialogue between countries of the EU on the one hand and those that have an interest in close 
cooperation with the EU, and who aspire to join it on the other hand. On some occasions the 
EU has been accused of seeking to impose its norms and rules on other countries, and as long 
as there has been the possibility of membership on offer, the EU has succeeded in this and it 
has proved a fast track way of promoting the democratisation process.  
In the post-Cold War world, the CoE is one of the organisations that seeks to challenge 
the unipolar nature of world politics. Although it lacks any military or security role, as a body 
that is broader than the European Union and is committed to promoting and upholding 
common European values it has a certain moral authority as it embraces many of the second 
tier powers. Membership of the CoE is seen as a marker of being part of the advanced group 
of countries, while not being subject to US influence. 
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5.2 Russian entry to the Council of Europe and The first Chechen war 
Special guest status within the Parliamentary Assembly was granted to the Russian 
Parliament on 14 January 1992. In May 1992 Russia submitted an application to become a 
member of the Council of Europe. The Russian application was held up first by the internal 
events of autumn 1993, ‘The White House drama’, and then the first Chechen war, which 
started in December 1994. In January 1995 in Rossiiskiye vesti an article from the Russian 
Foreign ministry called the international reactions to the Chechen war hasty and declared 
Russia’s readiness to constructively cooperate with international human rights and 
humanitarian organisations. Furthermore it accused the West of being unfair: ‘…to our regret, 
such rhetoric [western reactions] evokes memories of the recent and very sad past of our 
relations with the West. In a number of instances we are observing a syndrome in which 
chronic reflexes are being triggered and long standing stereotypical ways of reacting to 
events associated with Russia are returning’.342  
These were direct appeals for Russia to be treated in a different way from the Soviet 
Union. Russia was no longer the Cold War adversary, but suspicion was cast that many in the 
West still viewed her in these terms. In the initial exchanges with the CoE, Russia’s 
representatives were seeking to establish its place as a significant power in the new world 
order, one which should be treated with respect and on equal terms. 
Assurances of continued progress were given to the Council of Europe by the President 
of the Federation, the Prime Minister, the President of the Duma and the President of the 
Council of the Federation in a letter dated 18 January 1995.343 The letter at the time was not 
enough and procedure on Russia's request for membership was interrupted on 2 February. 
Even if the application process was temporarily stopped in the first half of 1995, the President 
of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Miguel-Angel Martinez said that the 
council’s leadership had no fundamental objection to admitting Russia.344 The COE’s way of 
using the word ‘freeze’ in the context of the Russian application triggered very emotional 
Russian reactions and cold war rhetoric was brought up again. Ernst Muelemann, a Swiss 
parliamentarian, speaking at the CoE’s session of February 2nd did not see Russia’s entry to 
the CoE as possible under the circumstances and thought it unlikely that the matter would be 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
342 The Current Digest, Vol.XL VII, No.3, 1995, p.28 (original Rossiiskiye vesti, January 17, 1995) 
343 Council of Europe, OPINION No. 193 (1996) on Russia's request for membership of the Council of Europe, 
Assembly debate on 25 January 1996 (6th and 7th Sittings) 
http://assembly.coe.int/documents/adoptedtext/ta96/eopi193.htm (accessed 25.06.2012) 
344 The Current Digest, Vol. XL VII, No.4, 1995, p.27 (original Pravda January 26, 1995) 
 
 
131 
solved in the near future.345 The Baltic States were particularly keen in opposing Russia’s 
entry. In the summer of 1995 the matter was taken up again in Strasbourg, but even if the 
Russians were willing to allow a PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) 
delegation to visit Chechnya the answer to the Russian application was negative. However 
the Assembly did admit Albania and Moldova as fully fledged members.346 In September the 
debate started again and this time the tone from CoE started to soften. By 27 September, with 
the adoption of Resolution 1065, the Russian application procedure was resumed on the 
grounds that Russia was henceforth committed to finding a political solution in Chechnya and 
promised that alleged and documented human rights violations were to be investigated. But 
now the Russian tone had become very bitter. Vladimir Lukin, the chairman of the Duma’s 
international affairs committee, went to a CoE Parliamentary Assembly meeting in 
Strasbourg where the Russian application for admission was ‘unfreezed’. In the briefing he 
gave afterwards he questioned the need for Russia to join the CoE, since he felt that there was 
a strong dislike for Russia. In particular given that the Political Commission recommended 
the admittance of Ukraine and Macedonia to the CoE, he asked, ‘Why is a kind of criterion of 
absolute perfection set exclusively for Russia?’347 
In this period of January to September 1995, Russia was playing a game of 
brinkmanship, in which it was unready to make more than minor concessions over Chechnya, 
while insisting that there were no reasons that this should hold up CoE membership. In the 
end, the application was unfreezed and Russia had scored a victory, but Lukin’s comments 
indicate that the country did not accept this graciously. Russia wanted to be more than just a 
member of the CoE, it wanted acknowledgement that it was now a leading player and was 
ready to give up membership rather than entertain outside interference with its own affairs. 
 The fact that Russia had displayed a strong will to find a political solution in Chechnya, 
it had accepted an OSCE mission in Chechnya, had come to an agreement with the EU over 
the interim trade agreement, and that democratic political development was moving forward 
were seen as positive developments.348 In October 1995, Jean Seitlinger, chairman of the CoE 
Parliamentary Assembly’s committee on relations with non-members, made an 
announcement that since Russia had shown a strong willingness to join the CoE, which is the 
first condition for admission, and even if Russia still had a long way to go to catch up with 
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the Western countries, when it comes to the second criterion of having a legal structure and a 
normal democratic society, it was on the right path and so most likely would be admitted to 
the Council in mid-January 1996.349  
Russia played the card of multilateralism strongly while seeking CoE membership. The 
method was to warn the other side of the more negative elements of Russian foreign policy. It 
seemed that the Russian side’s warnings about isolationism, the threat of ultranationalism, a 
new iron curtain and weak western support for Russian reform efforts had started to have an 
effect. In January 1996 the view that a positive signal, which the granting of membership 
would provide, might boost reform started to gain strong support in the CoE. Membership 
was seen as a support mechanism for Russia on its road to democracy and that accepting 
Russia would pre-empt any division of Europe and help Russia to strengthen its European 
identity. Furthermore Russian membership would allow CoE to apply more monitoring 
procedures and so have an influence on Russian policymaking. This in spite of the fact that in 
early January, the commission on legal issues and human rights of the CoE’s Parliamentary 
Assembly came to a conclusion that Russia cannot be considered a law-governed state. At 
their press conference the commission’s chairwoman Lidia Ehr rejected the Russian 
accusations of double standards and stated that Russia was treated with a maximum of 
objectivity and impartiality. In this kind of approach we see something close to the classical 
liberal view of international relations – for the CoE it was the rule of law and acceptance of 
international norms that determined Russia’s status in the CoE, but from a liberal perspective, 
membership of such a body ought to accelerate Russia’s development in this direction. 
 However the final result was hardly surprising since the Russian side was united on all 
sides in applying to the CoE. Before the vote on 25th January 1996 Russia made a final 
assault in its bid for membership. President Yeltsin made a speech where he said that if 
Russia was not accepted it would be indirect support for Chechen terrorism and a sign of a 
withdrawal of Western support from the Russian democrats. The communist leader Gennady 
Zyuganov repeated the president’s remarks almost word for word in Strasbourg. In the 
domestic political arena Zyuganov was a bitter opponent of Yeltsin. Zyuganov also stressed 
in his speech that rejection would be tantamount to support for extremist forces and the war 
party in Russia and would encourage the rise of fundamentalism in the Caucasus. Also the 
human rights activist Sergei Kovalev joined the Russian effort by sending a letter to the 
Parliamentary Assembly in favour of entry, saying that an isolated Russia is more dangerous 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
349  The Current Digest, Vol.XL VII, No.43, 1995, p.23 (Original Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 25, 1995) 
 
 
133 
to itself and to the world than an integrated Russia.350 The very split Russian political elite 
was very unanimous in their bid for Russia’s membership of the CoW.  
Furthermore Vladimir Lukin, who had been questioning if Russia really needed the CoE, 
four months later suggested that Russia could ‘mature’ to the high standards of the Council as 
a member. This would both accelerate the maturation process and rid Europe of its 
psychological complex about a Russian threat.351 Even the Liberal Democratic Party’s leader 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky played his part in favour of Russia’s entry, but in his typically 
controversial way. He stated that Russia’s admission to the CoE would be a wonderful gift 
for Europe, while a denial of admission would be a gift for him as a presidential candidate. 
He also continued by warning ‘We will have no reason to protect those who push us away 
with disgust – we will part ways, and Basaevites along with other terrorists from the East will 
instantly turn up in Riga, Tallinn, Warsaw, Berlin, Paris and London’.352  
The Russians were shooting on all fronts and their approach and policy was successful. 
The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly voted 164 to 35 with 15 abstentions for 
granting the Russian Federation admission to the CoE. So initial objections on the part of the 
CoE to Russian membership, based largely on Russia’s record in Chechnya but also a poor 
state of the rule of law and respect for human rights, were eventually overcome, in no small 
part thanks to an apparently orchestrated Russian campaign which highlighted the likelihood 
of improvements in Russia’s behaviour should membership be granted, in almost equal 
measure to barely disguised threats as to the serious consequences of rejection. Thus Russia 
became a member of the CoE in February 1996 under the idea that Russia is better in than 
out. In spite of that some still consider that Russia was admitted too early and was not ready 
for membership.353 ‘In other words, Russia was admitted in the name of an “up-and-coming” 
democracy and the risks entailed in its possible isolation, even if the decision was made 
without any real enthusiasm’.354 Also the Russian side seemed to admit that Russia had not 
fulfilled the requirements. Director of the legal Department of the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs A. Khodakov wrote in early 1996: ‘At the present moment Russian 
legislation, with the exception of the Constitution of the Russian federation, and law 
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enforcement practice do not fully meet the Council of Europe’s standards’.355 Similar views 
were still dominant ten years later: ‘We were naïve and had illusions about membership. 
Russia was not prepared and had this romantic idea of a common European House’356. 
On top of the idea of institutionalism, better in than out, there were additional factors too 
pushing Russian membership through from the CoE side, in circumstances where any other 
country might not have even been considered. Similar ideas to those  in the case of the OSCE 
were expressed in the CoE case as well. According to Mr. de Lipkowski, ‘Russia's joining 
will give our organization a new impetus and authority. We shall be the only pan-European 
organization (...) We shall be the only forum for dialogue embracing all countries of a Europe 
whose divisions we shall have at last healed.’357 Russia acted also in the post Cold War world 
as a sufficiently prestigious case, to show the importance of an organization that was created 
especially to fit in a very bipolar world with ideological divisions. 
Furthermore there was no greater fear in the West than the return of communism in 
Russia. Russia was a big enough country to shake the newly found democratic trend in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Russian internal politics had taken a turn to the worse, from the 
Western point of view, in the Duma elections of December 1995. Both nationalists and 
communists had gained popular support and President Yeltsin looked very weak. An 
additional factor that played positively for the admittance of Russia to the CoE was the 1996 
presidential elections. For the West and particularly the European countries it was important 
that Yeltsin would win the elections and if CoE membership would help, it would be 
granted.358 
The manner of Russia’s entrance to the CoE is significant. Russia’s hopes were high and 
quite unrealistic in terms of what membership meant in real terms. For the Russian 
government it was very important to be one way or other anchored in some European 
structures, to institutionalise its foreign policy and get a feeling of belonging to the ‘European 
Common House’, the positive legacy of Gorbachev’s foreign policy. As a modern democratic 
European Great Power, a membership in one of the well respected clubs in Europe would 
bring the conformity of institutional type of greatpowerness.  
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No EU member country has entered the organization without being a member of the CoE 
first and later the membership became one of the criteria for the EU membership. Some 
circles in Russia saw Russia’s membership to the CoE as a key for closer cooperation if not 
even membership in the EU. There was also, among the Russian political elite, a view of the 
CoE as a ‘mini UN’359 and ‘a visiting card that looks good’.360 As a result of these 
expectations, when Russia continued to face criticism from the CoE and particularly from the 
direction of the PACE and it realised that CoE membership was not the way to get closer to 
the EU, Russian attitudes towards the organisation became more reserved and involved 
tougher rhetoric. ‘Very soon the reality hit. There was frustration and a feeling of being 
manipulated. Obligations were many but very few advantages’.361  
The first Chechen war acted as a trigger for worries in the EU member countries and 
other European states that Russia’s path towards democracy would not be that easy. The 
ideas of liberal institutionalism played a very significant role in acceptance of the Russian 
application for CoE membership. Russia’s own arguments were supporting the ideas 
embedded in liberal institutionalism arguing that the road to democracy for Russian would be 
even slower if not going into reverse if Russia was not a member of the CoE. The quarrelling 
factions of Russian political thinking were also united behind the idea, though with very 
different arguments. The question to be asked here is whether the Russian political elite from 
all groups have the motive of liberal institutionalism, wanting to learn, share information and 
harmonize societal practices in their mind while arguing for Russia’s membership, or was it 
the idea of prestige, belonging to a group that represents Western values, more important than 
developments in Russian domestic politics? 
 One of the definitions of being a great power includes belonging to different multilateral 
frameworks, and this seemed to be one of the underlining motives of the Russian foreign 
policy elite to seek membership in a Western based organization where it had no place before 
the fall of Soviet Union. The CoE was known as a ‘club of democratic countries’ a definition 
that was suited for Russia while seeking a new international identity after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Furthermore the original ideas of the CoE, dating back to the late 1940s when 
the general feeling was that human rights, the rule of law and the understanding of democracy 
were too difficult subjects to be agreed on and forced upon countries in the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War in Europe and the rest of the world, suited  Russians. So 
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even if Russian signed for the CoE values, there was no mechanism apart from undermining 
one’s reputation, to force anything on member states. This is also in accordance with great 
power thinking. 
The mechanisms that exist today in the CoE for taking action against a member state that 
does not comply with the obligations of the CoE are two-fold. PACE can strip the member 
state of voting rights. PACE is the institution that monitors member states’ progress or 
current situation in the sphere of human rights. PACE is an institution of parliamentarians. Its 
status has not always been considered high and its reputation has been that ‘second class 
parliamentarians’ have been sent there. This reputation however does not do justice to PACE 
and its members. Its reports have been highly valued and well put together. In the process of 
monitoring the democratic progress of former socialist countries including Russia it has been 
essential for the European integration process. The Russian representatives have always been 
rather high ranking professional diplomats with leading positions in Russian political parties 
represented in the state Duma.362 But it is the Committee of Ministers (CM) where the real 
power lies. It is the committee that can suspend cooperation, assistance programmes or freeze 
or cancel the whole membership.363 CM decisions are arrived at in three different ways 
depending on the issue: unanimous vote, simple majority or two-thirds majority.364 
Furthermore, the meetings of the CM are private in nature and the CM decides what will 
become public out of their meetings.365 The CM is an institution where countries are 
represented by foreign ministers. This is the fundamental issue when it comes to countries 
like Russia with a strong Great Power identity. The CM is a decision-making body that fits 
into the picture of Russian foreign policy views. The working mechanisms are in line with 
Russian understandings of multilateralism. Russia pays 11 per cent of the CoE budget and 
belongs to the big five that contribute together about 56 per cent of the budget. The big five 
are Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and France plus Russia. Currently Russia pays 2,4 
per cent less than the other four.366 This budgetary detail gives Russia a certain status. 
It is clear that after the fall of the Soviet Union Russia was seeking membership in 
different ‘clubs’ in the form of international organizations. The CoE has ever since the end of 
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the Second World War symbolized reconciliation in Europe. The second time in European 
history that this kind of symbolism was needed was after the breakup of the Soviet Union and 
the fall of communism. It was very important for the Russian Federation to become a full 
member of the CoE. The first Chechen war had a negative effect on Russian internal 
development and that also reflected on Russia’s path to becoming a member of the CoE. It is 
important to remember how and under what circumstances Russia did become a member. The 
shadow of Chechnya followed with Russia’s membership in Strasbourg.  
All three definitions of a Great Power outlined in chapter 2 highlight the acceptance by 
other powers and membership of international organisations as among the indicators of Great 
Power status. Membership of the CoE is not dependant on size and power, and so on its own 
does not confer any such statues, but nevertheless we have seen that for Russia it was treated 
as such. But the CoE comes closer to the liberal understanding of Great Powers than the 
realist definition, which can be seen reflected in Russia’s approach to membership and its 
insistence on being one of the major financial donors. Conflicting understandings of what 
constitutes a Great Power contributed as much to the difficulties over Russia’s admission to 
the CoE as the actual clash over values triggered by the first Chechen war. 
 
5.3 The Second Chechen war  
When the second Chechen war started Russia had been a full member of the CoE for 
nearly three and half years. This time around possible membership could not be used as a 
bargaining chip, as it had been during the first Chechen war. Russia was already in the 
Council. It entered the organization without a good record of human rights or sound 
democratic development. CoE monitored the presidential elections in Chechnya in January 
1997 and the observers Ernst Muehleman and Tadeusz Iwinski stated that the elections were 
carried out in a calm and positive atmosphere.367  During the interwar period the Council of 
Europe did raise its voice especially concerning the assassination of British and New Zealand 
hostages. They appealed to Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov to end the violent practices. 
‘These executions are against the Council of Europe’s principles and incompatible with the 
moratorium on the death penalty in force in the Russian Federation, composed of 89 entities 
and a member of the Council of Europe’ stated Lord Russell-Johnston.368 Once the conflict 
situation in Chechnya started to escalate the Council of Europe strongly reminded Russia of 
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its obligations for respect of the rule of law, human rights and fundamentals of freedom. 
However it also expressed its support for the Russian government’s fight against terrorism; 
‘The Russian government can count on our support in the fight against terrorism’.369 In 
December 1999 after the ultimatum of 6th December given by Russian Federal authorities to 
citizens of Grozny the expressions of concern increased. CoE’s Secretary General Walter 
Schimmer wrote to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on the 15th and asked Moscow to 
give an explanation about the human rights situation in Chechnya. In his reply, which met the 
given deadline, Foreign Minister Ivanov presented a cooperative attitude underlined by his 
statement that ‘the situation in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation is a matter of 
concern for the Council of Europe by virtue of its competence’.370 This was a positive signal, 
which allowed the CoE the possibility of getting involved in the conflict. In January 2000 the 
Parliamentary Assembly noted with satisfaction that the acting president Vladimir Putin had 
accepted the CoE’s presence in the region and it welcomed Russia’s willingness to cooperate 
with the CoE in the solution of the Chechen conflict and to take into consideration the 
proposals of the organization in the matter.371 It looked like the place that was occupied by 
OSCE during the first Chechen war, Russia looking for assistance and support from 
international organizations, somebody to tackle the problem of Chechnya with Russia, was 
now replaced with the CoE. Russia was clearly seeking an ‘alliance’ formation with CoE in 
its war against Chechnya. International terrorism provided here a necessary framework. Even 
if Russia was challenged from within, with international cooperation the conflict became 
equivalent to an outside attack on Russian statehood. 
The situation in Chechnya was getting worse during January 2000. There were enough 
worrying developments in Chechnya for the PACE to take a vote to suspend Russian voting 
rights on 27th January. The result of the vote was against suspending Russian voting rights. 
Not all of the parties and blocks inside of the CoE were happy about this. In the same session 
Igor Ivanov gave a speech. He saw the role of CoE as a provider of training for local self-
government officials, judges and prosecutor’s office employees, an organization that could 
help to improve the Chechen educational system, to promote civic development in a spirit of 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, monitoring elections and providing other 
services.372  
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The result of the session was that if the situation in Chechnya would not improve the 
matter of suspending Russia’s voting rights was going to be brought up again in April. Russia 
was given three months to improve the situation in Chechnya. As the main task of the CoE is 
to defend human rights that was also the main issue it concentrated on in the case of the 
conflict in Chechnya. The Council of Europe did not question the intervention by Russian 
Federal forces in Chechnya but they tried to stress ‘…the modalities of the intervention and 
measures taken to uphold Convention rights in the context of that intervention’.373  
These exchanges again illustrate the different perceptions that were at work here. From 
the Russian point of view, the CoE’s role was to take practical measures itself to promote 
developments within its member states, whereas the majority view was that the organisation 
should seek to ensure its members themselves observe basic human rights, enacting 
disciplinary measures where needed. The Russian stance at this stage also marked a shift 
from its earlier position in being ready to embrace some of the organisation’s values, to one 
where it would not be dictated to but instead the CoE would need to take actions to meet its 
own agenda. 
In the first half of 2000 there was correspondence between the Council of Europe and the 
Russian Foreign ministry, a questions and answers game with recommendations from the 
CoE side. It demanded a complete cease-fire, the start of negotiations without preconditions 
and the immediate cessation of all human rights violations on both sides. It strongly made 
clear that it did not accept the Chechen behaviour either, but put the main blame onto the 
Russian side. It reminded Russia that, upon its accession to the CoE, it had signed documents 
that she was breaking with the Chechen conflict. Attention was turned especially to Article 3 
of the Statute of the Council of Europe.374 Mr. Rudolf Binding, the reporter of the Committee 
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, wrote in his recommendations in April 2000 ‘…The 
Committee of Ministers should be asked to consider whether to initiate, in accordance with 
Article 8 of the Statute, the procedure for suspension of Russia from its rights of 
representation in the Council of Europe’.375 Also the Political Affairs Committee’s rapporteur 
Lord Frank Judd spoke strongly about the situation in Chechnya and in his conclusion he 
stated ‘ The membership of the Council of Europe is about human rights or it is about 
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nothing’.376 The PACE voted on the issue on the 6th of April and the result of that voting was 
that the Russian delegation was indefinitely stripped of its voting rights.  
The response from Moscow was strong. Russian newspapers reacted with headlines like 
‘Is Russia on the Verge of Expulsion from Europe?’ (Izvestia), ‘Garden Gnomes defend 
Human Rights’ (Noviye Izvestia), and ‘Russian Foreign Ministry is Perplexed’ (Rossiskaya 
Gazeta). The PACE not only suspended the Russian voting rights but also recommended an 
investigation for suspending Russia’s membership in the CoE. This had an even bigger 
psychological impact then the voting rights since only one country’s membership in the 
history of the CoE has been suspended (in 1961 when the military seized power in Greece). 
Since the issue of the humiliation of Russians after the breakup of the Soviet Union has been 
very central in Russia, this added more fuel to the feeling. The matter was not made better by 
the interview of Aslan Maskhadov where he approved the PACE’s decision and called for 
OSCE to come and participate in the conflict.377   
In May the Committee of Ministers met to debate about the possible suspension of 
Russia from the organization. Igor Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister, travelled to 
Strasbourg to lobby against such a measure. He went as far as saying that Europe should be 
grateful to Russia for combating terrorism on its own territory, thereby preventing it from 
spreading further.378 This, for those with a deeper knowledge of Russian history and how it 
has been used to promote the feeling of ‘uniqueness’ inside of Russia, immediately brings to 
mind the reference to the fact that Russians see themselves as saviours of Europe from the 
Mongol invasion. One can only wonder if the speech was meant for the home audience rather 
than for the CoE members and delegates. This is one fact that should be kept in mind when 
trying to understand some quite strong and unusual statements by Russian leaders. Are they 
addressing Russians or those outside? One CoE official saw that ‘Putin’s foreign policy is 
very much internal policy’.379 This fits also the ideas of greatpowerness in foreign policy. 
Actions in the international arena are guided by their use in internal politics. 
One of the pleas the CoE made to Russia was to have a CoE presence in the conflict area 
and when the Russian announcement came that the necessary security measures were in place 
so that the organization’s staff could start to work in the Znamenskoye office in Chechnya, 
the tone from CoE’s side changed a little. Walter Schwimmer stressed in his declaration that 
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the Council of Europe was the first international political organization to establish its 
presence in Chechnya since the beginning of the crisis in September 1999.380 This inevitably 
recalls the triumphant way the OSCE announced its agreement with Russia about its presence 
in Chechnya during the first Chechen war. At the end of June the answer from the Committee 
of Ministers arrived and it did not see enough reason to suspend Russia from the CoE. ‘The 
Committee remains of the view that the Council of Europe has a major contribution to make 
to the restoration of human rights in the Chechen Republic. At the same time, it recognizes 
that the contribution can only be made on the basis of Russia being a member of the 
Organization and fulfilling its commitments to the Organization.’381 This again strengthens 
the argument that for the CoE as well as for OSCE, both organizations without power to 
enforce their resolutions, their presence in Russia can be seen as an achievement for the 
organization and so Russia’s membership which opens up this possibility is viewed as highly 
desirable. Furthermore it has to be kept in mind that a higher political level also has higher 
stakes to play with, and so suspending Russian membership would possibly have had a 
devastating effect on Russia-Europe relationship. The relationship was already deteriorating 
in 2000 due to the Kosovo conflict the year before. 
 It seemed that there was a rift inside of the Council of Europe over the Chechen issue. 
After the Committee of Minister’s reply the PACE adopted a draft resolution which stated: 
‘The Assembly believes it to be totally unacceptable that the Committee of Ministers has 
neither denounced Russia’s conduct of its military campaign in the Chechen Republic and the 
resulting grave human rights violations as contrary to the Council of Europe’s principles, nor 
seriously considered the implications for Russian membership of the Council of Europe.’382 
This reflected well the approaches of different levels in the CoE. 
In July the EU unblocked an aid package it had frozen 6 months earlier in protest against 
the war launched in Chechnya. In September 2000 Lord Judd reported to the PACE about the 
developments in the Russia-Chechnya conflict after his visit to the region. The report 
condemned Russian military conduct and took a swipe at the Committee of Ministers which 
failed to strongly criticise the conflict. However he stated ‘Nevertheless, the repost accepts 
that there have now been some encouraging developments such as the beginning of work by 
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the human rights bodies put in place by Russia.’383 This kind of line continued almost 
throughout 2001 as well.  
The Joint Working Group on Chechnya by PACE and the State Duma of the Federal 
Assembly of the Russian Federation increased considerably the Council of Europe’s hopes 
for a better future. The working group was set up after the PACE re-instated the credentials 
of the Russian delegations at the Assembly in the spring of 2001. Also the reopening of the 
OSCE mandate in Znamenskoe in June reinforced the European belief in the positive process.  
Prior to 9/11, then, the CoE took an ambivalent attitude to Russia’s actions in Chechnya. 
In part this was due to recognition that Russia was in clear violation of CoE standards on 
human rights on the one hand, and to the idea that Russia’s behaviour could only be 
influenced as long as she remained in the CoE fold on the other. Which consideration had the 
upper hand depended on whether it was the Committee of Ministers or the PACE which was 
speaking, and the issue caused a clear rift between the two. Already before 9/11, however, it 
appeared that even the PACE was softening its stance and that the CoE recognised the 
Chechen conflict as to some extent an anti-terrorist operation. In January 2001 it voted to 
give back Russia’s right to vote and a PACE-Russian state Duma working group on 
Chechnya was set up. 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the CoE initially moved towards an even more 
accommodating stance with Russia. In March 2002 the Assembly’s monitoring committee 
reported on the Russian Federation and welcomed the progress made by Russian authorities 
since it became a member of the Council of Europe in 1996. The areas of progress mentioned 
were in regard to the signature and ratification of the CoE conventions, the reform of the 
judicial system, the transfer of responsibility for the penitentiary system from the Ministry of 
Interior to the Ministry of Justice and the adoption of the Law on the Office of the 
Commissioner of Human Rights. However the biggest rift between Russia and the Council of 
Europe remained over Chechnya.384 The matters were not made better by the 
recommendation of the CoE  that Aslan Maskhadov was to be included to the peace 
negotiations. Russia had categorically opposed that. 
 After about two years of relatively ‘peaceful coexistence’ the arm wrestling between 
Russia and the Council of Europe began again. Russia had announced already in June 2002 a 
plan for a referendum on the approval of a new Chechen constitution. By the end of the year 
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the necessary signatures were collected and the process went ahead. The date for the 
referendum was given as 23rd March 2003. In January 2003 Russia closed the OSCE mandate 
and started a strong attack against those arguing that the referendum was to be held too early 
and the political process in Chechnya needed more time before it would be ready for a 
referendum. On January 27 Mikhail Margelov was elected as a deputy chairman of the 
PACE. He stated that the referendum is a must ‘otherwise we shall be forever more entangled 
in corridor battles over recommendations offered by international organizations, the situation 
in Chechnya and with various groups of influence in the Chechen political elite.’385 Russians 
twisted the dispute to be all about Lord Judd personally. Dmitri Rogozin, a Russian 
outspoken hardliner and then the head of the Russian Federal Assembly delegation to the 
PACE, stated to Interfax: ‘This form (PACE- Duma working group [on Chechnya]) has 
outlived its usefulness. This was especially clearly manifested when part of the group, 
represented by Lord Judd, tried to ruin the fruits of their own labour by opposing the 
referendum in the Chechen republic on the draft version of the constitution, scheduled to take 
place in March’.386 Rogozin’s words did create tremors in the PACE. As a result the PACE in 
its meeting on the 29th January amended the wording of a draft resolution and did not give 
support to the line which Lord Judd had taken. It only stated concern that the necessary 
conditions for the holding of the referendum may not be created by the stated date.387  
In April the Russia – Council of Europe relationship became even more complicated. 
The PACE in its spring session adopted a resolution and a recommendation on human rights 
in Chechnya and proposed that the Council of Ministers should suggest that the international 
community consider setting up an international tribunal to investigate alleged war crimes in 
Chechnya. The resolution points out that the most likely reason for the continuity of human 
rights abuse is because both Russian servicemen and Chechen fighters are seldom if ever 
punished.388 This quite naturally received a fierce response from the Russian side. Even the 
Russian foreign minister expressed disappointment and unsurprisingly Dmitrii Rogozin, 
already known for his strong words, said that Russia was considering cutting its annual 
financial contribution of $25million to the Council of Europe.389 
Eventually both Rogozin and Lord Judd resigned from the CoE-Russian negotiations 
over Chechnya. Their removal signalled the victory of a more accommodating stance on both 
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sides. The argument that the events of 9/11 were the reason for a shifting stance is not, 
however, conclusive. The softening of the CoE attitude was evident well before 9/11, indeed 
the Committee of Ministers can be seen to have acted consistently throughout the second 
Chechen war. Celine Francis gives one explanation to this: ‘There were two main reasons for 
this: the election of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency, and the formulation of his 
“Chechenisation” policy. With Putin’s election in March 2000, a new era began for Russia: 
the dynamic young president, now officially in charge, quickly gained the trust of Western 
leaders who were generally willing to believe in his ability to stabilise the country. Putin’s 
decision to reject once and for all the option of direct control of Chechnya, and instead to 
appoint non-separatist Chechens to manage the Republic, was a second reason for the 
European states to trust him: they were hoping that this new Chechenisation policy would 
turn out to be the political solution they had been waiting for since the outbreak of the 
conflict.’390 Furthermore in her in-depth analysis she comes to the conclusion that ‘terrorist 
acts had no real impact on the EU’s or the CoE’s definitions of the conflict in Chechnya’.391  
In the case of Putin’s presidency and, to some extent, with regard to Chechenisation 
policies this study comes to the same conclusion but not in the case of terrorism. However the 
Chechenisation policy became acceptable in the CoE by force and events that shook Moscow 
in October 2002. As John Russell has argued: ‘The October 2002 hostage-taking crisis at 
Moscow’s Dubrovka theatre not only allowed Putin to put an end to any prospects of 
negotiations with the separatists but also define them all as “terrorist”, a view hotly disputed 
in the West’.392 Richard Sakwa  in his analysis follows the same lines: ‘Although Putin 
sanctioned meetings with representatives of the insurgents in autumn 2001 and in October 
2002 it appears that some sort of negotiation process was in train until disrupted by the 
seizure of the Dubrovka Theatre... Putin resolutely pursued his Chechenisation strategy.’393 
Even if the Chechenisation strategy seemed to have been favoured by Putin from the 
beginning,394 it was not at all clear before the summer of 2002 when he announced the 
military phase of the conflict finished. The CoE reports reflect the belief that the Russian 
authorities where in the same lines with the CoE’s and especially PACE’s view.  In the 2001 
PACE report where it recommends the return of full credentials of the new Russian 
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delegation, it also acknowledges that many important Russian officials dealing with the 
Chechen question share the view of the PACE representatives.395  The fierce fight of prestige 
between JMG Russian delegation leader  Dmitry Ragozin and Lord Judd in January 2003 was 
the final blow for the CoE’s resistance to Putin’s Chechenisation plan. Up until then the 
PACE’s decision to return Russia’s voting rights and more conciliatory line came from how 
the PACE rapporteurs saw the situation. Partly the more positive tone in January 2001 and 
2002 reports came from the fact that Russians had been cooperating with the CoE officials 
well and also expressed their own concerns relating to the situation in Chechnya. In the 2002 
report it is stated: ‘…at least some progress has been made; it [the Assembly] notes that this 
is the result of positive changes of attitude which are now identifiable in the Russian 
Federation concerning the way to deal with the conflict’.396 
The Russian side did portray the second Chechen war as a war against terrorism rising 
from North Caucasus. The course of events helped the Russian argument significantly also in 
a number of international organizations. The 9/11 attacks changed fully the attitudes in 
European organizations, among them the CoE, relating to the war in Chechnya. As Anna 
Politkovskaya observed ‘things changed especially after 9/11. It (Chechnya) became an 
international conflict and conversations relating to Chechnya in Europe were about war 
against international terrorism’.397 Also the statements from the CoE’s side like the Political 
Affairs Committee report in January 2002 says: ‘The assembly recognizes that there are some 
terrorists, including foreigners, operating in the Chechen Republic who have no interests in a 
reasonable political solution.’398 Noteworthy in the same paragraph was also reference to the 
fact that no state should use war on terrorism as a justification for disrespect for human rights 
and rule of law. In the 2003 report the CoE tone had toughened and the terrorism element was 
clearly there: ‘Chechen fighters should immediately stop their terrorist activities and 
renounce all forms of crime. Any kind of support for Chechen fighters should cease 
immediately’.399 In that report the theme of terrorism and human rights violations from both 
sides is more visible than before. 
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In Russia’s relations to the CoE two elements that arise from the case of Chechnya are 
the effects of the war on terrorism and Russian diplomacy keeping the attitude of a Great 
Power as the dominating factor. The lower level of the CoE in the form of PACE gave the 
strongest criticism and took action but also its efforts were successfully managed by Russian 
diplomacy. One significant factor was also Mr. Rogozin’s appearance as the leader of 
Russian representatives in the JWG. Despite the very small steps forward from the Russian 
side, the words made a strong effect in pushing the Russian critical voices into a minority in 
the PACE. The Committee of Ministers, the higher level, was from the beginning more 
cautious in its criticism of Russia. Personal relations are more important in the CM and 
contacts closer. In such circumstances Russia’s bilateral relations with different member 
countries play a bigger role than at any parliamentary level, where member state politicians 
also play domestic politics. The Russian side made a significant effort in cleaning up its 
image in the CoE and clearly some of the issues brought up in the CoE relating to conflict 
resolution in Chechnya made a difference in details, but not in overall policy. The ideas of 
multilateralism played a constructive role but it was overtaken by Russian views on 
sovereignty and feelings of greatpowerness. 
 
5.4 The Council of Europe’s place in Russian foreign policy 
One of the original ideas behind the creation of the CoE was that traditional 
greatpowerness would count less and that all states despite their size or abilities would have 
equal standing. As Churchill stated in 1948: ‘The structure of the United States of Europe 
will be such as to make the material strength of a single State less important. Small nations 
will count as much as large ones and gain their honour by a contribution to the common 
cause’.400 Furthermore the CoE was the first institution created after the Second World War 
in Europe, whose aim was to safeguard human rights and democracy. All these ideas of 
equality in international politics, respect for human rights and support for democracy also 
became a part of being a Great Power in the post-World War Two world. This factor was also 
recognized in Moscow after the fall of the Soviet Union. Foreign minister Kozyrev argued 
that Russian membership in CoE would enable Russia to join Europe as an equal of its 
Western partners and at the same time suggested that for Russian democracy to succeed it 
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needed to share Europe’s experience.401 The Russian foreign policy concept from 1993 
mentioned also the equality aspect as one of the priorities in Russian western European 
affairs: ‘Further steps to ensure Russia’s equal participation in the Council of Europe’.402 The 
other argument was relating to Russia re-joining the mainstream of Western civilization or 
being an inalienable part of European civilization.403 Both of these arguments can be seen as 
Russia’s strong need to confirm that first Russia is treated in Europe as an equal and secondly 
that Russia is part of Europe.  
How Russia embarked towards the membership of the CoE showed the inexperience of 
the Russian political leadership over what multilateralism consisted of in an institution based 
on CoE principles. There was plenty of idealism. It seemed that the Russian idealism was 
based on the fact that it saw itself as a special case.404 One conclusion why this was the case 
is that Russian identity as a Great Power raised false expectations and assumptions. 
Membership in the CoE was seen as an easy access process but the objectives proved to be 
more difficult than generally expected.405 The prestige factor and the fact that Moscow had, 
arguably since Gorbachev’s new thinking in foreign policy, recognized that institutional 
affiliation and liberalism were part of the modern Western Great Power recognition, played a 
major part in the fact that the Russian political elite united in their argumentation for the 
necessity of Russian membership in the CoE. 
Russia was ready to execute several objectives for membership, but its attitude was, for 
example, that when the parliamentary elections in December 1993 as well as a referendum on 
a new Russian constitution were held, the Russian authorities sought to speed the process of 
admission since from their perspective two major conditions had been fulfilled. At the same 
time, the two events that from the Russian perspective should have ensured Russia’s 
membership increased the CoE’s hesitation and made it question even more Russia’s 
democratic path.406  
Interestingly the war in Chechnya and the worsening of the human rights situation in 
Chechnya as well as the turn in Russian foreign policy away from liberal ideas, was one of 
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the triggering factors in admitting Russia to the CoE. Both the Russian and CoE side used the 
argumentation that it is better to have Russia in than out. 
Each time Russia was showing willingness to  cooperate, it was seen as a good omen 
from the CoE’s side. Yeltsin’s administration did think that Russia had made commendable 
progress towards CoE principles, Chechnya excluded.407 This also signalled how Russia in 
principle respected and recognized common rules and norms but at the same time saw 
exceptions - a view that is typical of Great Power thinking. 
By the year 2000 and at the height of  the second Chechen war Russia wrote in its new 
foreign policy concept as follows about the CoE: ‘Based on its own needs to build a civil 
society, Russia intends to continue its participation in the activities of the Council of 
Europe’.408 This indicated that Russia did see the clear advantages of CoE membership. On 
the other hand the events and argumentation around Chechnya reveal Russia’s attitude to a 
multilateral cooperation as one that expects treatment according to country specificities and 
not according to common norms and values. As Andrei Zagorsky wrote already in 1997: ‘The 
impact of Russia’s admission to the Council of Europe on domestic legislation could 
certainly be positive and help accelerate implementation of Russia’s international 
commitments related to human rights. However, it may cause friction with the Council of 
Europe, given the inherited habit of the Russian authorities of explaining all deficiencies in 
the political, economic or legal system by the uniqueness of Russia among world 
civilizations’.409 
The interesting aspect relating to the Council of Europe is the two different levels 
working side by side and thereby bringing a domestic aspect to foreign policy and vice versa. 
Russia insisted and still does that Chechnya is an internal matter of Russia. However, as was 
already the case in the first Chechen war, by making a case for exclusive domestic 
jurisdiction, Russia was in contradiction to international texts to which it had already acceded 
and which shared the spirit of key COE conventions.410 This was not the only contradiction 
since Russia eventually made the case for internationalizing the Chechen wars first by seeing 
the place for international organizations, both the OSCE and COE, in solving both 
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humanitarian and legal aspects of the conflict411 and then in the second Chechen war arguing 
itself that the war in Chechnya was a war against international terrorism. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Russia is a special member of the Council of Europe, not only according to themselves 
but from the view point of the other members as well. Russia does have a strong feeling and 
need for belonging to something and the CoE gave it a platform where it feels that it is truly 
working in the European context. As Andrei Zagorsky points out: ‘The special value of the 
Council of Europe for Russia lay in the fact that it is the only West European institution of 
which Russia could become and wished to become a full member’.412 This was an important 
factor in Russia’s relationship with the West. 
The situation today, of Russian membership in an organisation like the CoE and the 
organisation’s stand towards Russia, is defined by three main factors: the nature of the 
organisation as moral value and norm setter rather than enforcer, the decision making 
structure, and the way Russia joined the organisation. All these factors have come together in 
the cases of Chechnya. 
The first factor that the organization is more of a moral value and norm setter than norm 
forcing organization has its roots in the very start of the organisation in 1949. It was then that 
a precedent was created for the way in which it functions in the Post-Cold War environment. 
When the enforcing function is dropped the prestige factor comes to play a strong role. The 
CoE has demonstrated its usefulness in pulling Russia closer to the European sphere of norms 
and values. In Russian foreign policy multilateral cooperation is a very central theme but at 
the same time it does include a line of thought that Russia should also belong to the group of 
‘big’ members that have enough influence to protect Russia’s own line, and the CoE fitted in 
perfectly. This wish to be viewed as one of the big members is clearly demonstrated by 
Russia wanting to pay membership fees not according to its GDP but in the way of belonging 
to the ‘big’ five in the COE.413 However this prestige factor was also a central reason why the 
case of Chechnya became such an important question for Russians. In the spirit of 
multilateralism, almost in a liberal institutionalist way, Russians acted in the organisations 
over a wide range of matters but when it came to Chechnya the limits of that thinking were 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
411 Liz Fuller,  RFE/RL, Vol.1, No.14, Part I, 19 January, 1995, 
412 Zagorsky, 1997, p.537 
413 Interview with Russian diplomat in CoE, Strasbourg, France, 20.06.2006 
 
 
150 
clearly shown. As the case of Chechnya shows, the principles of multilateralism and great 
power prestige made Russia seek membership and cooperate and contribute to the CoE. But 
in the end other elements of great power identity such as the principle of sovereignty and 
non-interference of outsiders in the affairs of a great power prevailed over the gains to 
prestige that could be made by submission to international scrutiny.  
The second factor is the structure for decision making involved in the CoE. It is in the 
Committee of Ministers where Russia’s position is affected by the fact that Russia is viewed 
as a European Great Power for better or worse. There the major decisions are made and that 
is where power lies. In the case of Chechnya this mechanism was crucial. This way 
diplomacy in the organization can also be selective. Furthermore Russia invested a lot of 
political prestige in the CoE and the Russian delegation has been put together from politicians 
that represent the highest ranks in their parties but are also professional diplomats by training. 
Thereby the CoE has acted as a learning forum for both Russian diplomats and Europeans, to 
get to know each other’s way of thinking and acting. CoE was not able to enforce anything on 
Russia and the ultimate threat – throwing Russia out from the organisation - was not a 
thinkable measure for the Committee of Ministers, where Russia as a Great Power was a fact. 
The PACE questioned Russian greatpowerness but was not able to enforce its views on 
Russia. This divide inside the organisation has clearly helped the Russian stand. So 
interestingly Russian membership also changed the internal dynamic of the CoE, as the case 
of Chechnya created a rift between the Committee of ministers and the PACE. 15 years of 
Russian membership showed that some steps have been made but that there are issues which 
remain ‘untouchable’ from the Russia perspective. 
The third factor - the time and the way Russia joined the CoE - is haunting in the 
background.  From the Russian side, the expectation was that membership was automatic 
based on the idea of Russian great power identity.  Russia as a Great Power should have been 
enough from the Russian point of view to grant membership. Yet when this view did not hold 
sway inside the CoE, the feeling and attitude from the Russia side started to turn more hostile. 
Furthermore the CoE side was disappointed that the process of democratisation in Russia had 
gone so slowly, as one CoE official put it: ‘What matters is what conventions are ratified not 
the quantity.’414 The frustration of the CoE side was taken out on the Chechen cases, 
sometimes very justly and sometimes with an element of overreacting which did not go down 
well with the Russian side. It was taken as an attack against Russian Great Power identity.   
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Russia also learned that eventually the rules can be bent in the CoE. Since the accession 
process was filled with false expectations on both sides, the reality also hit harder. The 
concept of double standards, used by Russians, in the Russia-West relations originates from 
the times when Russia was admitted to the CoE. The case of Chechnya illustrates this well. It 
has also shown that Russia will think out its own policies and if they do not coincide with the 
Western views, they will only alter their ways, like the Chechenisation process or showing 
some cooperation such as allowing CoE monitoring in Chechnya, as a Great Power would do 
– that is to say, with limited and controlled access, and once things get heated it will pull out 
the card that a great power always has in its use - power resources and threat perceptions. 
The Putin era has confirmed that Russia is quite firm in its commitment to its 
membership in the CoE. The first Putin era of 2000-2008 was also an era of strong revival of 
Russian greatpowerness. This did not change during the Medvedev years 2008-2012 and 
continued even more strongly in Putin’s third period in the presidency. It should be noted that 
now and then the Russian administration has used the CoE as an advisor to its legislation and 
especially regional cooperation with the CoE is viewed from all sides as a very positive 
cooperation. The wars in Chechnya have left their marks on the cooperation. When Russian 
great power identity feels hurt the concepts of ressentiment appear in the Russian foreign 
policy elite’s statements. How the Chechen cases developed and played a role in Russia’s 
relationship with the CoE has been illustrated above. Even if in the case of Chechnya the 
organisations in the end failed to be influential, the process showed how important 
multilateralism is for Russian foreign policy, how a great power is ready to reconcile to 
common norms and where then lie the limits of integration of a Great Power. 
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Chapter 6: The Russian Federation and the European Union; The lost 
opportunity that Chechnya revealed  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Russia and Europe have always had a special relationship. There are different accounts 
what has made the relationship “special” but agreement that the relationship is special. The 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe was created with security matters in 
mind. The Council of Europe promoted democracy and the rule of law. When the EU was 
born in Rome in 1952 the economic integration of Europe was the starting point and the 
motivation. This naturally made the identity of the EC (European Community), as it was 
known in the beginning, very specific. 
 In Soviet times the EC figured only in lateral contexts for Soviet foreign policy, despite 
the fact that Western Europe was the USSR’s important trade partner. As Jackie Gower has 
pointed out ‘throughout most of the Cold War period, Soviet attitudes towards European 
integration in general and the European Community (EC) in particular were both sceptical 
and hostile’.415 When Gorbachev introduced new thinking in Soviet foreign policy and the 
concept of the Common European home, Western Europe became more interesting from the 
Kremlin’s point of view. By 1995 Russian trade with the Western European countries was 
more than 50 per cent of its total foreign trade and even more interestingly the EU countries 
provided more than 60 per cent of Western economic assistance to Russia in 1990-1994.416  
Russia-EU relations developed from something in the background to one of the most 
significant foreign relations Russia has. Both the EU and Russia have changed significantly 
since the fall of the Soviet Union. The enlargement of the EU from 11 to 27 members has 
been a major contributor towards the growing ties, but it is also important that Europe has 
always been one of the main directions of Moscow’s foreign policy. The economic ties have 
increased the interdependence and the soft power aspect of Russian greatpowerness is 
strongly connected to Europe, but more importantly it can be argued that the European state 
identity has been the foundation of Russian great power identity.   
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At the same rate as the Russia-EU relationship has grown in economic terms and both 
parties gone through significant changes, the academic literature on Russia-EU relations has 
expanded. The numerous writing from different aspect of Russia-EU relations include 
security cooperation, different agreement analysis on Russia-EU relations, economic aspect, 
different EU member country attitudes towards Russia, Russian domestic politics influencing 
the relationship, historical accounts to name just a few.417 The features that seem to be 
common for nearly all the publication is to agree that the starting point is that there are big 
problems as well as clear closeness in the relationship -cooperation or conflict style. 
The evolution of Russia-EU relations from a not so prominent place in Russian foreign 
policy and mainly focusing on economics to gradually becoming one of the most significant 
partnerships for Russia with values and norms on top of the agendas, has much to do with the 
Chechen wars together with the evolution of the EU itself. The expanding economic agenda 
has much to do with the enlargement of the EU but the norms and values and questions 
relating to identity belong to the internal developments of Russia, and there the wars in 
Chechnya play a major role.   
The main issue for this chapter is to examine Chechnya as a test case for common values 
and integration ideas between Russia and the EU. At first the chapter examines to what extent 
the two Chechen wars can be seen as revealing test cases of the differences that cause time 
after time trouble in Russia-EU relations, and to what extent the wars also show why Russia 
and the EU are destined to be together for better or for worse. The next two parts go through 
the two Chechen wars in chronological order, showing some of the twists and turns in Russia-
EU relations, while highlighting the differences and the points where good relations continue 
to hold. 
The chapter then continues with an overview of the EU’s place in Russian foreign policy, 
arguing that even if there is an interest based approached with historical roots in Russia’s 
relationship with the EU, there are also clear identity based expectations, and in Russia the 
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EU is often viewed not as an international organisation but as Europe itself, which Russia 
should belong to, much more than in the case of CoE and the OSCE. This identity based 
search for cooperation and integration also has deep historical roots but not so much in the 
areas of trade and security as in cultural and historical aspects. It is argued that only by 
looking at both aspects of the Russian attitude towards the EU that a clearer picture of 
Russia’s aspiration and aims regarding the EU can be identified. 
 
6.2 Chechnya as a test case of common values and integration ideas 
The conflict first started in 1994 and was then widely regarded in the West as a fight for 
independence, an anti-colonial war. The Russian Federation in turn insisted that the matter 
was internal and that the Chechen drive for independence posed a threat to the whole 
federation. This was especially the case throughout the course of the first Chechen war. The 
second Chechen war acquired a more international character as a result of Russian initiatives, 
but was still regarded by Russians as an internal matter. Gradually, new characterisations 
evolved both in Russia and in the West. The common Russian characterisation of the conflict 
turned into one of a guerrilla war linked to the fight against terrorism, and by 2003 and the 
EU-Russia summit in St. Petersburg the situation was being compared to that of the Basques 
in Spain.418  
The Chechen wars (1994-1997 and 1999 -2003) had different starting points and 
occurred in the context of different international environments. As detailed in chapter 3, in 
the first war the international dimension was minimal, even if international media coverage 
was more thorough. Russians considered it to be Russia’s internal affair which had to be 
resolved by its own government, a view which was widely accepted abroad. The second war 
automatically took on a more international character from the start, with great emphasis on 
the links of Chechen rebels and their supporters with Al Qaeda. Thus an internal affair of the 
Russian Federation also became an international one. In the West as well, during the first 
months of the second Chechen war the international connection was strengthened in a 
different manner, with a more critical examination of Russia’s commitment to human rights 
and international law. 
 This could be interpreted as indicating that the West, especially Europe, now regarded 
Russia as sufficiently stable as a state to be criticized over its conduct in regard to 
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international norms and values, the rule of law, and human rights. The argument here is that 
during the first Chechen war the EU regarded Russia as a country in transition, and so the 
relationship between the EU and Russia was that of an older brother towards a younger one. 
Russia was more willing to listen to what the EU had to say, but on the other hand the EU 
was careful not to do anything that would provoke a negative reaction. Furthermore during 
the first Chechen war it started to be clear that the questions of common values showed a big 
gap between Russian and the European Union’s thinking, thereby indicating already that the 
integration process would not be a realistic future expectation and that even economic 
cooperation where there was clear common interests would present challenges. It needs to be 
noted that even if the differences between Russia and the EU started to show during the first 
Chechen war, it only became evident during Putin’s presidencies and the second Chechen 
war. 
When the second Chechen war broke out in 1999 the EU had recognised Russia as 
possessing a market economy, as stated at the Cardiff meeting of EU ministers in June 1998. 
A year later at its Cologne meeting, the EU published its common strategy on Russia, which 
expressed the cultural proximity of Russia and the EU: ‘The European Union welcomes 
Russia to return to its rightful place in the European family in a spirit of friendship, co-
operation, fair accommodation of interest and on the foundation of shared values enshrined in 
the common heritage of European civilisation.’419   This marked a distinctly different attitude 
towards Russia on the EU’s side, and laid the framework for more open criticism of Russian 
actions based on an equal relationship and mutual respect supposedly founded on common 
values.  
Having welcomed Russia into the European family on the eve of the second Chechen 
war, the EU’s response was one of frustration and disappointment at Russia’s apparent 
violation of those values, as much as one of principle. At the heart of the EU’s position was a 
tension between the desire to improve Russia’s record on human rights on the one hand and 
the recognition, on the other hand, that continuing and closer cooperation in the long term 
presents the best opportunity for influencing Russia’s behaviour and development.  At the 
same time the EU, which as a multinational organization can and has put ethical 
considerations at a central place in its foreign policy, may have been at odds with individual 
member states, for who business and security considerations took priority. Thus Western 
values and norms, which are especially important in current debates about international 
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relations, are a source of both integration and confrontation between Russia and the countries 
of the European Union. The second Chechen war took Russia even further away from the 
common values idea but kept alive the notion that Russia was a European country and some 
of Russia’s problems were also problems of the EU. Globalisation and geography played a 
trick on Russia and the EU and despite major problems and differences between the two 
actors, it also became clear that both are dependent on each other, very differently, but never 
the less permanently. 
 
6.3 The first Chechen war 
When the first Chechen war had started the EU faced a strategic dilemma. How was it 
possible to balance the development of mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia, support 
for the Russian reform programme, and criticism of Russian actions in Chechnya? The EU 
and Russia had drawn up the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) at Corfu in June 
1994. This Agreement was to become a cornerstone of the future development of Russia-EU 
relations. The idea of strategic partnership between Russia and the EU was put on the table. It 
was established that common respect for democracy and human rights was to become a 
leading principle in Russia and EU cooperation. This was a mutual agreement and at that time 
Russia seemed to be committed fully to its principles.  
The significance of the agreement on Russia’s future orientation was underlined by 
Yeltsin himself at Corfu: ‘Our country has made a strategic choice in favour of integration 
into the world community and in the first instance, with the European Union.’420  In its 
political aspects the PCA stressed the importance of common values shared by Russia and the 
EU. These values included promotion of international security and peace, respect for human 
rights, and the development of democratic norms, institutions, and practices.421  By launching 
the Chechen conflict Yeltsin’s Russia halted progress in this direction. From the EU’s point 
of view, the war marked a departure on Russia’s part from the principles which underlay the 
agreement.  
From the start, the EU was very eager to influence and guide Russia. ‘From the 
beginning, the EU energetically criticised Russia’s behaviour, although at first mostly 
verbally and in a form of secret diplomacy’.422  But initially there were two major areas 
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where the EU moved beyond secret diplomacy and threatened concrete action. The first was 
the ratification process of the PCA, which  was temporarily suspended by the EU in early 
1995. When peace negotiations in Chechnya started at the end of June, following a Russian 
military defeat after its 4 June offensive, and shortly after the Russians had walked out of the 
OSCE-sponsored peace talks, the EU resumed the ratification process.423 According to Jackie 
Gower: ‘The action by the European Parliament in suspending the ratification of the PCA for 
several months in 1995 owing to its concern about the violation of human rights in Chechnya 
demonstrated that political conditionality is no empty threat’.424 While this reflects the most 
widely held view that the suspension of the process was purely due to Chechnya, according to 
the Delegation of the European Commission in Russia the complications in the ratification 
process were due to a number of different circumstances, only one of which was the Chechen 
war.425 Some even suggested that the Chechen war became a convenient excuse for the EU to 
halt the ratification process.426 There was a lot of doubt relating to the Russia-EU cooperation 
process, in much the same way as with the CoE. 
The second issue was more clearly connected to the Chechen war. The aim of the so-
called Interim Agreement between Russia and the EU was to precede the PCA and ease and 
accelerate the implementation of the PCA’s trade and commercial portions. The agreement 
was very important for Russia but also for the EU trade partners. It covered trade regulations, 
as well as a number of aspects of customs, standardization, competition and protection of the 
rights to intellectual property. From the Russian side the agreement was seen as an agreement 
to remove numerous discriminatory restrictive measures. Furthermore the EU was not able 
officially to label Russia with the term ‘transition-economy’ which was branded in Russia as 
a political tool in trade relations by the EU. Aleksei Portansky in Finansoviye izvestia wrote: 
‘The entry into force of the interim agreement between the Russian Federation and the EU is 
also of considerable psychological and political significance for Moscow, since it relieves the 
unpleasant feeling of isolation that has intensified in connection with the war in 
Chechnya’427. But the Interim Agreement that should have entered into force in March 1995 
was postponed due to the conflict in Chechnya. In March 1995 representatives of the EU 
troika (France, Germany, and Spain) travelled to Moscow and laid down four conditions for 
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implementing the Interim Agreement: a cease-fire, progress in the political settlement of the 
crisis, free access for humanitarian aid, and the establishment of a permanent OSCE mission 
in Chechnya.428  
Even here the Russian side questioned the connection to Chechnya. Russian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Nikolai Afanasyevsky responded by saying that if the war in Chechnya had 
not taken place another reason would have been found not to sign the agreement.429  This 
assessment contrasted with the mood of sections of the Russian press, which carried a 
number of concerned articles about the EU’s move, for example: ‘There will be no agreement 
on partnership with the EU – neither interim nor major – as long as the military action 
continues’,430 and ‘let us hope, our western partners will stop linking trade with politics’ .431 
With Russia still finding her feet in international diplomacy after the Cold War, there may 
have been sound reasoning behind both points of view. Long-standing suspicion of the West, 
ressentiment, and a natural cynicism about the EU’s intentions, together with a firm belief 
that Chechnya was a matter of Russian state sovereignty, fuelled the belief that acceding too 
readily to external pressure would only lead to further demands with nothing gained in return; 
on the other hand the liberal media and politicians saw support from Europe as essential at 
any cost, and saw no reason to disbelieve the sincerity of the EU’s stance. The Russian 
‘liberals’ saw Russia as a European country and therefore a part of the European community 
not separate from it.432 
In the event, a policy of partial concessions seems to have been sufficient for both sides 
to save face and a policy of constructive engagement to be pursued. By the summer of 1995 
such strong EU criticisms had softened, and by the June European Council ministerial 
meeting in Cannes the tone was far more conciliatory: ‘The European Council here feels that 
the dialogue between Russia and the Atlantic alliance should be stepped up by using the 
existing mechanisms. All developments should though be compatible with NATO, WEU and 
the gradual integration of the Central European countries. In the near term the European 
Council, noting that progress has been made with regards to the situation in Chechnya and 
relying on confirmation of that progress, has decided in favour of signing the Interim 
Agreement’.433  
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By the end of June 1995 Russia had demonstrated that it was indeed filling all the four 
conditions expected from it. The new cease-fire came into force on 19 June. The Interim 
Agreement was signed in June and played an important part in regulating Russia-EU 
relations. It provided a basis in the World Trade Organisation for the treatment of EU-Russia 
trade. At this point it seemed that the EU’s pressure had worked, to the extent that Russia had 
fulfilled the requirements demanded of it. By doing so Russia obtained in return a great deal 
of good will from the EU, and in the end was also even admitted to the Council of Europe 
with the EU’s approval, even if it was highly questionable whether Russia really was actually 
eligible for membership. The first two fulfilled conditions - a cease-fire and progress towards 
a political settlement - were very fragile and did not hold for long. The EU’s readiness to 
accept what were little more than cosmetic measures was perhaps an early indication of the 
priority given to keeping Russia on board rather than forcing the issue of the conflict. Russia 
had responded to the conditions laid down by the EU, but in doing so had gained enormous 
benefits for a very small price. 
In the second half of 1995 progress in political relations was steadier, while the fighting 
in Chechnya was pushed to the background. At the European Council’s meeting in Madrid in 
December 1995 the tone seemed warmer and the search for more co-operation was more 
prominent: ‘The European Council trusts that Russia will continue its actions to promote 
stability, development, peace and democracy. It means to support its efforts. It wishes to 
strengthen permanently the ties between the European Union and this great country.’434  In 
the same document the EU declared its support for Russia’s efforts to become integrated into 
the international economic system, and for its admission to the WTO and other international 
organisations including the Council of Europe. It was clear that the EU side seemed to want, 
from the relationship with Russia, something that went beyond the purely economic 
cooperation which had dominated up until then. Already in November 1995 a ‘strategy for 
future EU-Russia relations’ was adopted which tried to balance the emphasis on economic 
matters characteristic of the PCA with broader political concerns, and in May 1996 the EU 
adopted an Action Plan which was intended to supplement the PCA by identifying priorities 
and laying out a work programme in a wide range of policy areas.435 While the war was still 
being fought in Chechnya, 1996 was also a presidential election year in Russia and in the first 
half of the year, western governments and institutions refrained from criticising Yeltsin in 
order to avoid any adverse affect on his campaign, fearing that any western comment on the 
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Chechen issue might be to the benefit of the communists or Zhirinovsky’s extreme 
nationalists. This as shown in the previous chapter was also the case with the CoE. The 
presidential elections of 1996, and the EU’s handling of the situation, appeared to give 
substance to later Russian claims of double standards as exercised by the West. The Action 
Plan’s main purpose was to send a strong political message of commitment and support to the 
reformers in Russia in the run-up to the 1996 presidential elections and to inject renewed 
dynamism into the relationship during the frustratingly long period while the PCA was still 
being ratified in the EU.436 However strong the objections to Yeltsin’s record in Chechnya, in 
western eyes he was at least, and by a long way, preferable to any of the alternatives. Strobe 
Talbott has summed up the thinking of most western politicians: ‘I doubted that withholding 
support from Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin would have strengthened Yavlinsky’s party in the 
December parliamentary elections or his personal showing in the presidential race. More 
likely, it would have played to the advantage of Zyuganov and the communists in both the 
elections’.437  
Arguably the first Chechen war coincided with an early phase of Russia’s efforts to 
assert its own state identity and to find its own place in the new international order. It raised 
two kinds of concern in the West - the fear of Russia falling apart and being in flux, or 
alternatively and even worse, the prospect of a stable Russia with no concern for democratic 
development and respect of human rights. In the EU, initially some attempts were made to try 
to influence Russia through threats, but after the first six months of the war that approach 
seemed to have been aborted, with the issue of state integrity and good relations with Russia 
winning over objections to her conduct.  
The EU, and especially the European Parliament, did persist in condemning the violation 
of human rights in Chechnya.438 However this line, firm and consistent as it was, did not 
negate the fact that the EU’s general approach was supportive of the Russian government. 
The lessons of the episode could not be lost on the Russian administration and public: the EU 
had demonstrated considerable goodwill and a readiness to compromise, against the fears of 
both cynics, who doubted whether anything could secure genuine EU support for Russia, and 
of liberals, who thought no progress could be made as long as the war continued. On the EU 
side some success could be claimed as to the benevolent influence of international pressure, 
but Russia had also made clear that it would not accept everything the EU dictated, and was 
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able to play the card of the extreme right and the extreme left in demanding its right to 
exercise sovereignty over internal affairs. On this basis, the future ground for cooperation 
was laid down but it took a second war in Chechnya, before the reality of the difficulties in 
the relationship started to be clear on both sides.  
 
6.4 The Second Chechen war 
On the part of the EU, Russia-EU relations had been improving since the signing of the 
Khasaviurt Peace Agreement, reaching an all time high during the summer of 1999, as stated 
in the Cologne presidency conclusions.439 This time the EU’s reaction to the Russian 
offensive in Chechnya was faster and stronger then in the first war. Still the action itself was 
not condemned, but ‘all disproportional and indiscriminate use of force in Chechnya which 
has given rise to severe hardship for the civilian population and the internally displaced 
persons’.440 The same sentence can be found in the Council’s Conclusions in both December 
1999 and February 2000. The European Council conclusion from its Helsinki meeting in 
December 1999 came down very harshly against Russia on the Chechen issue compared to 
the first time. It released a separate declaration on Chechnya, which stated: ‘this behaviour is 
in contradiction with the basic principles of humanitarian law and commitments of Russia as 
made within the OSCE and its obligations as a member of the Council of Europe’.441 The 
declaration included an ultimatum on human rights in Chechnya if implementation of the 
European Union’s Common Strategy was to proceed and the PCA continued, as well as 
announcing the possibility of limiting the TACIS budgets.442 Russia’s territorial integrity and 
her right to fight against terrorism were nevertheless confirmed.  
The strength of criticism reflected the feeling that this time the EU felt on more stable 
ground with Russia than before. Several times in January and April 2000 the Council stressed 
Russia’s status as a major partner of the EU, but also that political dialogue with Russia could 
now take place at the level at which questions of mutual interest could be addressed on an 
equal and open basis, including issues of disagreement and concern such as the conflict in 
Chechnya. As the European Council expressed in its April 2000 Conclusions, ‘The Council 
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underlined that an open and frank dialogue on issues of concern is an essential element of our 
long-term strategic partnership’.443  
The closer cooperation and institutionalization of Russia-EU relations during the 1990s 
made a difference, compared to the first Chechen war, in the way that the EU felt more able 
to openly criticize Russian conduct over different issues. Also this time the EU proposed a 
number of actions in order to make its point. It could be argued that they were more symbolic 
then anything else, but the list of ‘threats’ was this time longer and more carefully thought 
through. They included the revision of the Presidency’s work plan for the implementation of 
the Common Strategy of the EU on Russia, suspension of the signature of the Scientific and 
Technological Agreement, and the Commission’s decision not to carry over 30 million euros 
of unspent funds of food aid from 1999 to the 2000 budget. In addition the Tacis 2000 
programme was re-focused to core areas directly promoting democratic values as well as to 
promoting networking in civil society, and any uncommitted balances from it were to be 
transferred to humanitarian assistance. It was also decided to suspend consideration of the 
possible extension of additional GSP preferences for Russia.444  
In his speech of November 1999, the EU’s external relations commissioner Christopher 
Patten made it clear that the three main bodies of the EU - the Council, the Parliament and the 
Commission - had reached a consensus on condemning all kinds of acts of terrorism (this 
clearly referred to Chechnya as well), while at the same time condemning the use of strong 
military force, and the fact that political solutions were being disregarded as well as the 
human consequences of military action. He did, however, stress the fact that Europe should 
not make the same mistake they had made in 1917, by isolating Russia from European 
affairs.445 Patten addressed directly to Russians the point that they should understand that the 
situation in Chechnya was putting a strain on Russia-EU relations, that it would have an 
impact on the acceptance of Russia by the international community and on Russia’s 
credibility as a political and economic partner.446 
Patten’s strongly expressed opinion was that Russia should allow international 
organizations, namely the OSCE and the Council of Europe, to again get involved and 
monitor human rights: ‘I am concerned that so far neither the OSCE (in spite of assurances 
given by Russia at the Istanbul Summit) nor the Council of Europe, nor indeed we, have 
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succeeded in persuading the Russian Federation of the need for a political solution and 
respect for human rights for the civilians caught in the conflict. Collectively we should be 
able to make a difference once Russia agrees to allow the international community to re-enter 
the conflict zone’.447  
Statements about Chechnya from the EU side, and especially from Commissioner Patten, 
were issued with frequent regularity from the beginning of the second Chechen war up to and 
including the first half of 2000. One could sense a certain degree of frustration in Patten's 
statement of 25th February: ‘Again and again we have made abundantly clear to the Russian 
Government our dismay at these allegations. We will certainly raise our concerns, notably on 
the mass grave and filtration camps allegations as well as on the fate of Russian journalist 
Andrei Babitsky, at the upcoming EU-Russia Ministerial summit on 2 March and the trilateral 
ministerial meeting with Russia and on the US on 3 March in Lisbon’.448   
The Lisbon European Council Presidency conclusions sent a strongly worded message to 
Russia on the eve of its presidential elections in regard to the Chechen issue. Russia should 
put an end to the indiscriminate use of military force, should allow independent investigations 
of human rights violations, should allow competent international organizations and observers 
to perform their mission freely and should pursue without delay the search for a political 
solution.449 However, the loudly voiced demands of late 1999 and early 2000 about 
Chechnya, and how Russia should seek a political solution, should let international 
organizations get involved in the conflict, and should follow its international commitments, 
and that failure to do so would have far reaching negative consequences, had more or less 
disappeared by 2002.  
This downgrading of the criticism indicates that the European politicians believed in 
what they call ‘quiet diplomacy’, that they could manage disagreements over Chechnya 
without upsetting overall ties with Russia through positive engagement rather than overt 
criticism. This shift was evident as early as the EU-Russia summit in Moscow on 17th May 
2001, where the joint statement read, ‘We agree upon the need to seek a political solution in 
Chechnya as a matter of urgency with due regard for sovereignty and the territorial integrity 
of the Russian Federation ... The Russian side reaffirmed its readiness to cooperate with the 
EU in connection with programmes of humanitarian assistance to Chechnya’.450 In the first 
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Chechen war the line of argument went just the opposite way. The EU started with ‘quiet 
diplomacy’ and then stepped criticism up until the election year 1996, when it was toned 
down. 
This shift was not linked to any noticeable improvement in the situation in Chechnya 
(although according to the Russians the war had officially finished). Rather, by 2001 it started 
to be clear that tough language seemed to have little effect on Russia and that the EU was not 
ready to jeopardize the relationship they had already established by threatening concrete 
measures. This appeared to be the stand not only of the EU but of other international 
organizations, on the basis that it is more dangerous to isolate Russia than it is to let it have 
its way, and it seems that Russians have understood that this is how it stands - Russia could 
push the limits of international tolerance to a very high degree. 
The war on terrorism, and the radically changed international climate after 11 September 
2001, helped to ease even further the international pressure on Russia concerning Chechnya. 
Russia and the EU both joined the anti-terrorism coalition. At the EU-Russia summit of 
October 2001 the joint statement stressed the EU’s support for the Russian authorities’ efforts 
to reach a political settlement.451 Christopher Patten’s tone in his speeches had changed 
markedly, moreover, and he had shifted his emphasis since 2000: ‘The arms reduction 
agreement with the US, and today’s decisions on a new relationship with NATO, have set a 
seal on Russia’s emerging role as a participant in our collective security. The war on 
terrorism has undoubtedly acted as a catalyst’.452 He continued in the same speech: ‘In the 
case of Russia and the EU, the sheer size of the economic potential and the enormous 
commercial importance of proximity is singularly impressive; but my point is that with 
Russia, it goes way beyond commercial relations. We share culture, history and tradition’.453  
Overall, all of the concerns and warning signs, which had been visible two years earlier, 
had now diminished. In that particular speech Patten mentioned Chechnya only once ‘we 
should be able to discuss things like editorial freedom, the treatment of religious minorities, 
and our differences over human rights abuses and access of international humanitarian 
operators in Chechnya’.454 The same kind of sentiments apparent in this article can be seen in 
other sources, and in November 2002 Patten replied to the criticism that not enough was 
being done to help humanitarian organizations to act and help in Chechnya and Ingushetia. 
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He complimented the way the Danish Presidency had raised concerns over Chechnya. He 
also firmly stated: ‘We continue to raise those issues and to raise them vigorously while of 
course at the same time deploring terrorist activities, especially the sort of activities which 
recently caused so mush loss of life in Moscow’.455 This confirms the power of the anti-
terrorist military campaign, but also the strong negative effect on any legitimate Chechen 
cause created by the Dubrovka theatre drama. At the tenth EU-Russia Summit the joint 
statement on the fight against terrorism stated: ‘We strongly condemn the hostage taking in 
the theatre on Melnikov Street in Moscow in October 2002 and agree that taking innocent 
civilian people hostage is a cowardly and criminal act of terrorism, which cannot be defended 
or justified for any cause’.456 Finally, whereas the European Union had been accustomed to 
addressing the Chechen issue in each of their EU-Russia summit joint declarations, after the 
tenth summit in November 2002 Chechnya was left out from the official agenda. 
In fact it could be argued that the ‘tough approach’ of the international community had 
already changed with the advent of the new century. The parliamentary elections in 
December 1999 sent out a positive wave of feeling about Russia across Western countries, 
aided by the fact that Yeltsin resigned and Putin became acting president and the most likely 
candidate to become the next full President of Russia, signalling a stable transition to a strong 
and more effective president. The British Foreign secretary Robin Cook, who had spoken out 
strongly at the Istanbul summit, while visiting Moscow in February 2000 replied to a 
question from western reporters as to whether it should be necessary to take tougher actions 
against Russia regarding the ongoing Chechen war: ‘That’s not at all the case. Russia has not 
remained deaf to the concerns of Europe and other countries regarding Chechnya. There’s no 
need for tougher statements from the West, it is important that we maintain good relations 
with Russia’.457  
The tone had changed beyond recognition from demands to gentle requests. The 
explanation the Russian side gave for the surprise (at least as far as Russians were concerned) 
change in approach was the fact that the West did not want to force Putin into the hands of 
the anti-western and isolationist camps in Russia. The bottom line was that the West needed 
partnership with Russia just as much as Moscow needed partnership with the West. Pami 
Aalto refers to the fact that in EU-Russia relations economic power is asymmetrical but that 
‘the EU’s strengths in geo-economics do not automatically translate to strengths in 
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geopolitics. Consequently the EU is in a clearly weaker position (in relation to Russia)’.458 
Hence the attitude shift of the second half of the 1990s and the early years of the new 
millenium can be seen in terms of recognition by the EU of the geopolitical role of Russia. At 
the same time Russia recognised the EU in its own right (Russian foreign policy concept 
2000) and as a serious player in European and world politics.  
The beginning of a new political development in the Chechen crisis was a referendum on 
a new constitution for the Republic of Chechnya held on 23rd March 2003.  At least that was 
the effect Moscow was hoping for. With the CoE Russia had to have very heated discussions 
and boiling points over the referendum. The Russian position eventually won in the CoE and 
so it did with the EU as well. The referendum was widely criticised in the EU in advance, but 
by May 2003 western criticism had almost disappeared. A joint statement issued from an EU-
Russia summit stated: ‘We took note of the recent referendum in the Chechen Republic of the 
Russian Federation. We expressed the hope that the recently started political process as well 
as the economic and social reconstruction will lead to the restoration of the rule of law, thus 
promoting the protection of human rights and leading to a genuine reconciliation in 
Chechnya.’459 This was a striking statement considering how much criticism the referendum 
had got from the CoE and also from the EU side. In statements like this, it looked like Russia 
and the EU were addressing the Chechen issue with one voice.  
 
6.5 The European Union’s place in Russian foreign policy 
The existing major foreign and security policy documents - Russian foreign policy 
concept, Russian security doctrine and national security concept from 2000 - left the role of 
the EU very vague in Russian foreign policy. The foreign policy concept defines the role of 
the EU in Russian foreign policy as follows: ‘The Russian Federation views the EU as one of 
its main political and economic partners and will strive to develop intensive, sustainable and 
long-term cooperation with it, cooperation that would be free from any opportunistic 
fluctuations. …. The EU’s emerging military and political dimension should become a matter 
of particular attention.’460 This indicates that for better and for worse Russia would be 
seeking cooperation with the EU, but also saw the potential problems arising – the many 
member countries of the EU will not share the same views on Russia always and the role of 
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the EU in future world politics will be still open, therefore Russia will not define either its 
own position more clearly towards the EU. 
In the 2008 foreign policy document the tone is rather similar. Here, the EU clearly has 
the role of an international organisation and the word European is used in a wider context 
than just relating to the European Union. It is mentioned in the concept that Russia, the EU 
and the United States should be treated on an equal basis in world politics. Relating to 
Russia-EU objectives the concept states the following: ‘The Russian Federation will develop 
its relations with the European Union, which is a major trade, economic and foreign-policy 
partner, will promote strengthening in every possible way the interaction mechanisms, 
including through establishment of common spaces in economy, external and internal 
security, education, science and culture. From the long-term perspective, it is in the interests 
of Russia to agree with the European Union on a strategic partnership treaty setting special, 
most advanced forms of equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation with the European 
Union in all spheres with a view to establishing a visa free regime’.461 Both the council of 
Europe and the OSCE are mentioned before the EU and the concept argues strongly for a 
pan-European cooperation structure. 
Since contemporary official documents are extremely guarded and offer very little new 
clarity on Russia-EU relations, one way of approaching Russia-EU relations is by adopting a 
more historical angle. Over a long period of thime there have been increased tensions and 
then a period of détente. Russia has allied itself with those that had similar interests at a 
particular time, and the same actor that once was Russia’s ally can at a different time be 
Russia’s enemy. Dmitri Trenin has put it as follows: ‘Virtually anyone can be a partner 
[Russia’s] and practically anyone can be an opponent. The cooperation-to-competition ratio 
varies, depending on a particular field of interest, point in time and wider constellation of 
power relationships.’462 This fact has also created some ‘survival’ strategies of Russia in 
diplomatic games. These are especially clear and needed in Russia’s relations with Europe 
and the EU. One of them is forging a special relationship with one of the European big 
powers and so managing to create confusion and diversions in the EU’s common stands. 
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Mike Bowker saw this trend for the Soviet Union as long ago as the 1922 Rapallo 
Agreement.463 The Rapallo agreement was very much based on Russia’s economic interests.  
In support of an interest-based approach as opposed to an ideological or value-based one, 
a historical example of Alexander III’s foreign policy strategy is also a good example, ‘In 
aligning itself with France and Britain against it fellow autocracies Germany and Austria-
Hungary, Russia demonstrated the dominance of geopolitical and economic factors over 
dynastic ties and ideological affinities.’464 Furthermore fully contradicting Russia’s domestic 
realities and practises Catherine the Great favoured Americans in the American War of 
independence and Alexander II sent Russian warships to New York and San Francisco to 
show support for the North in the American civil war. These examples illustrate well why 
Russian foreign policy is so difficult to interpret; Russia can engage in a bitter war against 
Germany or Britain but be allied with them in a matter of years after the war. Russia can also 
support liberal ideas against conservative ones contradictory to its own domestic political 
thinking. These trends are still very visible in Russia’s policies towards the EU even during 
the period following the collapse of Soviet Union.  
These historical examples would support the idea that Russian foreign policy formation 
is mainly interest based. As Bobo Lo has stated; ‘None of the above [several factors showing 
very short-term interest based policies] is to deny that there were long-term priorities or 
interests. But they were not carved in stone; their importance fluctuated for all sorts of 
reasons, good and bad, objective and subjective.’465  
The place of the EU is arguably somewhat special in Russian foreign policy even if it 
does not come through so much from the official documents. If it can be said that for better or 
for worse today’s Russian Federation is the heir of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire, 
today’s EU is very much the heir of ‘Europe’ in terms of Russian foreign policy. Therefore 
the EU does not represent a normal international organisation in the eyes of Moscow’s 
foreign policy makers. Sometimes this is a fact that the Russian foreign policy would like 
avoid and treat the EU just as an international organisation. However, actions and talks speak 
more than official documents. 
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One of the most common roads of explanation about the reasons behind the difficulties 
and drifts between Russia and the EU is the fact that a huge part of Russia also belongs to 
Asia and for a long period of history Russia was connected to Mongol rule. This part of 
Russian history was, as Angela Stent expressed it ‘… the relationship between geography and 
civilization’466 which, together with the fact that Russia chose the Orthodox religion as its 
faith, has naturally had a rupturing effect on Russia-Europe relations. With the Eastern 
Christian tradition Russia became a European frontier state that had a European origin but 
expanded beyond Europe.467 But despite the differences in ideology, and a religion that 
introduced many values for societal and governmental development, some administrative 
practises and numerous wars between Russia and other European countries, Russian national 
identity in its origin is rooted in europeanness and Russia’s foreign policy priorities are based 
on that identity. This claim is not easy to prove in the light of both historical behaviour and 
today’s actions of Russia in regard to it’s neighbours in the West. And yet some evidence can 
be found by looking at Russia’s interactions with the EU during the two Chechen wars.  
It can be argued that for better or for worse the EU and the European direction is the 
outside factor that very much determines Russia’s policy choices. Former Russian foreign 
minister Igor Ivanov has written; ‘For most of their history, Russians have continually 
pondered the questions “Are we part of Europe?” Regardless of the answer, it is undeniable 
that the European vector has played the lead role in determining Russia’s foreign policy for 
the past several centuries.’468 Since the fall of the Soviet Union all Russian presidents have 
stressed the importance of Europe for Russia. President Putin made his vision of the future of 
the relationship in 2002 clear: ‘I consider it necessary today to once again firmly state our 
priorities in the European direction. Clearly in evidence here is our consistent position and 
the many specific steps to integrate with Europe’.469  
Five years later Putin held a view that Russia and the Europeans share a common view of 
the world: ‘Today, building a sovereign democratic state, we share the values and principles 
of the vast majority of Europeans. Respect for international law, rejection of force to settle 
international problems and preference for strengthening common approaches in European and 
global politics are factors that unite us. In our joint work within the United Nations, the G8 
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and other forums, we always feel we share a common view of the world’470. Through these 
statements comes out clearly the Europeaness in Russian identity. This is not to say that the 
greatpowerness cannot trump the Europeaness. And yet the historical experience as well as 
current Russian statements continuously confirm how important Europe is for Russia even if 
Russia is sometimes seeking to discredit the European Union as an organisation. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
?
The first Chechen war started at a very sensitive time in Russia-EU relations. Many 
things were going in the right direction. The Partnership and Cooperation agreement had been 
signed in summer 1994 and expectations were still high even if signs of difficulty had started 
to appear on other fronts. At the same time the first Chechen war gave the EU an opportunity 
to review its Russia politics. Arguably, the first Chechen war served as a learning experience 
both for the EU leaders and for Russian politicians.  
From the Russian side, during the first Chechen war, the growing fear that Russia had 
underestimated Western reactions was visible. ‘According to Vremya’s sources, Kremlin 
officials believe that Western pressure could force Russia to embark on a fundamentally 
different course of action in the world arena’.471 Perhaps that was the case, and a number of 
adjustments on Russia’s part were made in response to EU pressure. At the time, many 
Russians also thought that the deadlocked Chechen conflict would only be solved with 
Western assistance.472 As far as Russians were concerned, what was meant by western 
involvement was western financial aid. The internal foreign policy community in Russia was 
divided about the outside involvement in the first Chechen war and that came through the 
Russian actions. This tension between fear of isolationism and defending sovereignty inside 
of Russia also confused the EU stand. In seeking to influence Russia politically, the EU had 
to strike a balance between applying short-term pressures and a more strategic long-term 
view of Russia’s position in the world. The fear factor was not exclusive to Russian actions. 
The same seemed to apply to the EU. The EU failed to take advantage of the situation. Half 
hearted demands and actions quite often backfire. This was also the case with Russia and the 
EU after the first Chechen war. 
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When the second Chechen war started, the international environment was already very 
different from the early/mid 1990s. As was the case in the summer of 1994, Russia and the 
EU had tried to strengthen their relationship after a rather rocky winter/spring in the summer 
of 1999. However the illusion from the early 1990s that Russia would rapidly integrate with 
Europe had already been broken, in fact with the first Chechen war.  Furthermore the 
attitudes from the EU side were more visible than five years earlier. Viacheslav Nikonov, 
director of the foundation ‘Politics’ in Russia, has also analyzed the change in Russia-EU 
relations as a shift from an economic emphasis and the EU’s desire to see economic reform 
work in the first half of the 1990s, to the situation where at the beginning of the new 
millenium the EU was more interested in Russia’s political processes and the maintenance of 
the democratic element.473 
The second war in Chechnya interestingly was not criticized as much as the first one, 
even if the emphasis from the EU side was more on political processes and human rights than 
was the case with the first. It would seem wrong to argue that the second Chechen war was 
only criticized less because there was less media coverage, as has sometimes been claimed in 
the EU. Indeed for the first six months of the second war the criticism and the threats of 
action were perhaps stronger than during the first war, but they were later toned down 
significantly. A silent understanding between Russia and the EU had already been created 
during the first Chechen war regarding where the limits were and what could be achieved. 
And then there was a factor that played strongly into the Russia-EU dialogue over Chechnya: 
the war on Terrorism. 
The terrorist attacks in America on 11 September 2001 helped Russia to be prominent in 
the anti-terrorist coalition, and its campaign in Chechnya gained new wings. The emphatic 
Russian claims during the autumn of 1999, that the second Chechen war was actually started 
as an anti-terrorist action, and the consistent view of the war as against international 
terrorism, came to fruition with the US launching its own ‘War on Terror’. Thus Russia did 
not join the ‘Western’ anti-terrorist war but the rest of the world joined with Russia. Also 
Russia’s claim that there was nobody to talk to in Chechnya, since even Aslan Maskhadov 
had contacts with terrorists, reduced western pressure for a political settlement and for the 
opening of negotiations with the Chechens. Russia’s integration with the West only 
accelerated in this period. This was along the line of how Russia views its role in the world 
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and in its Great Power identity. The paradox of Chechnya in Russia-EU relations is that the 
war action that the EU criticized became the uniting factor.  
The EU’s need to keep Russia on side in the War on Terror provided additional impetus 
to Russia’s Great Power arguments. This made the situation even more complicated. The EU 
was not only at odds between its own political (value and human rights) and economic 
(Russian economic integration with Europe) considerations but also with its member states 
who have increasingly viewed Russia according to each state’s ‘personal relations’ with 
Russia. The increase of economic interdependence and historical factors spoke in favour of 
closer relations and flirting with Russian Europeanness. At the same time the Russian 
greatpowerness surfacing through the second Chechen war, as was the case with the first 
Chechen war, did put the EU and Russia at loggerheads with each other. 
Putin and other Russian leaders appeared well aware of the leverage they had, continuing 
a policy of brinkmanship based on loud protests against interference with sovereignty 
together with minor concessions, which is not only a feature in the Russia - EU relationship 
but characterises also more generally Russia’s dealings with the West ever since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. The interesting question remains: would Russia and the EU have 
been able to integrate also at the new value- and norm-based level if there would not have 
been wars in Chechnya at all? 
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Chapter 7: The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe – 
Russia and the West working together in constant conflict 
 
‘Russia has not remained deaf to the concerns of Europe and other countries regarding 
Chechnya. There’s no need for tougher statements from the West, it is important that we 
maintain good relations with Russia’474 
  
7.1 Introduction 
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation was a Soviet initiative towards all-
European security. Some analysts put the date back to 10th February 1954 when ‘Molotov’s 
plan’ was published, but some put this Russian desire for a pan-European collective security 
arrangement back as far as the 1930s.475 The Helsinki final act from 1975 and creation of the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became one of the most 
important aspects in Soviet-West and especially European relations. ‘The road of multilateral 
preparations for the CSCE was not easy. The East and the West held very different concepts 
of European security. The NATO countries saw the armed forces and arms in Europe as the 
main issues. But the Warsaw pact countries wanted to have political consultations under the 
auspices of CSCE’.476 In the end one could argue that the political aspects of the Helsinki 
Final Act were the most significant for the future of European security and the fate of the 
Soviet Union.  
The CSCE became an important balancing act in Soviet security thinking. Since 
superpower relations took up most of the foreign policy capital, Western Europe was left in 
the shadow of superpower politics. The CSCE kept Moscow involved in Europe and by the 
mid 1980s ‘elements in the Soviet leadership realized that this policy (concentration of 
Soviet-USA relations) had not just decreased Soviet security in Europe but had resulted in the 
Soviet Union’s isolation from an increasingly dynamic group of states’.477 This factor 
alongside Gorbachev’s new thinking policies with a greater focus on European affairs, gave 
CSCE more attention in late Soviet security and foreign policy thinking. 
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At the time of the first Chechen war Russia wanted to view the OSCE as a structure for 
dealing with security matters in Europe. To promote the OSCE’s role as the main security 
organisation, countering NATO, Russia seemed to be willing to accept a role for the OSCE in 
the first Chechen war.  ‘Its (Russia’s) general line toward security matters in Europe has been 
to propose a collective security system based mainly on the OSCE structures…’478  
As the beginning of the organisation indicated, the relationship between the West and 
Russia has not been easy. Even if Russia sees the OSCE as one of the main organisations to 
promote the idea of pan-European security, it is not happy how things have been evolving. As 
president Putin put it in Munich in 2007: ‘What do we see happening today [with the OSCE]? 
We see this balance [between the political-military, the economic and the human dimensions] 
is clearly destroyed. People are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument 
designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries.’479 
It can be argued that the overall foreign and security policy thinking in the Soviet Union 
and in Russia had an effect on what kind of a role for the OSCE was envisaged by Russians 
in both of the Chechen wars. The first one started when European structures and integration 
was still young and were receiving a new drive from the fall of the Soviet Union. In the Paris 
summit of 1990, the Soviet influence in drafting the charter was high and Gorbachev added 
fuel to already high expectations by stating: ‘Great European minds have often dreamed of a 
united, democratic and prosperous Europe, a community and a commonwealth not only of 
nations and States but of millions of European citizens. It is up to our generation to tackle the 
task of making that plan an irreversible reality in the coming century.’480 Why, from such 
high hopes, the road has been downhill and developments not as recent Soviet/ Russian 
leaders would have preferred it to be, also has a great deal to do with the wars in Chechnya. 
 
7.2 The First Chechen war 
At the 1992 CSCE Helsinki summit the organisation agreed that ‘the commitments 
undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and 
legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal 
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affairs of the State concerned.’481 At the 1994 Budapest summit the politically binding ‘Code 
of Conduct’ was signed. The code was meant to mark a major change in the way states 
conducted military activities.482 Both of the summit outcomes were to be important markers 
of what was considered as an internal affair and when international involvement was 
expected and accepted by the member states of the OSCE. Russia, by accepting these facts, 
was also moving towards a sort of state identity that the Western countries had. 
By the end of 1994 it started to be clear that NATO would enlarge despite Russian 
dislike and objections. The Budapest CSCE summit (the last as CSCE, from 1 January 1995 
OSCE) reflected the mood in Russia-West relations. The East-West drift that was occurring 
shadowed the important factors agreed in the summit. From that summit onwards the concept 
of ‘Cold Peace’ cast a shadow over Russia-West relations. Yeltsin said: ‘There should be no 
longer enemies, winners or losers, in that Europe. For this time in history, our continent has a 
real opportunity to achieve unity. To miss that opportunity means to forget the lessons of the 
past and to jeopardize our future…. Europe, even before it has managed to shrug off the 
legacy of the cold war, is at risk of plunging into a cold peace’.483 After giving the warning 
concerning a cold peace president Yeltsin suggested ‘A roadmap for Europe towards the 21st 
century’. ‘Its essence is the creation of a comprehensive European security system. In this 
room there are now the leaders of more than 50 countries in the world! CSCE is, in its 
coverage of countries and the potential of its participants, a unique structure. It is designed to 
be a strong and effective instrument of peace, stability and democracy’.484 Yeltsin’s vision 
was that the programme would have been an agreement between NATO, the EU, the OSCE 
and the CIS. At that time Russian diplomacy pushed such an option as an alternative to 
NATO’s eastward expansion. For Russia it was still important to try to find an alternative to 
NATO enlargement, even if the indication from former East European countries and the US 
was that there is no stopping enlargement. 
Only five days after the Budapest summit, the Russian army crossed the border between 
Russia and Chechnya. The decision for the full-scale military operation was however already 
made on 29 November, thus before the Budapest summit. When speaking in Budapest 
Yeltsin was aware of what would follow. Since both of the commitments undertaken in the 
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Helsinki and Budapest summits were violated by Russia in its military operation, two 
conclusions relating to Yeltsin’s appearance in Budapest can be drawn; he did not see any 
connection between Chechnya and the Helsinki and Budapest summits, or that he saw 
Russia’s internal affairs as not to be included to these commitments. The first reason suggests 
inexperience in international multilateral commitments and their meaning, the other Russian 
arrogance in international cooperation. Great Powers have different rules than others. 
 The Secretary General of the OSCE Dr.William Höynck saw the conflict as a case for 
the OSCE: ‘Although it is clearly an internal conflict, the international community wanted to 
make direct contributions to solving it. As OSCE commitments were violated, the OSCE had 
formal reasons to become involved. One possibility was the activation of OSCE mechanisms. 
But these mechanisms are not very flexible and may lead into blind alleys.’485 The warfare in 
Chechnya brought out a large Western European reaction, together with the United States. 
They all pointed out that Yeltsin had agreed in Budapest to commit Russia to the principles 
that in case a use of force cannot be avoided ‘the armed forces will take due care to avoid 
injury to civilians or their property’.486  
From the Russian side the response to the Western reactions were statements by several 
Russian high level representatives, among them a declaration from the Russian foreign 
ministry that said Russia was against involvement from the OSCE since the matter was an 
internal Russian affair. The Russian reaction reflected a similar attitude to that of Yeltsin in 
Budapest: internal affairs of Russia do not fall into the category of international involvement. 
The matter of outside involvement in Chechnya became a power battle in Moscow and 
showed well how divided the establishment was. First Ramazan Abdulatipov and justice 
minister Valentin Kovalev spoke against any OSCE observer mission. Then foreign minister 
Kozyrev interfered personally and met with OSCE representative Istvan Gyarmati. In that 
meeting Kozyrev agreed to receive the mission.487 
 Only days after Gyarmati and Kozyrev’s meeting the deputy foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov came out with a statement  that OSCE participation in any political settlement of the 
Chechen conflict was out of the question. However Ivanov saw a place for the OSCE in 
humanitarian aspects of the conflict.488 Different signals continued to come out relating to the 
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role of the OSCE in Chechnya. Foreign Ministry official Mark Entin was quoted by Interfax 
on 17th January ruling out any OSCE involvement in mediating a settlement of the Chechen 
conflict. Entin termed the conflict purely as ‘Russia’s internal affair’. But as Igor Ivanov had 
seen it, Entin also saw a possibility for the OSCE to be involved with the ‘humanitarian and 
legal’ aspects of the crisis. At the same time Chairman of the State Duma committee for 
International Affairs, Vladimir Lukin, told Interfax after his talks with OSCE emissary Istvan 
Gyarmati that the proposal to deploy OSCE observers in Chechnya is ‘legal and sound.’489  
Lukin’s view was based on Russia’s obligation to comply with the OSCE Code of Conduct. 
Gyarmati himself wrote about his first visit to Moscow and why the OSCE was in the end 
able to negotiate a mandate as broad as circumstances allowed. ‘Help came from the place 
where we least expected it: the first glimmer of hope became visible when we met with the 
Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Oleg Lobov, who was generally viewed as a 
conservative - apparently a very short-sighted view. To our great surprise he asked, with 
unexpected frankness, why the OSCE was not taking on a political role in the crisis.’490  
There is some indication that Russians themselves thought that international involvement 
might be of some use in the war that they had launched. Kozyrev stated ‘I have now been 
trying to see to it that a mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe comes to Chechnya. Because human rights are not an internal affair’.491  Rene 
Nyberg, one of the members of the OSCE commission which visited Moscow and Chechnya 
(on a fact finding visit) before the establishment of a permanent OSCE mission to Chechnya, 
says that it was from Moscow’s side that the first indications came that Russians were 
interested in international involvement.492 Gyarmati sensed, in his first visit to Moscow as a 
Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office, a great resistance to international 
involvement in Russian internal affairs, but what in the end allowed the OSCE involvement 
were, according to Gyarmati, the OSCE principles. ‘What the Russian side accepted - 
surprisingly, to many people - was that an international organization should participate in 
crisis management. It did this on the basis of the OSCE principle which states that gross 
violations of human rights are not exclusively the internal affair of a state. It is an irony of 
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history that Soviet diplomacy of the Gorbachev era took the lead as an advocate of this 
principle.493 
After the Budapest speech it was important for Yeltsin to promote the OSCE in any way. 
‘Cooperating with the OSCE observers in Chechnya, the Yeltsin administration wanted to 
emphasise the importance it attached to that international organization vis-à-vis NATO’.494 
That is seen as one of the main reasons why the OSCE was able to establish the permanent 
Assistance Group in Chechnya in April 1995. It seems that the Russian administration was 
split on the matter and all of them viewed it as a Russian internal matter, but the Yeltsin-
Kozyrev tandem was prepared for a ‘greater cause’ to cooperate with the OSCE. Opposition 
against the OSCE involvement remained. Ramazan Adbulatipov, Vice-Chairman of the 
Council of the Federation stated ‘If the OSCE gets involved in resolving the conflict, it will 
drag on for decades.’495 
This has been seen at the time as a major breakthrough, at least from the point of view of 
the OSCE. It is seen as a striking factor496 and a success of European diplomacy since several 
factors pulled together in arguing for the OSCE involvement. The OSCE, the EU and the 
CoE all wanted to see international involvement in the conflict. The Assistance Group in 
Chechnya became the first official experience in Russia of the kind of a role an international 
organization can play in ‘internal conflicts’ and represented a break from Soviet tradition 
which strongly opposed other countries’ ‘right to monitor’ events from inside the Soviet 
Union. This act from the Russian side to allow the permanent presence of the OSCE on 
Russian soil could be seen as Russian agreement with Finnish President Urho Kekkonen’s 
opening words in the first CSCE foreign ministers’ meeting in Helsinki in June 1973: 
‘Security is not gained by building fences; security is gained by opening gates’. The OSCE 
saw the Assistance Group as a big step forward. Dr. Höynck wrote: ‘Russia has come a long 
way. The possibilities for concrete action are improving. The prospects are good that OSCE 
involvement will make a difference, unfortunately not today but – hopefully – tomorrow. The 
precedent will be important.’497  
After the establishment of the Assistance Group the official statements were marked by 
self-congratulation. This of course had a huge psychological effect and symbolism. Russia 
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was a part of an international organization and for once in an internal crisis it has allowed 
assistance from an international organisation. This was the only way an outside involvement 
inside Russia could have happened – through an international organisation where it is a long 
term central member and where decisions were based on a strict principle of consensus, 
which did not have any supranational aspirations and no punishment mechanism.498 Anatol 
Lieven claims that the agreement was made under ‘fairly heavy diplomatic pressure from 
Western Europe and the USA (heavy that is by the standards of the pressure that the West 
applies to its friends, like Turkey or Indonesia, not of course by any objective standard)’.499 
In the chairman’s summary of the Ministerial Council meeting in Budapest in December 
1995 the role of the Assistance Group was described as follows: ‘The Assistance Group has 
achieved considerable success by developing a framework for negotiations between the 
parties and playing the role of facilitator in the subsequent military agreements’.500 In the 
Stockholm declaration of July 1996 the Parliamentary Assembly noted ‘… with satisfaction 
that thanks to active mediation by the OSCE Assistance Group, negotiations have taken place 
and an agreement has been concluded:… recognizing the contribution of the OSCE to 
security and cooperation in Europe through its constructive role in negotiations aimed at 
securing a peaceful resolution of the war in Chechnya…..’.501 It is hard to find any really 
critical official OSCE documents, but one is the Ottawa Declaration, which reads 
‘Condemning the Russian Federation for its gross violation of the international law and 
OSCE principles stemming from its military campaign in Chechnya’.502 
 It seems that the OSCE viewed its involvement in Chechnya more from the point of 
view of its own reputation (by being the first monitoring organisation accepted by Russia) 
than anything else. ‘A comprehensive security model for Europe will be based on OSCE’s 
comprehensive approach to security. The particular advantage of the OSCE is that it is a truly 
all–European organisation. Nobody regards its actions as an interference. This is evident in 
the way Russia has accepted the role of the OSCE in Chechnya.’503 Lieven sees that the 
continuation of OSCE work in Chechnya after the establishment of the Assistance Group 
became more and more controversial.504 Furthermore it started to become clearer and clearer 
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that there was no comprehensive pan-European security system on the cards and NATO-
Russia cooperation was institutionalised in the Partnership for Peace programme. The 
Russian view of the future of the OSCE was not happening, in fact ‘The West was willing to 
accept the OSCE as an alternative to NATO only as a complementary organization to NATO 
because it was proven in the Chechen conflict that the OSCE was able to go places where 
NATO could not. The OSCE was viewed as a useful channel for direct dialogue on security 
issues with Russia.’505 
It was quite clear that the OSCE did not stop violence and Russia continued to break the 
OSCE’s own code of conduct throughout the war, and the conflict prevention function which 
is one of its main aims would not have been of any use in the Russia-Chechnya conflict. It 
did not in any sense ease the cruel reality of the war and the pain the civilians had to go 
through. But the three most important achievements here are that the elections held in 
Chechnya 1997 were monitored by OSCE and declared by it free and fair, there was some 
objective information about the war available and, most importantly, Russia had indicated the 
importance of international organisations as a mediator. 
 The fact that Russia chose the OSCE as the organisation to let into Russia, became an 
issue for self-congratulation on the OSCE’s part. The reason for that was the need for OSCE 
to redefine its role in the post-Soviet European order. Laslo Kovacs wrote: ‘The new 
missions and other forms of involvement not only brought a quantitative increase in such 
activities by the Organization but opened up new qualitative opportunities for the OSCE’.506 
One of the first examples in Kovacs’ list was the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya. He 
saw the establishment of a permanent mission in Russia as a huge success: ‘The 
establishment of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya meant that for the first time a 
large international organization could set up a long-term presence in Russia and was in a 
position to counsel and mediate there on an issue which not only Moscow but many OSCE 
countries had for decades regarded as being exclusively an internal affair; some still regard it 
as such.’507 In Moscow this way of presenting the matter was not an advantage for the 
Yeltsin-Kozyrev line, often also defined as the Westernisers/Atlanticist line. The Russian 
political establishment was not united behind the OSCE involvement and the military 
establishment was against it. In the overall picture, it started to look like Russia had bent 
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under international pressure – with all fronts from the West strongly pushing the OSCE 
involvement. 
This can be seen as the underlying reason why, after the peace agreement had been 
signed and elections held in Chechnya, Russia was keen to get the OSCE out. This was made 
very clear in the statement the Russian Federation delivered to the OSCE Permanent Council 
on 13th March 1997: ‘the part of the OSCE Assistance Group’s mandate which is related to 
mediation efforts in the context of settling the armed conflict and smoothing the way to 
negotiations has been carried out in full.’508 When the second Chechen war became reality 
Russians did not want the OSCE back at all, but yet again somehow the international 
community managed to twist Russia’s arm at the OSCE Istanbul summit in November 1999.  
 
7.3 The Second Chechen war 
Prior the OSCE Istanbul summit the Secretary-General of the OSCE, Jan Kubis, visited 
Moscow at the beginning of October 1999 and his attempts to bring up the possibility of an 
OSCE mediation effort were dismissed from the outset. He was told continuously that 
Moscow did not see any grounds for involving third parties in a settlement of the situation in 
the North Caucasus.509 This indicates that the more conciliatory line, from the highest 
political level, that Russia clearly had in the first Chechen war, wanting to see international 
involvement, had changed fully. Earlier in 1999 the Kosovo conflict and the NATO 
intervention had increased suspicion from the Russian side relating to US policies which, in 
the Russian view, were deliberately undermining Russia’s role in the European security 
architecture.510  
The tendency to interpret events, causes and solutions differently was clear in Kosovo’s 
case and also very present in the case of Chechnya, as the first war had already shown. The 
politics of ressentiment started to enter more visibly into Russia-West relations. Steven Eke 
reported after the Istanbul summit, ‘Senior Russian military figures have gone further 
recently, even suggesting the US is striving to perpetuate tension in the Caucasus, with the 
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aim of weakening Russia on the international stage’.511 These views were known also on the 
US side and formed around the rumour that Turkey, a US ally, was providing covert support 
to the Chechen rebellion.512 
The OSCE’s Istanbul summit in November 1999 proved to be a real test case in Russia-
West relations. Furthermore it also marked a watershed not only in Russia’s attitude towards 
the OSCE but also a defining factor in Russia-West relations for years to come. ‘For 
example, concessions made by President Boris Yeltsin at the last OSCE summit, held in 
Istanbul in 1999, in the military sphere, had a profound effect on Moscow’s attitudes to the 
whole organisation, including the human dimension’.513 The trend had begun already with the 
Kosovo-conflict but with the summit, it became institutionalized. The view of the OSCE in 
Russia and the future that had been envisioned for it from the Russian side had not 
materialized. ‘The OSCE has not become the central structure for European Security, as was 
planned during the Gorbachev era. Instead, the OSCE has turned into a discussion club, a 
vegetative organization with good intentions’.514 
Emotions were high at the summit. The tensions between Russia and the West due to the 
Chechnya and Kosovo crises during that year had changed the atmosphere inside the OSCE 
as well. The Istanbul summit was meant to establish a new agenda of cooperation and 
goodwill at the start of the new millennium. Instead as Rogov put it, ‘we are entering the 21st 
century in an atmosphere of very strong tension between Russia and the community of 
Western states’.515 
Yeltsin has been described as changing colour in his face and tapping his fingers and 
shaking his head during the speeches of Gerhard Schroder, Jacques Chirac and Robin 
Cook.516 For President Bill Clinton Yeltsin showed his watch several times as if to point out 
that Clinton’s speech was too long. President Clinton disagreed with Yeltsin especially on 
two counts relating to Chechnya. They were the use of force and whether or not Chechnya 
was fully an internal or also an international matter. ‘If the attacks on civilians will continue, 
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the extremism Russia is trying to combat is only intensifying’.517 Clinton also reminded 
Yeltsin of the events of 1991 when Yeltsin himself had stood on a Soviet tank opposing the 
coup attempt in the Kremlin. As Clinton put it for Yeltsin ‘If they had put you in jail instead 
of electing you president, I would hope that every leader of every country around this table 
would have stood up for you and for freedom in Russia and not said, “Well that is an internal 
Russian affair that we cannot be a part of”’.518 
Yeltsin’s own speech was very firm. He condemned those who criticised Russia’s 
actions. ‘At the same time, we do not accept the prescriptions of the so-called objective 
critics of Russia, those who have failed to understand that we are quite simply obliged to put 
a stop in good time to the spread of the cancerous tumour of terrorism, to stop it spreading far 
beyond the North Caucasus and even outside the Russian Federation’.519 
The understanding of the proportion of military force needed in the case of Chechnya 
was different in the West than in Russia. For Russians there was no other way than extensive 
use of military means to respond to terrorist activities in and from the North Caucasus. The 
Western leaders’ comments at the Istanbul summit indicated that not everyone was convinced 
of that. British foreign minister Robin Cook said ‘war cannot be of help in opposing 
terrorism; it can only strengthen it’, Jacques Chirac called the Chechen operation a tragic 
mistake and Gerhard Schröder said that Russia was undermining faith in the OSCE 
principles.520 These different approaches towards warfare were also visible during the first 
Chechen war.  
The Russian frustration with the Western leaders’ attitude was clear in president 
Yeltsin’s speech: ‘Russia is firmly intent on businesslike co-operation in the context of this 
summit. I am convinced that both for Russia and for other members of the OSCE what is 
especially necessary is dialogue based on respect and not mutual recriminations and 
moralizing’.521 Furthermore Yeltsin argued strongly against the concept of humanitarian 
intervention: ‘Not all the ideas which have come up during discussion of the future of Europe 
seem well-founded to us. I refer to calls for humanitarian intervention in the affairs of another 
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state - a new idea, this - even when they are made under the pretext of defending human 
rights and freedoms.’522 
The Russian press after the summit picked on similar themes to those in Yeltsin’s speech 
as well as presenting analysis on what actually happened in Istanbul. There were two 
accounts when analysing the summit results: one that saw Yeltsin to have succeeded in 
Istanbul and another that Yeltsin and Russians were humiliated. Dmitry Gomostayev wrote in 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta: ‘Russia went a distance and won. At the OSCE summit, the West 
failed to win any substantive concessions on the Chechen problem. What is more, Russia’s 
diplomats found a way to effectively rescue the European forum itself from imminent failure 
while simultaneously accomplishing their own goals and defending Russia’s national 
interests’.523 Otto Latsis in Noviye Izvestia saw that the strength that Yeltsin showed in 
Istanbul was due to the fact that the whole Russian nation stood behind him: ‘That’s what 
gave the President the strength to show, in his dialogue with the West, the firmness and 
resolve that television viewers observed with pleasure’.524 To balance the rather positive 
viewing of the Istanbul summit’s result there were also articles that were very critical of 
Russian achievements in the summit. Sevodnya newspaper’s correspondent Aleksander 
Portfiryev’s analysis was not very complimentary towards the Russian delegation: ‘In actual 
fact, unfortunately, there was no breakthrough. Russia’s downfall came, as expected, because 
of Chechnya – Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s main area of work. Yeltsin’s presence at the 
summit eased this situation only partially – not, sad to say, fundamentally.’ Portfiryev’s 
conclusion was that the summit results were interpreted in Moscow as consensus and in the 
Western media as a humiliation of Moscow, which meant that the summit results could not be 
interpreted in any other way than that Russia was isolated.525 Kostantin Varlamov saw an 
even gloomier picture when analysing what had been agreed in Istanbul: ‘a closer analysis of 
the future repercussion of the documents that the Russian delegation signed in Istanbul allows 
one to say that Russia not only made “concessions”, but carried out a full-scale retreat on the 
South Caucasus front. Russian diplomats, no matter how pleased they may be with 
themselves in the wake of the Istanbul summit, were caught in a trap laid by Western 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
522 Yeltsin, 1999 
523 Dmitry Gomostayev, ‘Russia Takes Istanbul Round From West’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 20, 1999, 
pp.1 and 6, translated in The Current Digest, Vol.51, No.47, p.3 
524 Otto Latsis, , ‘Has National Accord Finally Been Found’, Noviye Izvestia, November 20, 1999, p.1, 
translated in The Current Digest, Vol.51, No.47, p.4 
525 Aleksander Portfiryev, ‘We’re Back in the Agitprop Business’, Sevodnya, November 20, 1999, pp.1 and 3, 
translated in The Current Digest, Vol.51, No.47, p.5 
 
 
185 
propaganda’.526 In Varlamov’s view the West had used the Russian military campaign in 
Chechnya as a distraction so that they could get Russia to retreat from several CIS republics. 
The aim of the Istanbul summit was, in Varlamov’s opinion, to drive Russia out eventually 
from all the former Soviet republics and put them under the protection of the United States.527 
Yeltsin left Istanbul an hour earlier than planned and at ‘boiling point’, as Russian 
newspapers described it.528 This also meant that Yeltsin himself did not sign the Istanbul 
summit’s charter for European Security. Foreign minister Igor Ivanov signed it for Russia. 
This naturally added to the speculation of how happy Yeltsin was about the situation. In the 
shadow of Russia-West tensions the Istanbul summit agreed to adopt the Platform for Co-
operative Security, in order to strengthen co-operation between the OSCE and other 
international organizations and institutions, to develop the OSCE’s role in peacekeeping, to 
create rapid expert assistance and co-operation teams, to establish an Operation Centre in 
order to plan and deploy OSCE field operations, and to strengthen the consultation process 
within the OSCE by establishing the Preparatory Committee under the OSCE Permanent 
Council.529  
The section of the summit declaration where Chechnya was taken up is worth citing here 
in full: ‘In connection with the recent chain of events in the North Caucasus, we strongly 
reaffirm that we fully acknowledge the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and 
condemn terrorism in all its forms. We underscore the need to respect OSCE norms. We 
agree that in light of the humanitarian situation in the region it is important to alleviate the 
hardships of the civilian population, including by creating appropriate conditions for 
international organizations to provide humanitarian aid. We agree that a political solution is 
essential, and that the assistance of the OSCE would contribute to achieving that goal. We 
welcome the willingness of the OSCE to assist in the renewal of a political dialogue. We 
welcome the agreement of the Russian Federation to a visit by the Chairman-in-Office to the 
region. We reaffirm the existing mandate of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya. In this 
regard, we also welcome the willingness of the Russian Federation to facilitate these steps, 
which will contribute to creating conditions for stability, security, and economic prosperity in 
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the region’.530 This point follows the same lines as the one confirming the OSCE role in the 
first Chechen war. Even if many viewed the paragraph as humiliating for Russia, the two 
important elements for Russia were once again stated in an official document: respect of 
territorial integrity and condemnation of terrorism in all its forms.  
The Istanbul summit showed a real gap in thinking between Russia and the Western 
countries. The OSCE had become an arena where Russia and the US measured each other. In 
multilateral practical cooperation, both see an advantage but the side product of multilateral 
cooperation is that more fundamental issues, principals that are understood very differently, 
also surface. In all countries foreign policy is important and influenced by domestic politics 
but in cases like Russia where the state building as well as nation building was and is a work 
in process, foreign policy events and statements matter more. At the end of the 1990s Russia 
was searching for international approval and a significant global role as one of the Great 
Powers. But Russia was an odd Great Power, it needed Western assistance for its financial 
problems, it had a war in Chechnya, an antiterrorist operation, that burdened the country even 
more and showed up some fundamental weaknesses of the country. On top of that its internal 
politics was its own battleground. With the second Chechen war it seemed that internally 
Russia was pulling together better than ever after the fall of the Soviet Union, and externally 
the war was widening the gap between Russia and the West. 
One could argue that for the OSCE, one of the most important outcomes from the 
Istanbul summit was that Russia confirmed its commitment and the mandate of the OSCE 
Assistance Group in Chechnya. By this reaffirmation Russia showed that it was still leaving 
the door open to international involvement however symbolic it might be. The chair-in-office 
of the OSCE, Romanian Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana expressed his clear satisfaction: 
‘Having the OSCE back in Chechnya is a major breakthrough for the Organisation. An 
important phase of our effort has ended. The most difficult has yet to come. The OSCE 
Assistance Group stands ready to facilitate a political settlement in the crisis’.531 Despite 
agreeing to continue the OSCE assistance group’s mandate Russia was not happy to see the 
return of the OSCE in Chechnya. Russia needed to be reminded time after time of its promise 
in Istanbul. Before Russia was ready to invite the OSCE head Knut Vollebaek to Chechnya, 
US secretary of state Madeline Albright had to give a call to foreign minister Ivanov before 
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the invitation was issued.532 In March 2000 Vladimir Putin as the acting President told UK 
Prime Minister Tony Blair in Moscow that Russia was willing to let the OSCE play a role in 
Chechnya: ‘We spoke about how an ombudsman can attract cooperation with international 
organizations, including the OSCE and the Council of Europe’.533 However, from Putin’s 
statement it was not at all clear what role he had envisioned for the OSCE. Without 
continuous pressure from different Western leaders, the Assistance group would never have 
entered Chechnya again. From the Istanbul agreement to the actual return of the OSCE 
mission to Chechnya took one year and 8 months, finally being completed a few months 
before 9/11.  
What seemed to have been a promising start for OSCE involvement in the second 
Chechen war at the Istanbul summit, ended before it had time to have any influence. The 
mandate expired on the 31st December 2002 and Moscow did not extend it. The Assistance 
group was able to be only a year and half in Chechnya. Sergey Markov, director of the 
Institute of Political Studies, analyzed the decision as a continuation of a conflict between the 
Russian authorities and European public opinion, and as a result of discussions of the 
methods that should be used in Chechnya.534 He also seemed to think that this decision from 
Moscow was only a matter of time, since there had been a feeling that the OSCE pushed 
Russia into signing the peace agreement with the Chechens in 1996 and that this kind of 
development could be prevented by expelling (or, more accurately, by not prolonging the 
mandate of) the OSCE. According to Markov the decision was also an example of the 
absence of mutual understanding between Russia and Europe, which was slowing down 
Russia’s integration with the European political and economic system.535  
It was clear that the decision to end the OSCE mandate in Chechnya divided opinions in 
Russia. The official side did not see that the role of OSCE in normalizing the situation in 
Chechnya had been that great. First deputy Chairman of the Federation Council’s Defence 
and Security Committee Valeriy Manilov strongly criticised the OSCE mission: ‘As a rule, 
they focused their attention on negative things and disregarded positive changes. The 
termination of the OSCE’s mission in Chechnya will not be a serious loss’.536 The critical 
voices that did not agree with rejecting the continuation of the mission in Chechnya came 
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mostly from those known to defend human rights. In Echo Moskvy’s radio programme Ella 
Pamfilova, chairman of the presidential human rights commission spoke for the OSCE 
presence, ‘I am convinced that it is absolutely necessary for the OSCE mission to exist in 
Russia… I am confident that the OSCE mission could now develop in a new way – first and 
foremost, it could boost the humanitarian components of matters involved in putting the 
necessary resources into improving the situation of forced migrants and refugees, not only in 
a material sense but psychologically, and that is something very important’.537 Lyudmila 
Alekseyeva, chairman of the Moscow Helsinki Group, was on the same lines, ‘There are 
things in Chechnya to hide from the international public and from our own population….It’s 
understandable (sending the OSCE home), but it’s a great pity, because if we really want this 
peace process that has been announced, if we want it to be even a partial success, 
international observers would not be any hindrance to us.’538 Alekseyeva saw the role of 
OSCE as very important in establishing peaceful relations between the federal centre and the 
population of Chechnya.  
There were also other kinds of objections. Vyacheslav Nikonov, president of the Politika 
Foundation saw the situation as follows, ‘There are no other standards (reference to double 
standards) in the world. If we are to remain a civilized nation, we must observe the rules of 
the game. This is not a serious reaction and it is putting Russia in an awkward position’.539 
Also a state Duma deputy from Chechnya Aslanbek Aslakhanov saw the decision to end the 
OSCE mission in Chechnya as a mistake. His reason related to the referendum on the 
Chechen constitution that was held shortly after the OSCE mission left Chechnya, ‘They are 
providing grounds for people to assert that the necessary conditions for holding the 
referendum haven’t been created and that this is so they (Russians) can conceal this and 
abolish the commission (OSCE)’.540  
The statements representing the official line clearly indicate the splits and differences of 
opinion inside of the OSCE. The dividing line seems to be very much along a Russia-West 
line. Deputy foreign minister Vladimir Chizhov said that the reason for not prolonging the 
OSCE group’s mandate was down to the fact that the OSCE’s 55 member states failed to 
reach a consensus as to what terms the mandate would continue under.541 Deputy speaker of 
the State Duma, Vladimir Lukin, opened up a bit more the Russian attitude on the OSCE 
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involvement in Chechnya, ‘After giving our permission, after agreeing with the OSCE that it 
should monitor the humanitarian aspects of what is happening in Chechnya, humanitarian aid, 
the issue of observation of human rights, we should specify very precisely the mandate with 
the OSCE. They are not party to talks, since we don’t want them to participate in talks, 
because that does, to some extent, of course, bring the issue onto the plane of internal affairs, 
and we insist, not without justification, that this is an internal problem. They should operate, 
but within the framework of their mandate’542. As Lukin stated, the Russian view of the 
OSCE mandate was that the OSCE had done more than agreed in Chechnya, trying to be a 
middleman in negotiations and making Chechnya an international matter against the Russian 
view that it was an internal issue. Interestingly Lukin saw in an interview in Ekho Moskvy a 
place for the OSCE in Chechnya but not a role in solving the problem.543 This was a 
confusing position for the Western side. As for the OSCE side the mandate they enjoyed in 
Chechnya in 2000-2002 was similar to that in 1995. In 1995 the OSCE Assistance Group was 
established to perform tasks such as promoting respect for human rights, assisting in 
preparation for possible new constitutional agreements, holding and monitoring elections and 
developing democratic institutions. Furthermore the OSCE was given the task of facilitating 
delivery to the region by international and non-governmental organizations of humanitarian 
aid, with ensuring along with the Russian authorities the speediest possible return of refugees 
and displaced persons, promoting peaceful resolution of the crisis, pursuing dialogue and 
negotiations through participation in round tables, with a view to establishing a ceasefire and 
eliminating sources of tension, and supporting the creation of mechanisms guaranteeing the 
rule of law, public safety and law and order.544These points were accepted by Yeltsin and 
gave the OSCE officials at least a theoretical mandate to be involved in the negotiations 
towards the political and military solution of the conflict. In 1995 OSCE officials were not 
sure whether Russia would give a green light for the mission. ‘We proposed that the OSCE 
set up a long-term mission in Chechnya and that it be given a mandate to participate in the 
political and military solution of the conflict. We had discussed these proposals previously 
with our partners in the West. They thought them an excellent idea but did not believe they 
had much chance of success. We, to be honest, were also not convinced that they would 
work. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister (Hungarian Gyula Horn) and the Foreign Minister 
(Hungarian László Kovács) managed to convince Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and 
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in a long session that lasted well into the night. When I 
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look back on it, it seems to me that what they hoped for from cooperation with the OSCE was 
probably a reinforcement of their own point of view - which is what they got.545 
In the case of the second Chechen war it seems that the OSCE acted as they did in the 
case of the first Chechen war; pushing Russia to use the OSCE in their internal conflict and 
seeing the role of the OSCE in the broadest possible terms. Russia on the other hand had 
agreed to the OSCE involvement in 1995 due to their own ambitions relating to the OSCE 
and while interpreting the role of the OSCE as symbolic. The Russian side seemed to think 
that if respect for Russian territorial integrity was mentioned in all the decisions and 
documents, this would guarantee a minimal role for the OSCE but a maximum gain for 
Russia in its quest for European integration – a Russia in rather than out approach. In the 
second Chechen war Russian politicians had taken a stronger stand on the politics of 
greatpowerness and so it became harder for Russians to see the OSCE’s role as anything but 
symbolic and possibly an organisation to assist in humanitarian aid. After the Istanbul summit 
and especially the changing security discourses in the world after 9/11, Russia no longer saw 
any need to grant even a token role to this organisation. It is not surprising that Russia came 
increasingly to view the OSCE as an irrelevance to the extent that in 2008 they suggested a 
new security treaty for Europe, along much the same lines as the idea was in 1975. The 
Western position grew weaker with the war on terror that Russia had been fighting for a 
while before it became a war for the Western countries as well. 
  
7.4 The OSCE’s Place in Russian Foreign Policy 
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe is an international organisation 
that on the one hand is central to the Russian understanding of multilateral cooperation 
shaping international security cooperation towards predictability in accordance with the view 
that Russia is one of the Great Powers in the world, and on the other hand it is an organisation 
that is not acknowledging Russia’s Great Power status and which is countering time after 
time Russia’s desire to be a shaper of pan-European cooperation. The Russian foreign policy 
concept from 2008 expresses this the following way: ‘It is in Russia's interests that the OSCE 
fulfill in good faith its function of being a forum for an equitable dialogue between the OSCE 
participating States and for collective consensus decision-making on the basis of a 
comprehensive approach to military and political, economic and humanitarian aspects of 
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security based on the balance of interests. In order to fully implement this function the whole 
process of OSCE functioning should be underpinned by a solid regulatory framework 
ensuring the supremacy of collective intergovernmental bodies’ prerogatives.’546 Russia’s 
national security strategy to 2020 has no direct mention of the OSCE but it does refer to 
Euro-Atlantic security arrangements: ‘The long-term national interests of Russia are served 
by the creation of an open system of Euro-Atlantic collective security, on a clear legal and 
treaty basis.’547 
One of the main drivers for Russia’s cooperation and the best bargaining tool for the 
West has been Russia’s fear of isolationism, especially from the European multilateral 
structures. This can also be seen as a factor behind the acceptance of the OSCE as a mediator 
in the first Chechen war. ‘One of the major fears on the Russian side now is that increasing 
scepticism about the OSCE, which is now widespread over Europe, could result in Russia’s 
increasing marginalization.’548 The fear of isolationism is fed by power political factors and 
Russia’s attitudes towards NATO. Vladimir Baranovsky has analysed the organisation’s 
place in Russian foreign policy as follows: ‘The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe is - in terms of its genesis, composition and operational mode - by far the most 
attractive multilateral institution for Russia. It corresponds to many of Russia’s concerns 
regarding the organization of the continental political space, and one would expect Russia to 
make consistent efforts to promote this institution. However, Russia’s attempts to increase the 
role of the OSCE are often perceived as motivated by the intention to oppose it to NATO - an 
effort which cannot but discredit any pro-OSCE design. Furthermore, Russia seems to fear 
that the OSCE might limit its freedom of action within the post-Soviet space (particularly 
with respect to peacekeeping, as was manifested in the developments around the issue of 
Nagorno-Karabakh) or even within Russia proper (for instance, with respect to attempts to 
suppress separatism in the North Caucasus). Thus, while having a clear interest in upgrading 
the OSCE, Russia remains one of its “difficult” participants.’549 Thus there are two rather 
conflicting aspects of the OSCE: one the one hand the OSCE as the organization putting 
forward Russia’s very long term national interest of pan-European security arrangement, and 
on the other hand the organization’s involvement in matters that Russia considers its internal 
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affairs. Both aspects of the OSCE do reflect in the OSCE’s place within the larger framework 
of Russian foreign policy. 
Dov Lynch has defined three different periods and two alternating trends in Russian (and 
Soviet) policy towards the CSCE/OSCE. Russia has seen the organisation as an agent to 
maintain the status quo and as an agent to transform European affairs. Between 1975-1989, in 
Lynch’s view, the Soviet Union wanted to use the organisation for reinforcing the post-war 
status quo in Europe. In this picture the Soviet Union was drafting the rules so as to 
normalize East-West relations. Then from 1989-1995 the OSCE was seen as a useful context 
to transform European security affairs with the aim of eliminating the bloc system in Europe. 
After 1995 the policy turned back to the status quo aspect.550 In the case of the Chechen wars 
these periods are clearly reflected. In the first one Russia was ready to grant a role for the 
organisation in the hope of changing the European security architecture. In the second 
Chechen war Russian reluctance reflected the overall Russian foreign and security policy line 
that had shifted from multilateralism towards a stronger emphasis on sovereignty and 
greatpowerness, fuelled by feelings of ressentiment. 
The OSCE would not have ever been created if it had not been for keen interest from the 
Soviet Union side. As Dov Lynch has observed: ‘Russia is a historical champion of the idea 
of pan-European security cooperation based on inclusive and equal participation by all 
states.’551 Interestingly the OSCE is an international organisation that has been accepted by 
most if not all the Russian political groups. Most of the OSCE principles stated in the 1975 
Helsinki declaration -respect of the territorial integrity of states (inviolability of frontiers), 
centrality of UN and international law, non-intervention in internal affairs and equality, are 
still today at the core of Russian foreign policy. Those in Russia leaning towards the liberal 
Westernisers school see the human rights aspects as good for Russia. This is not a unanimous 
view. In order for those principles which were important to the Soviet Union and today’s 
Russia to be included into the Helsinki final act, there was a price to be paid. ‘The Soviet 
Union and its allies were forced to accept the “third basket” agenda of human rights in 
exchange for the benefits of baskets one (mutual recognition of existing borders and a range 
of confidence-building measures) and two (economic goods).’552 
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A similar pattern to the one prior to the Helsinki Act can be detected in the case of the 
Chechen wars. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia wanted to be part of making a new 
European order. For Russia this included abolition of military blocs in Europe. The Warsaw 
pact disappeared, but NATO did not. Russia strongly argued for a stronger role for the OSCE 
and in that framework it was ready to accept some compromising positions like the 
humanitarian aspect in internal affairs as a matter for the international community in the 
Charter of Paris 1990, and signing into the Code of Conduct at the 1994 Budapest 
conference. The conflicting situation occurred when the Russian internal situation became 
one of the cases for the OSCE to tackle under the new framework the OSCE was operating 
under.  There was internal opposition in Russia to outside involvement in Russia’s internal 
matters as Chechnya became labelled. But since ‘the Yeltsin leadership in the 1990s sought 
to make what had become in 1994 the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) the premier security organisation on the continent and endorsed the work of its 
various agencies, including the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights based in 
Warsaw’553, Russia intimated that it was ready to give a role to the OSCE in Chechnya.  
The Russian policy and actions in the OSCE framework of the early 1990s showed the 
complex composition of Russian foreign policy. Medium term interests, such as multilateral 
cooperation with the West and transforming the transatlantic security arrangements towards 
the Russian view, were the driving forces. The picture became more complex, when long 
term underlying trends such as fear of isolationism, ressentiment and a traditional view of the 
role of Great Powers in the multilateral context, also became mixed into the picture. Fear of 
isolationism was one of the very strong arguments that persuaded the Westernisers or the pro-
West line in Russian foreign policy to go along with Western wishes and demands as well as 
agreeing to give a role to the OSCE in Chechnya. A similar situation had occurred in the case 
of the Council of Europe and with the EU. At the same time when pushing forward the policy 
of consolidation with the West, Russia’s policy had to face the reality with arguments that 
Kozyrev’s foreign policy, obediently following the United States and through that ensuring 
its integration into the Western community and into world economic mechanisms, was not 
getting anything in return.554 Andranik Migranyan’s views often appeared in the Russian 
media. He saw that with ideas of great power status, patriotism and law and order, Russia 
would find its internal political unity. For Migranyan the Western policy was fixed on a 
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course of Russian isolation rather than integration: ‘Considering that the West, through its 
action, is demonstrating an increasingly cautious attitude towards Russia and has embarked 
on a course aimed more at its isolation than at its proper integration into international 
structures, we do not have to do as much to gear our actions to consolidate power on a new 
ideological and political basis to the West’s reaction to this process.’555 The argument 
concerning the West’s tendency to push its own agenda and disregard Russia’s was very 
strong in Russia. As Kostantin Kosachev has put it: ‘In the eyes of the West, NATO is the 
main, if not the only, universal and irreplaceable security structure in the world. This attitude 
explains the tendency to deliberately devalue the UN role in security matters, and the desire 
to place all the eggs of the OSCE into one humanitarian basket. Other security structures, for 
example, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, are not viewed as potential partners, 
since any alternative collective security systems are out of the question.’556  
The OSCE’s place in Russian foreign policy is very much two faced and therefore very 
contradictory. In Russia at the beginning of the 1990s the OSCE was viewed as an alternative 
to NATO which increased the suspicion in the West. At the same time Russia helped to 
develop the OSCE in the way that it found its place in the post-Cold War world. The OSCE 
assistance group in Chechnya was one of the best examples and became the flagship of how 
the OSCE could be used. The OSCE is also the framework where Russia has been, can and 
will be pushing the idea of a pan-European security architecture. The Russia-NATO 
relationship is therefore a central aspect when analysing the OSCE’s place in Russian foreign 
policy, but that remains outside the scope of this study.  
The OSCE should have been the organisation where institutionalism ought to have 
worked best after the fall of the Soviet Union, since Russia was already a member and the 
historical role of the Soviet Union as the founding member, should have added positively to 
the possibilities. The reality turned out different. The OSCE became a framework where 
power politics, especially relations between the USA and Russia, dominated. This was also 
down to historical aspects, feelings that did not disappear overnight, when the Soviet Union 
fell. One of the biggest misperceptions in Russia-West relations in the early 1990s was over 
the question of how Russia-West relations would develop. Russians assumed that Russia 
would be directly differentiated from the Soviet Union. This was incorrect. The Russian 
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Federation had to carry on its shoulders the historical inheritance of the Soviet Union that 
played very negatively, especially in the framework of the OSCE. The West was prepared to 
give the benefit of the doubt to Russia, but wanted to see some significant changes in Russian 
policies, while covering its own back, before it was ready to compromise. Chechnya became 
a policy tool for the West in that respect as well as a huge burden for Russia. Russian 
attempts to turn the conflict in its favour by first working with the OSCE and than trying to 
find common ground in the war on terrorism failed.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
The principals of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act are still relevant today for Russian foreign 
policy, even if the interpretation of the Helsinki process differs between Russia and the West 
on the process.557 The OSCE was, in the minds of many Russian foreign policy elites, the 
prototype of an international organisation where security questions could be handled. For the 
Soviet Union the OSCE was an important channel through which to cooperate with the West 
in security matters, a middle ground between the Warsaw pact and NATO. For Russians the 
OSCE, after the fall of the Soviet Union, was to replace NATO and create a pan-European 
security organisation. Since this was not on the cards Russian criticism towards the 
organisation increased year by year. Russian criticism of the OSCE reached its height fifteen 
years after the fall of the Soviet Union, with Putin’s February 2007 comments in Munich 
(page 189). Chechnya is also much to be blamed in the development of the Russia-OSCE 
relationship. 
 The Soviet Union enjoyed always the hard security aspects that were needed for 
greatpowerness, but its weaknesses were always in the soft security and governance 
framework. Gorbachev started the trend to include soft security aspects and even good 
governance into Soviet greatpowerness. Paradoxically, the process that was meant to bring 
Russia and the West closer together and show Russian ‘greatness’ in other matters than hard 
security, revealed the big differences in understanding between the West and Russia. In the 
case of Russia and the OSCE the Chechen case shows that the tensions between Russia and 
the West were deep rooted and very easily revived. The concept of ‘cold peace’ was born out 
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of rather different interpretations over European security arrangements in general. This drift 
was reinforced by both the wars in Chechnya. 
Russians did indicate, as in the case of the CoE in the spirit of multilateralism, that 
OSCE could play a constructive role in the first Chechen war. However their idea was that 
the involvement would be under Russian control. Russians seem to see the first Chechen war 
as the first case for the new OSCE to become a platform for post-Soviet mediation. The view 
from the OSCE side was different. Russia was seen as one of its cases, not as one of the 
shapers of the organisation. Russian views were neglected. Russians also felt that OSCE 
member states ganged up to take advantage of Russian initiatives to have OSCE involvement 
in Chechnya. That situation aroused Russia’s Great Power identity. The aspiration towards 
becoming a modern Great Power, that was perhaps the Russian idea behind developing the 
OSCE and Russia’s role in it, came into conflict with the traditional Great Power concept. It 
was clear that Russia was not ready to drop its position as a one of the world’s Great Powers. 
When the more Eurasianist line in Russian foreign policy took over from that of the 
westernisers with the change of foreign ministers from Kozyrev to Primakov, this return to 
traditionalism was also connected to the change in Russian attitude towards the OSCE. 
Without the first Chechen war, the Westernisers in the Russian foreign policy elite might 
have had a chance, but the domestic political situation created by the war removed any 
possibility of their ascendancy. 
Russian domestic reporting on the 1999 Istanbul OSCE summit showed clearly  how 
important it was to portray Russia as a strong power with an independent line. It has always 
been a worry for Russians if their line has been opposed to the West, often giving rise to 
ressentiment politics, but the Russian response has not been to show a consolidating line. It 
has been more important that Russia appears a strong player in global politics. The Istanbul 
summit was a watershed in Russia’s relations with all the European based international 
organisations, not only the OSCE. The effects were seen in the cases of the CoE and the EU 
as well. From that point onwards Russia embarked on a less cooperative line with all of the 
three organisations. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
The study of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation since 1991 inherited much of 
the methodology of Kremlinology. This was a method of investigating Soviet domestic and 
international political developments based in large part on deduction from extremely limited 
sources. Scholarship on the international politics of the Soviet Union remained largely 
divorced from mainstream international relations research throughout the Cold War and into 
the early 1990s. Following Christer Pursiainen, who analysed the possibilities of applying 
liberal, realist and constructivist international relations approaches to the case of Russia, this 
dissertation began with an overview of these three schools of international relations theory, 
which have most commonly been engaged with Russian foreign policy studies. When 
international relations theory was applied to post-Soviet Russia, initially it was the Liberal 
school of thought that dominated. This was in line with an approach adopted by policy-
makers as well as some academics, who espoused an almost teleological idea of transition 
which offered Western models as the cure for all of the Soviet hangovers. In many ways this 
approach mirrored the mistakes of the modernisation theorists of the 1950s, with the 
difference that it was market forces that had priority over democratisation in holding the key 
to progress.  
In this atmosphere it was natural for political scientists to also analyse Russian foreign 
policy in terms of efforts to integrate into the Western world in political as well as economic 
terms. This was, after all, the central message of Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ which 
Boris Yeltsin inherited, and Russian cooperation in the first Iraq War signalled the highpoint 
of multilateral order through the United Nations. Russia’s keenness to join or step up its role 
in international organisations after the end of the Cold War, as well as to accept the advice of 
Western economists in domestic reforms and international trade, gave further support to the 
Liberal analysis. 
The early expectations of a smooth integration were soon disappointed, however, not 
least by Yeltsin’s actions in Chechnya. This revealed that Russia was prepared to pursue its 
own agendas in the face of international disapproval, and tensions between Russia and the 
West emerged over NATO expansion, the Balkans, missile defence, and the Middle East. As 
long as concrete Russian interests could be seen behind each of these disagreements, they 
gave more fuel to the Realist school of international relations in explaining Russia.  
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These developments did not mean an end, however, to the liberal school’s interpretation 
of Russian foreign policy. Russia still pursued integration internationally, and achieved much 
through its partnership with NATO followed by the Russia-NATO Council, joining the G7 to 
make it the G8, and so on. At the same time, however, leading academics from the 
constructivist school were turning their attention to Russia. Identity as a source of foreign 
policy became an increasingly popular notion as President Putin seemed to be injecting 
ideology into his foreign policy messages. As Christopher Browning noted in 2006, Putin’s 
position on all major foreign policy issues has been ambiguous, reflecting uncertainty over 
whether to emphasise what Russia has in common with Europe or rather its differences.558 
This meant that liberals, realists and constructivists could continue to debate the key drivers 
of Russian foreign policy. 
As discussed in chapter 2, when it comes to the broader picture of a unipolar world 
dominated by the USA, Russia has not lived up to realist expectations any more than it did 
earlier on to the liberal ones. One approach adopted by Russia specialists has been to see 
elements of liberalism, realism and constructivism as more or less useful for the 
understanding of Russian foreign policy, depending on the particular time, issue, and 
organisations involved. Old-style Kremlinology has also undergone something of a revival, 
as a result of  the relatively closed nature of the Putin regime, but when it comes to 
theoretical approaches to Russian foreign policy it is exclusively the major schools of 
liberalism, realism and constructivism that  have been engaged, with other approaches 
marginalised by the closed nature of Russian politics. As shown in chapter 3, different 
Russian institutions do take different approaches to foreign policy priorities which can also 
be related to the liberal, realist and constructivist schools, which further strengthens the case 
for focussing on these three schools of international relations theory when it comes to 
understanding the foreign policy of Russia.  
Hence, in its theoretical approach, this dissertation has focussed on the constructivist, 
liberal and realist schools which have dominated studies of Russian foreign policy. Rather 
than seeking to support exclusively one school of thought as providing the correct framework 
for the study of Russian international relations, this dissertation has focussed on a particular 
aspect – Greatpowerness – which can be of relevance to all three approaches, but which 
analytically falls into the constructivist framework due to the fact that greatpowerness is a 
question of state and national identity.  
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The central finding of the dissertation - that in terms of international institutions elements 
of Greatpowerness can be seen at work across the entire spectrum of Russian politics and in 
different institutional contexts - does not only provide greater understanding of an important 
specific aspect of Russian foreign policy. In identifying factors which persist across time and 
individuals, it also goes beyond both single-school explanations, and the approach of those 
scholars who have attempted to identify liberalism, realism and constructivism as at work at 
different times. This therefore provides some counterweight to the claim that Russian policies 
are often in flux. By looking at greatpowerness through different international relations 
theory lenses a more consistent underlying picture emerges. 
The definitions of a great power offered by leading proponents of each school, which are 
summarised in chapter 2.3, illustrate important differences on the question of what constitutes 
a great power, differences which in turn are important when it comes to alternative political 
understandings of the position of particular powers in the world. The chapter went on to 
argue that, by contrast, greatpowerness, as a form of self-definition, has not been subjected in 
the same way to alternative definitions. As a form of state identity, greatpowerness has 
mostly been taken up by the constructivist school, as described in 2.4, where it is offered 
against the realist school as an explanation of certain aspects of foreign policy behaviour 
which do not always match objective interests of states.  
Chapter 3 explained how greatpowerness in foreign policy can be closely linked to the 
needs of domestic policy, and goes on to describe the specific characteristics of 
greatpowerness in the Russian case. These features – imperialism, expansionism, sovereignty, 
ressentiment, isolationism, multilateralism and multipolarity – have all been repeatedly noted 
by both historians and political scientists as being present in Russian political thinking across 
a range of periods and contexts. Hence they are described as the persistent factors in Russian 
foreign policy, each of which can be linked to Russian greatpowerness. 
The task of chapters five, six and seven was then to trace how greatpowerness based on 
these persistent factors was at work in Russia’s experience of membership in three different 
international organisations. The context of this analysis was provided by the Chechen wars 
which sharpened the instances where the persistent factors in Russian greatpowerness clashed 
with other possible foreign policy priorities. As explained in chapter four, the domestic 
political arena as it was shaped by the Chechen wars provides the background to the 
interaction between Russia and international organisations. The chapter highlighted the 
differences between the first and second wars: whereas in the first Chechen wars public and 
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elite attitudes were split, there was more open protest, and hence it was harder for Russia to 
present a strong front in international contexts, in the second war Russia was more united and 
its foreign policy interactions were more confident, reflecting more clearly the great power 
aspirations. The tensions between ideas of Europeanness, modernity, and greatpowerness 
were also seen in Russian debates about the Chechen wars, which spilled over into foreign 
policy behaviour. 
From the point of view of Russian self-perception as a Great Power, its participation in 
the Council of Europe has proved the most successful. Firstly, this was because the 
organisation itself was largely a prestige organisation, and secondly because Russia was able 
to establish itself as one of the ‘big five’ in the CoE. Here, however, there were also clashes 
over values. When it came to it, Russia’s commitment to multilateralism was not great 
enough when it appeared that the principle of sovereignty and the territorial aspects 
associated with imperialism were called into question. As disagreements sharpened, 
ressentiment also became a factor, but the fear of isolationism as a countervailing force led to 
compromise and a more successful Russian integration in the CoE than in other bodies. Here 
we also saw how the liberal definition of a Great Power, which includes adherence to certain 
international norms and values, and which can be seen in the attitude of other CoE members, 
was not compatible with Russian greatpowerness. 
Likewise, the issue of human rights interfered in Russia’s relationship with the European 
Union. Ultimately, Russian greatpowerness provided one of the obstacles to closer economic 
integration with the EU, since Russian self-perception was out of line with the EU’s view of 
Russia. From the Russian perspective the EU never treated Russia as an equal, but acted as a 
superior political entity. As a result the experience of the 1990s affected later Russia-EU 
relations with strong feelings of ressentiment. In chapter 6 we also noticed an interesting 
contrast between Russia-EU relations during the first Chechen war and during the second 
Chechen war. It showed that criticisms from the EU side were less pronounced during the 
second war, when the War on Terror provided a context where Russia was able to operate 
more freely with less official condemnation. Western governments were more open to 
charges of hypocrisy when they were themselves enacting legislation which restricted human 
rights in the wake of 9/11, but a further factor was that the international alliance against 
terrorism provided a greater impetus to the imperialist and multipolar aspects of Russian 
greatpowerness. 
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The OSCE, with which Russia had a longer history and initially showed the greatest 
commitment to, illustrated most clearly of all the significance of greatpowerness. Russia was 
willing to build up the OSCE as an effective organisation, one which could perhaps eclipse 
NATO as a security organisation, and allowed the OSCE a monitoring mission in the first 
Chechen war. However, chapter seven showed that it was the OSCE’s failure to treat Russia 
as a Great Power rather than just one of many members which first led to tensions. The 
conflict in Chechnya turned Russia into a case for the OSCE to intervene in, which precluded 
Russia from assuming what it saw as its rightful place as a leading force in the organisation. 
Analysing Russian foreign policy through its interactions with international 
organizations – in this case the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe – it is clear that a strong Russian state identity based 
on greatpowerness has emerged. This Russian feeling of greatpowerness has been injected 
into foreign policy as an ideology.  There has always been a tension, however, between this 
great power identity and Russia’s desire to integrate in certain respects with Europe. The case 
studies in this thesis show that integration has proved much easier where cooperation does 
not threaten Russia’s great power status.  
The wars in Chechnya provided the ideal tool for highlighting this tension between 
Russian greatpowerness and Russian europeanness. Sometimes an internal conflict can reveal 
hidden agendas better than anything else. The contradiction between Russian genuine desires 
to be part of the West (Europe) and to be integrated into Western based multilateral 
organizations on the one hand and Russian Great Power identity on the other, revealed by the 
Chechen wars, plays a role in each of the three case studies. From the Western perspective 
Great Power status was understood as influence and status gained by hard and soft power 
combined with good governance. While this was clearly what Russia was also aiming at in 
the early 1990s, differences over the key elements of greatpowerness emerged, based on the 
different understanding of the persistent factors identified here as parts of Russian 
greatpowerness.  Breaking down Russian greatpowerness, we can see it playing a role in each 
of the three cases. The emphasis is on different elements, but the same common factor of 
greatpowerness is found in all three. 
Russian state identity as a Great Power and the different perceptions of Russia and the 
West as to what makes a state a Great Power in the contemporary world order are among the 
factors that complicate cooperation between Russia and Western countries. Mistrust and 
misperceptions, historical and even more recent events (the case studies in this thesis) and the 
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interplay of the persistent factors stem in part from the big pull in Russian foreign policy 
identity between greatpowerness and europeanness. By examining in depth greatpowerness 
as an aspect of Russian foreign policy making through the cases of international 
organisations, this study contributes to a better understanding of problems in Russia-West 
relations and adds an aspect to identity studies in general, the effect of greatpowerness. 
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